Commentary

Volume Fifty-seven, Number Three, March 1974

England in Crisis
Rudolf Klein

Literary Terrorism
Renee Winegarten

Spinoza and the Colonel
Milton Himmelfarb

The Myth of Malcolm Lowry
George Woodcock

"The Exorcist" & Its Audience
William S. Pechter

Books in Review:
Jane Larkin Crain
Elliott Abrams
David Singer
Herman Belz
Alan L. Mintz
Edward N. Luttwak

PUBLISHED BY THE
AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE/$1.25

The Specter of Eugenics
Charles Frankel

Israel After the War

WALTER LAQUEUR:
Peace With Egypt?

HANOCH BARTOV:
Back to Abnormal

DAVID VITAL:
The Need for Political Change

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Salem refreshes naturally.

- Naturally grown menthol.
- Rich natural tobacco taste.
- No harsh, hot taste.

King or Super King

© 1974 R J REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO

Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.

KING: 19 mg. "tar", 1.3 mg. nicotine,
SUPER KING: 19 mg. "tar", 1.4 mg. nicotine, av. per cigarette, FTC Report SEPT. '73.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



On January 10, 1975 Queen Elizabeth 2 will sail on her first voyage around the world. 80 days, from $4,800 to $86,240.

On a cold Friday night in January, The Greatest Ship in the World will slip from New York harbor to circumnavigate the earth. She will return at nine in the morning on Monday, March 31st.

Around the world in 80 days.

Her itinerary includes the most fascinating and exotic ports of call on four continents and seven seas. She'll sail to Curaçao and Cape Town, Mombasa and Mahé in the Seychelles, Bombay and Bali, Hong Kong and Honolulu and fourteen other ports in between. She will, of course, cross the international date line and the equator, and sail through the Panama Canal.

Queen Elizabeth 2 is the perfect world cruiser. She was built as both a transatlantic liner and cruise ship. As a result she is capable of great port-to-port speed, allowing more time in major ports. It would take slower ships many more days to traverse her glamorous route and would require a proportionately higher fare.

Queen Elizabeth 2 is magnificent inside and out. She's 65,000 tons and 13 stories high. Her staterooms and public rooms have been designed by noted interior designers. And there is a great variety of things to see and do aboard her; nearly as much as there is in many of the ports to which she can take you.

Queen Elizabeth 2 will provide a dimension of comfort and luxury never before known on a world cruise. Room for room, her staterooms are the largest afloat and nearly three-quarters have a view of the sea. The service is British, and impeccable; with two crew members for every three passengers.

The food will be impeccable as well. You will be travelling with three of the world's most superb restaurants. Each has an ocean view. Each has its own kitchen. Each has only one sitting, so dining is relaxed and unhurried. And the food will be, in preparation and presentation, some of the best the world has to offer.

Because it is her premiere world cruise and space is limited many of the most desirable staterooms are being reserved. If you would like to reserve space, or if you would like more information, simply call your Travel Agent. Or write Cunard, 555 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10017. We'll be happy to send you our brochure.

Queen Elizabeth 2

The Greatest Ship in the World®

Great Ships of British Registry since 1840.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Commentary

VOLUME 57 NUMBER 3 *MARCH 1974*

Articles
25 The Specter of Eugenics *Charles Frankel*
34 Israel After the War: 1
Peace With Egypt? *Walter Laqueur*
41 Israel After the War: 2
Back to Abnormal *Hanoch Bartov*
46 Israel After the War: 3
The Need for Political Change *David Vital*
51 England in Crisis *Rudolf Klein*
58 Literary Terrorism *Renee Winegarten*

In the Community
67 Spinoza and the Colonel *Milton Himmelfarb*

Observations
71 The Myth of Malcolm Lowry *George Woodcock*

Movies
73 "The Exorcist" and Its Audience *William S. Pechter*

Letters
4 from *Oded Remba, Alfred B. Mason, John W. Bowling, Theodore Draper, Albert Parry, Louis Sheaffer, H. T. Rowe, Will Maslow, George Gruen, Christopher Niebuhr, Earl Raab,* and others

Books in Review
76 Burr, by Gore Vidal *Jane Larkin Crain*
78 Paradise Lost, by Emma Rothschild *Elliott Abrams*
84 The Mask Jews Wear, by Eugene B. Borowitz *David Singer*
86 The Emerging Nations and the American Revolution; Seven Who Shaped Our Destiny, by Richard B. Morris *Herman Belz*
94 The Seduction of the Spirit, by Harvey Cox *Alan L. Mintz*
97 The Devil and John Foster Dulles, by Townsend Hoopes *Edward N. Luttwak*

Editor: Norman Podhoretz
Executive Editor: Neal Kozodoy
Managing Editor: Marion Magid
Associate Editors: Brenda Brown, Maier Deshell
Contributing Editors: Robert Alter, Milton Himmelfarb, Walter Laqueur
Editorial Assistant: Yvonne M. Lancaster
Business Manager: Ronald Greene
Production Manager: Bruce Lodi
Cover: The Drawing Board, Inc.

COMMENTARY is published monthly by the American Jewish Committee—Single copy is $1.25; $12 a year; 3 years $32; 5 years $48—Add $2.00 per year for Canada and Latin America; $3.00 for other foreign—Second class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional mailing offices.

Copyright © 1974 by the American Jewish Committee; all rights reserved under International and Pan American Copyright Conventions—Indexed in *Readers' Guide, Book Review Digest, Public Affairs Information Service, Index to Jewish Periodicals, ABC Pol Sci, Historical Abstracts,* and *America: History and Life*—Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope.

EDITORIAL & BUSINESS OFFICES: 165 E. 56th St., New York, N.Y. 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A sip of Sabra should never be hurried. It took 5000 years to get to you.

Sabra. The liqueur with roots that reach back to antiquity. With a taste as unique as Israel. The ancient land from which it comes.

A desert that became green and bloomed orange. With trees bearing Jaffa oranges, laden with a rich nectar to tempt all people.

Sabra.

The joyous liqueur that ever so carefully blends the exotic flavor of the Middle East with a hint of the world's finest chocolate. To create a drink that should be enjoyed more like a cognac than a cordial.

First by savoring its exquisite bouquet, and then very slowly sipping its exquisite flavor. The past five thousand years will rest on the tip of your palate.

You'll discover that "liqueur" is a very thin word to describe the experience that Israel would share with you.

Sabra. From the land of milk and honey. And oranges.



IMPORTED AND BOTTLED BY PARK AVENUE IMPORTS, 375 PARK AVENUE, N.Y.C. 60 PROOF

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Statement of Aims

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. Its pages will be hospitable to diverse points of view and belief, and it hopes to encourage original creative endeavor in the various fields of culture. The opinions and views expressed by COMMENTARY's contributors and editors are their own, and do not necessarily express the Committee's viewpoint or position. The sponsorship of COMMENTARY by the Committee is in line with its general program to enlighten and clarify public opinion on problems of Jewish concern, to fight bigotry and protect human rights, and to promote Jewish cultural interest and creative achievement in America.

AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
Elmer L. Winter, *President*

The Commentary Publication Committee

Maurice Glinert, *Chairman*

Eli M. Black
Donald M. Blinken
Charles D. Breitel
Edward E. Elson
Richard C. Ernst
Robert H. Haines
Sydney M. Kaye
Lewis J. Laventhol
Richard Maass
Bess Myerson
Ned Pines
Frederick P. Rose
David Sher
John Slawson
Harry Steiner
Alan M. Stroock*
Laurence A. Tisch
Ben Touster
Gerard Weinstock

**Honorary Member*

Letters from Readers

1967 and 1973

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Theodore Draper's basic thesis in his provocative article ["From 1967 to 1973: The Arab-Israeli Wars," December 1973] is that Egypt's political decision to go to war in October 1973 goes back two years, that the Soviet Union was implicated in this decision and was "up to its neck in this war," and that the "Soviets prepared this war under cover of the détente."

Mr. Draper's detailed reconstruction of the events which culminated in the 1967 war is particularly valuable, providing significant insights into what he terms the legend of "Israeli aggression" in that war. But the account of the developments leading to the 1973 war falls short of providing a full understanding of the complex forces at work in the period preceding the war, given the information available at the time of writing at the end of October. Nor does the article offer an adequate framework for analyzing the new realities which clearly emerged soon after the war, above all, the growing Arab oil power. If the Yom Kippur War has taught us any lesson, it is that one must constantly re-evaluate the shifting web of forces at play in the Middle East in a balanced, thorough, and openminded manner to discern emerging trends and new realities.

The Egyptian-Syrian decision to launch the coordinated attack can be explained in terms of three major interrelated factors: 1) assurance of Soviet military and political support; 2) mounting domestic pressures for renewed fighting, mainly from field military commanders, on President Sadat, whose political position had been weakened in the year preceding the war; and 3) the newly formed alliance between the oil-producing countries and the frontline Arab states. This entente, particularly between the leading nations in each group (Saudi Arabia and Egypt), unleashed the use of oil as a political weapon and opened the treasuries of the oil-rich states to Egypt and Syria.

While Mr. Draper presents a forceful exposition of the majority, though still disputed, view that Moscow was involved in a substantial way in planning the Egyptian-Syrian war, he has nothing to say about the internal power struggle in Egypt and the challenges to Sadat's precarious domestic political position from the army and to a lesser extent from Libya's Colonel Qaddafi as factors inducing the Egyptian leader to go to war. But still more serious is the total absence—except for a casual and oversimplified statement that Saudi Arabia's Faisal is paying Egypt not only to fight Israel but to spend energies that might be directed against him—of any analysis of Arab oil power as an increasingly important dimension in the Arab-Israel conflict. This is all the more surprising in view of the author's own assertion that "the inter-Arab aspect of every Arab-Israeli war should not be neglected or underrated."

Mr. Draper is at his best in shattering the illusions about the Soviet-American détente. But he neglects to observe that as the euphoria of détente was spreading in the U.S., two other major dramas were unfolding: an unmistakable shift of power from the oil-consuming to the oil-producing countries and the forging of new inter-Arab relationships. The rise in Arab oil power has been fairly clear since the Teheran agreement of February 1971 (which resulted in major increases in posted prices of crude oil); its threatened use in the Arab-Israeli conflict was abundantly clear for six months prior to October.

The two key developments in the more recent period were Saudi Arabia's well coordinated campaign, starting in April 1973, to use oil as a political weapon and King Faisal's pledge of more than $1 billion to strengthen Egypt's armed forces. The threatened use of oil as a weapon represented a sharp reversal of Faisal's long-standing policy that oil and politics do not mix; its ostensible intent has been to pressure the U.S. to compel Israel to meet the standard Arab demands on withdrawal from all occupied territories and restoration of the rights of the Palestine refugees. The financial commitment assured Egypt it could pay for new massive shipments of Soviet arms which have been made available to the Arabs on the basis of cash sales or barter arrangements.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the Passover Seder



No one will drink from this cup. It's Elijah's cup. It's a tradition.
The unleavened bread is a tradition.
And the egg and bitter herbs are a tradition.

Manischewitz wishes you a happy Passover.
That's a tradition, too.

Produced under strict Rabbinical Supervision.
Kashruth Certificate available upon request.
Manischewitz Wine Co., New York, N. Y. 11232

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I love you for your mind.

KAHLÚA®
& Coffee.
What a cozy idea.

Kahlúa added to steaming hot coffee. Further enhanced by a twist of lemon or lime. Delicious! Do send for the Kahlúa Recipe Book. It's free. Because you deserve something nice.

Kahlúa. Coffee Liqueur from Sunny Mexico.
53 Proof. Jules Berman & Assoc.,
116 No. Robertson Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif. 90048

The motives behind Faisal's new role and his alliance with Sadat are too varied and complex to develop here; they involve economic and political considerations on personal, domestic, and inter-Arab levels for both Faisal and Sadat. But the basic rationale for the new relationship was that for the first time the political interests of the "confrontation" countries coincided with the economic interests of the oil-producing states. These economic interests include a growing concern over the conservation of their exhaustible resources at a time when surpluses of oil revenues are depreciating in value due to inflation and devaluations as well as the desire for greater control over production, export, and pricing of their indigenous resources.

The Arab-Israeli conflict afforded the Arab oil states a useful pretext for taking measures essentially based on these economic interests, attempting to derive political fringe benefits for the Arab cause at the same time. The October War presented a well-timed opportunity to increase Arab oil power further by using all the weapons available to the oil states—selective embargoes, overall output cutbacks, nationalizations, and sharply increased prices. The potentially damaging effect of the oil weapon had been realized by certain experts for some time, but its awesome power came to be fully recognized only after the war when it was used with considerable skill and daring by the Arab states, acting in a unified fashion and at a time of tightened world supply. The successful use of the oil weapon in the wake of the 1973 war sharply contrasts with its totally ineffective use in the 1967 war, another factor overlooked by Mr. Draper in his comparison of the two wars.

The oil wealth has endowed the Arab states with immense economic and political power which has significantly shifted the balance of overall power between them and Israel. Contrary to Mr. Draper's assessment, which excludes the oil factor, time is indeed working in the Arabs' favor. Despite the resurgence of Arab disunities, oil has also altered the balance of power between the Arab world and the rest of the world, including the superpowers. Oil power has given the Arab world as a whole, or groups of Arab states, greater leverage and maneuverability in international affairs. This leverage has enabled the Arab world to buy advanced weapons from both East and West, to dictate the diplomatic positions of Japan and Western Europe on the Arab-Israeli issue while continuing to count on the unrestrained backing of the Communist bloc, to drive a wedge between the U.S. and most of its allies, to compel or persuade most African nations to break off diplomatic ties with Israel, and to dominate more firmly than before voting patterns at the UN.

The great irony about the current display of Arab oil power—and its major potential weakness other than the possible reappearance of debilitating rivalries—is that it poses serious dangers not only to Israel's existence but to the economic growth and financial stability of Western Europe, Japan, and the Third World. The threat to the American economy is far less severe because of its relatively lesser dependence on Arab oil. Only a unified effort on the part of the West can effectively counter the already detrimental impact and future abuses of this power.

ODED REMBA
Department of Economics
Staten Island Community College
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Theodore Draper tells us how the myth that gave us Hitler's war, the "stab-in-the-back" myth, is now generating World War III in the Middle East. We expect warmongers to be obsessed by myths . . . but the outlook would not be so grim if our peacemakers were not just as susceptible to their own varieties of myth. Alas, we find that statesmen and journalists are no better than the men of war when it comes to myths. They seem to have learned nothing since Neville Chamberlain's day. It might be worthwhile, therefore, to generalize a bit on this myth-making tendency. For I am as convinced as Mr. Draper is that both kinds of myth lead to wars.

The trouble seems to start with "simplification," the very human desire to avoid conflicting emotions. We would rather have all the signs pointing the same way. . . . The peacemakers as well as the warmongers are driven by the need for simplification. When you have no alternative to peace, it is unthinkable that there might be valid (even though inadequate)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tires
batteries
shock absorbers
fan belts
wiper blades
washer fluid
lamps
transmission fluid
brake fluid
road maps
etc.

You expect more from Amoco
and you get it. ™

Amoco Oil Company

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BACK ISSUES

For new subscribers and old friends. Back issues of Commentary are now available at $1.50 while they last.



MARCH 1971



APRIL 1973



AUGUST 1971


Commentary
The New Egalitarianism & the Old
The Conversion of the Jews
Moral Education and the Schools
A Dissent on Pynchon
Mumford in Retrospect
Politics in Film
AN APPOINTMENT WITH WATERGATE
SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & EARL RAAB

SEPTEMBER 1973



NOVEMBER 1972



OCTOBER 1973



FEBRUARY 1973

COMMENTARY SLIPCASE



The convenient way to preserve and organize your issues of Commentary. Each 9" x 12" slipcase of blue Boltoflex with "Commentary" stamped in gold-leaf, holds 12 issues.

1-3 slipcases $5.00 ea. 4-9 slipcases $4.50 ea. 10 or more slipcases $4.00 ea. (add 25 cents per slipcase for shipping)

Commentary 165 EAST 56 STREET NYC 10022

Please send me the following back issues at $1.50 each _____

Please send _____ slipcases at $_____ each.

Enclosed is my check for a total of $_____

(Commentary pays all packing & shipping costs)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

reasons to fight. So the peacemakers refuse to recognize the existence of dangerous aggressors who cannot be stopped short of war. . . .

If the aggressors get into a fight with anyone else, particularly if there seem to be indications that we ought to participate for one reason or another, we have to prove that the aggressors aren't really aggressors, that there was some sort of justification for their behavior, that the victims somehow deserved what they got, even that the people who argue for our intervention are doing it for some sinister reason. The result is that in such a dilemma the "bad guys" prove to be whichever side is safe to frustrate—i.e., least likely to start or widen a war if they cannot get what they want. . . .

A remarkable amount of 20th-century history can be fitted into this generalization. In the late 1930's the U.S. had little sympathy for Hitler; it remained for Britain, whose peace was most directly menaced by Germany, to find justifications for the German dictator and to sneer loftily at the importunate Czechs (cf. Saigon in more recent times). As Hitler's successes became a serious challenge to the U.S., talk spread through this country about the conniving British who always find somebody else to fight their wars for them.

After the war, "atomic stalemate" was hailed as the force that would bring permanent peace to erring mankind. Yet even an atomic monopoly in the hands of its chief enemy did not stop Soviet expansion into Europe and Asia. By contrast, with the first suggestion that "stalemate" might be at hand, first Europe and later the U.S. became committed to the "no-alternative-to-peace policy.". . .

Each example described here shows the pressure that works on the peace-committed to exonerate the most dangerous players and put the blame on everyone else. For if no reasons can be considered sufficient to make us fight, sooner or later we must sacrifice something that isn't trivial. . . .

ALFRED B. MASON
Huntington Beach, California

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Once again, Theodore Draper has enlightened and doubtless annoyed many experts by exposing fuzzy illusions to the cold hard light of historical fact. Also, he has raised two points which have

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a validity far beyond the subject matter of the article. First, as a retired professional diplomatist with more than twenty-five years' experience, I note with particular interest his emphasis on the relative predictive value of a regime's overt communications to its own people as against its covert communications to foreign governments or even its overt communications to foreign peoples.

I know of no diplomatic service in the world which subjects the first category listed above to regular, careful, and scientific analysis. Most governments, including that of the U.S., do not even record the radio and press commentary of foreign governments directed to their own peoples. Off-the-record interviews with famous journalists and cozy *tête-à-têtes* with foreign ambassadors are subject to the most minute scrutiny as probably predictive of the behavior of, say, Nasser's Egypt, but his propaganda to his own people is often not even noticed or translated into English.

It is a basic rule of politics that no regime can for long act deliberately in a way contrary to the way it has declared it will act. To do so at other than rare intervals will simply destroy the foundation of any regime—its legitimacy. The professional *raison d'être* of an ambassador or other high official or famous journalist, however, requires that he regard privileged conversations or exchanges of letters with foreign leaders as containing the ultimate clues to the future behavior of those leaders. The official or journalist who has been flattered and elevated by the honor of exchanging information and opinions confidentially with a "great man" will tend to act to some extent as an advocate for his eminent confidant, and to dismiss the analysis of public communications as "rhetoric" of interest only to groundlings. It is therefore probable that the magnificent analytical tools represented by the newest techniques of computer-based content analysis will, if and when they are used, be used on the wrong targets: privileged communications.

Mr. Draper has also spotted a long-festering problem of peacemongering in the era of the United Nations, the possibility of a small-state regime resorting to arms but escaping the risks which normally inhibit a resort to arms. The biggest inhibiting risk is, naturally, defeat. In the present age of UN cease-fires it is all too common for a defeated tactical aggressor (the wise man will lay aside the identification of the strategic aggressor in any conflict as a question fit for the judgment of the Supreme Arbiter only) not only to escape military countermeasures by his victim but to persuade his own people that his arms were victorious and that any deprivation of the fruits of victory was the result of trickery, machinations of conspirators, and the intervention of malevolent superpowers.

Unfortunately, while all this is most welcome to the regime which starts a war and proceeds to lose it, it evolves quickly into a political and military time-bomb which practically guarantees another war. Having "proven" his military superiority to his own people, our hero, whether he be a Nasser or an Ayub Khan or a Kim Il Sung, cannot arrive at a diplomatic compromise which takes account of his military inferiority. To do so would put him under intolerable pressure from rival leaders who could prove by his own words that the proffered compromise is a sell-out; persistence on his part would result in his removal from power. He or his successor will eventually be forced to renew the war, unless by virtue of some outside political force, the military victors could be forced to accept a peace of the defeated. The only other course of action would be suicidal for our protagonist—he would have to confess to his own populace, or to large and important segments of it, that he deliberately lied about the military results of the conflict.

There is a certain stability in a raw power-politics world. That stability lies in rational calculations of ultimate military capacity, limiting the current objectives of a state. The situation described above changes a positive feedback into a negative one and destabilizes the system. Sadly, the United States has habitually and in the name of peace and stability not only condoned but actually stimulated the syndrome to save the faces and skins of various "good ole boys" of the Third World. A recent horrible example lies in the behavior of Ayub Khan after his 1965 attack on Kashmir and the military defeat which followed it. His own fall and the imbecile exposure of his successor in Bengal were inevitable once he was allowed to get away with disguising defeat as victory. Just as the United States helped Ayub to sustain his pitiful illusion, the United States and the UN will help the military losers in the Middle East. If the Indian army had ignored cease-fires and superpower pressures and advanced on into the Punjab so far that every Pakistani would have had to acknowledge defeat and a corresponding limitation in national objective, the appalling slaughter in Bangladesh would have been alleviated. A military clash may end in a draw, but it cannot end with two victors and no vanquished.

I was once told by an old European diplomatist that a preliminary indicator of how any big negotiation is going lies in whose terminology is being used in public discussions. To the extent that this is true, things look black for the Israelis. "Egyptian territory," or "annexed Jerusalem" or "1948 emigrants" are simply not being used even by the public media in America. Instead, we solemnly discuss the disposition of something called "Arab lands" and "the Palestinians." One recalls an analogous creeping infiltration of North Vietnamese propaganda terms into discussion of factors and alternatives in Southeast Asia.

JOHN W. BOWLING
Troy State University,
Troy, Alabama

THEODORE DRAPER writes:

Oded Remba is right. My article did not, and did not intend to, provide "a full understanding of the complex forces" that led to the October 1973 war. I tried to develop two or three aspects at some length, to touch on others, while ignoring quite a few. I was, after all, writing an article, not a book, and I do not consider myself competent to deal with some of the subjects that interest Mr. Remba.

Alfred B. Mason seems to be flirting with the idea that "the importunate Czechs" of 1938-39 can be equated with the "Saigon" side of the Vietnam war. I doubt whether the relationship of Britain to Czechoslovakia before World War II is any kind of model for the relationship of the United States and South Vietnam three decades later.

John W. Bowling has apparently had some rich diplomatic experiences, the full story of which remains to be told and deserves far more than a letter.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Dissidence

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . In just six pages Lev Navrozov ["On Soviet Dissidence: An Interior View," November 1973] told me what six-hundred pages of some learned sociopolitical tome with twelve-hundred detailed footnotes wouldn't or couldn't. Mr. Navrozov fully acquits the rare promise of his first essay in COMMENTARY, "Getting Out of Russia" [October 1972]. . . .

ALBERT PARRY

Greenwich, Connecticut

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

. . . Because Lev Navrozov is able to turn his intellectual cynicism into subtle probing of moral responsibility and a profile of individuality, he writes with a wit and keenness long missing from Russian letters. . . .

F. D. REEVE

Higganum, Connecticut

O'Neill

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

No one could guess from Jack Richardson's disparagement of my biography ["O'Neill Reconsidered," January] that a great majority of the reviewers praised it highly. . . .

Since all criticism is subjective, I could not legitimately complain if Mr. Richardson simply thought my book unworthy of its subject--that's his opinion, not necessarily fact—but I do have a legitimate grievance when he goes so far as to misrepresent my *O'Neill, Son and Artist*. He claims that I believe "O'Neill's genius was present in almost every play he wrote, an attitude [Sheaffer] substantiates by quoting favorable reviews written at the times of the plays' debuts."

Now listen to Harold Clurman reviewing my book in the January 12 *Nation*: "[Sheaffer's] judgments on O'Neill's plays are in the main quite sound and in several instances particularly perceptive. His attitude toward his subject is sympathetic but *never adulatory* [emphasis added] . . . he has been careful to cite adverse as well as favorable opinion about O'Neill's personality and work." Or to quote Brooks Atkinson again: "Despite Sheaffer's admiration for O'Neill, he is judicious about the value of the plays."

However, I can best refute Mr. Richardson by quoting from my book. At the very start of a chapter, certainly a prominent spot, I say: "Of all the major playwrights, O'Neill is, with little doubt, the most uneven. During the larger part of his career—until in fact the final few years, when he at last found his truest voice—he kept producing, almost alternately, good plays and bad."

Does that sound as though I found "genius" in almost all his plays?

Following are my summary comments on certain of the plays.

The First Man: "A prosaic, unconvincing story . . . a heavy-handed play."

Welded: "A repetitious, wearisome drama . . . a bloodless duel of words, none of it seems real, none of it touches us."

Great God Brown: "Mystical, poetic, at times profound and beautifully written, other times hopelessly pretentious, and eventually so tortuous in its course and so difficult to follow that it becomes exasperating."

Gold: "An old-fashioned sort of work . . . contrived, melodramatic . . . the dialogue tends to be florid and stilted."

The Fountain: "Fell far short of distinction . . . the characters . . . are merely so many mouthpieces for the author's views."

Marco Millions: "Despite its Mardi Gras of characters . . . the play is more surface show than satisfying theater. . . . Marco himself . . . is too consistent, too predictable to be interesting."

Lazarus Laughed: "An overblown mixture of metaphysics and unconvincing drama . . . tireless and tiresome in hammering away at its mystical message."

Dynamo: "Tortuous in its thought, confused in its symbolism, obviously contrived in its story-telling . . . O'Neill dramatized [his subject-matter] with hammer blows through schematic, unconvincing characters."

AUSTRIA
If you long for the good life, come to Austria, the most European country. In this jewel of a vacationland, two thirds the size of New York State, you can find all the marvelous experiences you came to Europe for. There is history. Austria has more castles and palaces to visit than any comparable area in Europe. There are ballets, operas and concerts—a cultural season that goes full tilt 12 months a year. There is scenery. Snow-covered Alps. Mountain lakes. Lush forests and medieval cities—citadels of the arts. There is good eating. Austria's gracious restaurants are known the world over. The elegant and the rustic. Come to Austria. Mozart, Beethoven and Johann Strauss lived there and loved it. You will too.
Austrian National Tourist Office
545 Fifth Avenue
N.Y., N.Y. 10017
Please send me the new colorful brochure about Austria.
Name
Address
City State Zip
AUSTRIA

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Days without End: "Has any other major playwright ever written a play so awkwardly contrived or with such a feeble epiphany?"

To repeat, do the above comments indicate that I was in awe of nearly everything O'Neill wrote?

It is true that I find merit, in various degrees, in certain plays that Mr. Richardson dismisses summarily, namely, *The Emperor Jones, The Hairy Ape, Desire under the Elms, Mourning Becomes Electra*, but I'm not alone in this. Each of these plays has had such champions as Joseph Wood Krutch, Brooks Atkinson, Walter Kerr, and Stark Young.

Singling out *Strange Interlude*, Mr. Richardson writes: "This is a play that even Mr. Sheaffer takes exception to—though at the end of his critique he does make the usual despite-these-many-flaws apology that invariably comes up when an O'Neill worshiper has dared an unflattering remark about the master's work."

Well, here's what I wrote, after detailing the play's deficiencies: "An incredible heroine, a facile application of Freudian thought, a narrative that at times foreshadows today's soap operas, language that rarely rises above the commonplace—it is, in short, easy to fault *Strange Interlude*. Yet, rather paradoxically, its defects testify to the author's achievement [the word "achievement" is not synonymous with "genius"], for the play, in spite of being so flawed, generates considerable force and emotion, and holds one's interest almost continuously through its nine acts."

If *Interlude* was not effective theater in its day, how does one account for the great success of a drama running over four hours? . . . Undoubtedly the play had a kind of snob appeal, it was the one you had to see, but this was certainly not the whole answer to its popularity.

Mr. Richardson, taking a jaundiced view, more or less, of all of O'Neill's plays prior to the great ones of his final period, maintains that nothing in the earlier works prepares us for *Long Day's Journey into Night, The Iceman Cometh,* and *A Moon for the Misbegotten,* then goes on to criticize me for providing "no answers" to O'Neill's transformation into "a master of his art." However, it seems to me that I repeatedly provide clues to the greatness of these plays in my central thesis, namely,

Off Wall Street

Rare U.S. stamp investments outrun inflation... thrive on recession.

Since the end of World War II, rare U.S. stamp values have been spiraling up at rates which may be unbelievable to conventional stock market investors. During the past five years alone, U.S. stamp values have achieved an average annual compounded growth rate of 16.9% — far outpacing the overall performance of mutual funds, the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the average annual increase in consumer prices.



These impressive increases in value are the result of a rapidly increasing demand for the absolutely fixed supply of existing rare U.S. stamps. The supply of U.S. stamps produced in the 19th and early 20th centuries can never be increased. As today's 27 million stamp collectors become more affluent and as thousands of new collectors join their ranks each year, competition for the higher quality stamps of the past will only drive their prices even higher.

Rare U.S. stamp investments are liquid. The ever-increasing demand for investment quality rare U.S. stamps has created a seller's market. There are already many stamps which are very difficult to locate at any price and this situation is spreading to more and more stamps each year. In the future, the demand for these scarce items can only be met by those who have wisely invested in the existing supply.

Rare U.S. stamp investments are completely private. A large investment in rare stamps can be stored safely in a small space — like an album or safe deposit box. No one ever needs to know you are investing in stamps or how much your investment is worth.

Rare U.S. stamp values are not tied to the state of the economy. Based on past performance, rare U.S. stamp values seem to thrive on recession and easily outrun inflation. Remember the 1969-70 recession? In 18 months, the Dow Jones Industrials dropped 360 points, losing over 36% of their value. During the same 18-month period, consumer prices increased 9%. The value of rare U.S. stamps generated an impressive 33% gain!



Our professional new service makes investing in rare U.S. stamps simple. For as little as $25 per month, we will build a rare U.S. stamp investment portfolio for you — for your future. Until now, investing in rare stamps was usually a long, time-consuming and expensive process. It generally required many years of training, great skill, an intimate knowledge of the market and many long hours spent going from auction to auction and from dealer to dealer in an attempt to locate, examine and bargain for sound investment stamps.

Now, through First National Investors, all that effort on your part can be eliminated. For as little as $25 per month — or as much as $50, $100 or even $250 per month, depending on your investment objectives — FNI will build a rare stamp investment portfolio for you on a regular monthly basis. As a subscriber to FNI Rare U.S. Stamp Investments, you are provided the opportunity to capitalize on the experience and know-how of our stamp experts.

To learn more about this exciting new investment opportunity, mail this today.

1st First National Investors INCORPORATED

257 Riverside Ave., Westport, Conn. 06880

Please send complete information on Rare U.S. Stamp Investments plan.

C-1

Name _____

Street _____

City _____

State _____ Zip _____

Limited to residents of the U.S. and Possessions

© 1973 First National Investors, Inc.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The fountain pen that never went out of style

Classics never go out of style. The Pelikan 120 is the great classic fountain pen from Germany, long a favorite of European pen purists. (Now available in America.)

Large visible ink chamber. Convenient screw-plunger filling mechanism. Controlled ink flow. In elegant all-black or two-tone black and green. Choice of ultra-smooth extra fine, fine or medium standard nibs. Also fine, medium and medium oblique italic nibs.

Only $7.50 at artist material and pen shops as well as college book stores. Or send your check to Pentalic Corporation, 132 West 22nd St., New York, N.Y. 10011. State color and nib preference. Add 50¢ for handling.

Pelikan 120

A NEW HARPER TORCHBOOK



PEACEMAKING AND THE IMMORAL WAR

Arabs and Jews in the Middle East

Elias H. Tuma

"Tuma writes with unusual qualifications—born a Palestinian Arab, from 1948-69 an Israeli citizen—now a concerned observer-in-the-middle on the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . . *Convinced peaceful solutions are possible*, Tuma in his well-researched book outlines practical efforts needed by all involved countries in order to bring peace to the Holy Land. Strongly recommended."
—*Choice*

For a complete catalog, write
Harper & Row
Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

TB/1681 $2.25
Cloth TLE/87 $5.50

that O'Neill was an "eternal son" (hence the titles of my two-volume work, *O'Neill, Son and Playwright* and *O'Neill, Son and Artist*) forever analyzing and dramatizing his ambivalent feelings toward his parents, as well as for his brother, under various guises in most of his works, so that when he came to write his masterpieces his entire career before then had been a preparation for his ultimate triumphs as a writer. (*The Iceman Cometh* may seem to stand outside the family plays, but in my original interpretation of this work the leading character, Hickey, is depicted as embodying O'Neill's deepest and darkest feelings toward his mother.)...

LOUIS SHEAFFER
New York City

Evaluating Kissinger

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As one who has always found Walter Laqueur one of COMMENTARY's most interesting and incisive contributors, I was disturbed by the glibness I found in certain sections of his article, "Kissinger and the Politics of Détente" [December 1973].

Mr. Laqueur devotes but one short paragraph to what he calls Mr. Kissinger's "highest" achievement: his effort to end the Vietnam war—or at least direct American participation therein. Conspicuously missing from this reference is any mention of the "secret bombing" of Cambodia and Laos, the terror bombing of Hanoi, the present use of American-trained Thai mercenaries in Laos. . . .

"Détente" seems to me anything but the right description for the circumstances surrounding the Yom Kippur War, which was in effect a war which the superpowers fought by proxy (I am not denying the indigenous roots of the war, only questioning whether it could have been carried out at all, or at least as protractedly and destructively as it was, without the massive arms shipments of the superpowers), and which included a global nuclear alert by the United States, an event which President Nixon himself said was caused by the most serious big-power confrontation since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

I am also puzzled why Mr. Laqueur says nothing at all about what effect Mr. Kissinger's Jewishness will have on his policies, especially with regard to the Middle East crisis. Can we count on the Secretary of State not to "sell out" Israel in the name of détente (or oil), perhaps in part because of his own background and memories? Or will Mr. Kissinger prove to be another Herbert Samuel or Bruno Kreisky, at times "bending over backward" to prove his nonpartisanship? We have already seen some evidence of such behavior in terms of Mr. Kissinger's opposition to the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

Finally, in a period which has seen bitter wars in Nigeria, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, and Vietnam, not to mention numerous acts of guerrilla violence and several bloody coups, I am puzzled to say the least by Mr. Laqueur's assertion near the end of his article that "the last few years have been comparatively calm on the whole. . . ."

DAVID M. SZONYI
West Berlin, Germany

Public Opinion and Israel

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

As ominous as Arab attitudes may be to the survival of Israel, it seems to me that the historic and universal Jewish capacity for self-deception is a greater hazard. Although Earl Raab ["Is Israel Losing Popular Support?" January] takes an objective step, relatively, in assessing current American public opinion toward Israel following the Yom Kippur War, he succumbs to at least two basic fallacies—that the Middle East problem is "foreign policy" and therefore beyond the active ken of the average United States citizen, and that, as regards Israel, the citizenry will go along with Washington.

The cold fact is that the Middle East crisis became domestic crisis when it began to register on the gasoline gauge and the furnace thermostat. A colder fact is that, with a few idealistic exceptions, the U.S. Congressman is interested primarily not in Israel but in re-election. And he creates, rather than reacts to, public opinion only on those esoteric subjects on which he doesn't get an earful from his constituents during the holiday recess.

So, despite the lack of emphasis on the subject in Congressional round-ups of constituents' opinion ("Out Listening to the People," *Time*, January 14, 1974), the Congressmen are getting the message,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Last night, the Ambassador was noticed uptown.

And downtown. In fact, all around town.



Ambassador. Representing Scotch at its lightest.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and it goes something like this: "Sympathize with Israel? Sure I sympathize with Israel. But I sure as hell don't want to have to hold my breath while they make friends with the Arabs, and we get the oil back."

Told that the U.S. gets only about 10 per cent of its oil from the Arab states, Mr. Voter retorts: "Yes, but that's the 10 per cent I need to get to work. . . ."

So polls that ask questions about "sympathy" for Israel are about as meaningful as polls sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union, a major advocate of impeachment, asking if the respondent considers Nixon "guilty" of "charges" in connection with Watergate.

As a student of public opinion for more than forty years as reporter, editor, and industrial public-relations specialist charged with, among other things, taking the public pulse in scores of urban and grass-roots locations, I can attest to a couple of pertinent facts: a skillfully-worded question, properly asked, can get you almost any answer you want. Opinions of elite groups (MIT professors and Unitarian ministers, for example) who hurry off telegrams to Washington and permit their names to be appended to full-page ads in the New York *Times* are unreliable indicators of the general public temper, and impotent in affecting it.

As one who fervently supports a secure and prosperous Israel, . . . I feel that it would be the greatest tragedy, in a long history too fraught with tragedy, to assume that the average American is any less susceptible to "cold feet" than are Israel's warm-weather friends in Western Europe. . . .

H. T. Rowe

Ridgewood, New Jersey

To the Editor of Commentary:

Permit me to bring up to date Earl Raab's perceptive article with which I am in complete agreement. A later Gallup poll, taken from December 7-10, in the midst of the oil crisis, showed that public sympathy with the Israeli cause was increasing, not decreasing. Thus, whereas 47 per cent of those polled in October 1973 registered pro-Israel sympathy, in December that percentage had increased to 54 per cent, down only 1 per cent from the record high of 55 per cent reached during the June 1967 war. Pro-Arab sympathy in December 1973 increased to 8 per cent, as against 6 per cent in October to 24 per cent in December.

Israel is hardly a salient issue among blacks, despite the pro-Arab sentiments of the Black Muslims and the young blacks of the Third World. Nevertheless, three black Congressmen, two of whom were elected with white, if not Jewish, support voted against the $2.2 billion military aid to Israel. They were Parran Mitchell of Baltimore, Ron Dellums of Berkeley, and John Conyers, Jr., of Detroit.

What is perhaps most reassuring is that despite gloomy predictions Middle America is not blaming Israel for the oil shortage.

Will Maslow

American Jewish Congress

New York City

To the Editor of Commentary:

While I agree in general with Earl Raab's analysis of the bases and limitations of American popular support for Israel, I should like to amend and amplify several points that I believe are of particular significance in the light of current intense U.S. efforts to achieve a lasting Arab-Israeli settlement.

Mr. Raab notes that American public opinion has "dramatically followed the shifts of the U.S. government position." As an example he cites the fact that while 65 per cent of the American people supported the UN partition plan when the U.S. backed it in November 1947, in the following months, after the U.S. expressed objections to the plan, "American public opinion at one point dropped to a 24-per-cent approval of that same plan."

The shift was in fact far less dramatic if one places these statistics in the broader context of U.S. opposition to direct American military involvement. Thus, in November 1947 when a UN peacekeeping force in Palestine was being discussed, 65 per cent of the American public endorsed the formation of "a United Nations volunteer army" to keep order, but only 3 per cent favored unilateral American military action. In the beginning of 1948, as Arab-Jewish


Romania
is no
fairy tale.
Come see! From the Dracula country of the Carpathians and the painted monasteries of Moldavia to the Latin sophistication of Bucharest and the Black Sea resorts . . . Romania is a storybook vacationland. Fantastic? With all-expense tours from $19 a day it's almost unbelievable. But true! Our TOUROMANIA brochure lists hundreds of vacation bargains . . . independent tours in Romania and multi-country escorted tours including Romania. Write!
ROMANIAN NATIONAL TOURIST OFFICE
500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10036 Dept. C-3
Please send my free copies of the TOUROMANIA guide to escorted tours and independent travel.
Name
Address
City
State Zip

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Just because it's margarine doesn't mean it's parve.

Check the margarine section in your supermarket. You'll find that while just about every brand is marked kosher, Sweet Unsalted Mazola is one of the few that's also parve. So you can enjoy its fresh, light, delicate taste with all your meals.

And Sweet Unsalted Mazola is ideal for cooking, too. Unlike butter and most other margarines, it won't burn at normal frying temperatures of 300° to 350°.

Of course, there are a few other things you should keep in mind. Since Sweet Unsalted Mazola is made with golden corn oil, it's low in saturated fats. High in poly-unsaturates. And has no cholesterol at all. (Naturally the unique no-milk formula is perfect, too, for anyone with a milk allergy.)

Sweet Unsalted Mazola. It's good with dairy. Good with meat. And good sense, besides.

Sweet Unsalted Mazola. The fresh-tasting parve margarine.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How to make Passover

The Passover Haggadah
With Hebrew and English on facing pages
Edited by NAHUM N. GLATZER

"I have surveyed any number of Haggadahs in English and have concluded that the Schocken Haggadah is the best on the market." —Rabbi Ben-Zion Gold, Harvard-Radcliffe Hillel Society
paper $1.95

The Jewish Festivals
History & Observance
HAYYIM SCHAUSS

Carefully explains the origin and background, the rich symbolism and ritual practices of Passover, as well as that of the other Jewish holy days.
paper $2.95

The Work of Our Hands
Jewish Needlecraft for Today
MAE SHAFTER ROCKLAND

Details how to make your own, personalized ceremonial Passover objects in a variety of needlecraft techniques and styles. Included are patterns for cushions and matzoh covers, as well as instructions for a hand towel and an afikomen bag.
hardcover $10.00/
With 165 illustrations, 16 in color

from your bookseller or
SCHOCKEN BOOKS
200 Madison Avenue, New York 10016

violence intensified in Palestine, State and Defense Department officials repeatedly voiced the view that partition had become impractical because it would require substantial outside force to implement it in the face of militant Arab opposition. They pointed out that the U.S., which had rapidly demobilized after World War II, found itself critically short of manpower to meet the potentially greater cold-war crises then emerging in Berlin, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Turkey. Moreover, direct American military involvement would have enabled the Russians to claim an equal right to intervene—and the U.S. had just, with much difficulty, succeeded in getting the Russians to withdraw their World War II supply forces from Iran. Indeed, the Russians in 1948 were advocating a joint Soviet-American force to impose partition upon the Arabs, just as they were to recommend a similar method for imposing the October 1973 cease-fire agreement upon Israel.

The shift in American popular opinion from 1947 to 1948 did not represent an abandonment of the principle that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was a just and desirable solution, but only the belief that the implementation of partition would impose burdens and risks upon the U.S. which the American public was unwilling to assume. This is confirmed by a poll taken at the end of March 1948, after the U.S. delegation at the UN had formally dropped partition. A majority of those polled still believed that "*if the Jews independently managed to set up a Jewish state, anyhow,* the U.S. should encourage them" (emphasis added). Only 10 per cent actively opposed such a policy, the same percentage that had opposed partition in November 1947.

Americans also continued to rely primarily on multilateral UN solutions. In February 1948, some 43 per cent approved of American soldiers taking part in a UN police force, while 50 per cent were opposed; only 9 per cent favored the U.S. unilaterally sending American troops if the UN failed to agree on sending an international force. In April 1948, 62 per cent still favored the idea of a UN force and half of this number approved of American soldiers taking part in the police force.

Similarly, in the current crisis, Mr. Raab reports that a late October 1973 Harris poll "found an overwhelming majority of Americans"—actually 67 per cent versus 19 per cent—agreeing that "we should not become overcommitted to Israel, or we could find ourselves involved in another Vietnam, and that would be wrong." Yet it should also be noted that an even more overwhelming majority (68 per cent versus 10 per cent) in the same poll agreed with the statement that "the Arabs still want to destroy Israel, so the Israelis have no choice but to stay militarily strong to defeat any Arab invasion." A majority of the people polled also were aware of the global-strategic implications of the Arab-Israeli conflict for they agreed (56 per cent to 22 per cent) that "if the Arabs had won this war, Russia would control the Middle East with its important oil supplies and would have scored a major victory."

Nevertheless, as Mr. Raab correctly notes, the polls find the American public still strongly opposed to any direct U.S. troop involvement in the Middle East. The Harris poll found this opposition to extend to U.S. participation with the Soviet Union in a peacekeeping role. I suspect this was largely out of fear that a potential clash between American and Russian forces on the ground could escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Evidence that this fear rather than ideological opposition to cooperation with the Russians was the primary factor emerges from the fact that a sizable majority (63 per cent to 14 per cent) said that Kissinger was "right to send arms to Israel and then to get together with the Russians to work out a cease-fire."

Yet when the implicit linking of U.S. arms shipments to Israel with the possibility of cooperation with the Russians to lessen tensions is removed, the same group of Americans reacted much less favorably. In response to the question, "Do you think the U.S. was right in sending planes and other military supplies to Israel or do you think we should have taken a different course?," only 46 per cent said the U.S. had been right, 34 per cent favored a different course, and the rest were not sure. Mr. Raab mistakenly reports that "over three-quarters of Americans polled in late October approved of the aid that had been sent to Israel, as against only 4 per cent who disapproved." In fact, those

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nizer. Berger. Emerson. Ernst. Levy. Frankfurter.

Great legal minds. Great savings. Great time to join

Lawyer's Literary Club

20290. BURDEN OF PROOF: The Case of Juan Corona. *Ed Cray.* A riveting tale of the Sacramento Valley multiple-murder case involving 25 farm workers. Realistic account of police work and legal strategies are plotted, plus the tense courtroom battle that followed. Compulsive! **$8.95**

20640. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL. *Michael Meltsner.* "A deeply informed and clearly written guide to the recent past of capital punishment litigation. Indispensable to those who would understand the present position."—*Charles L. Black, Jr., Luce Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School.* **$8.95**

21680. THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY. *Louis Nizer.* The legendary attorney and master of courtroom suspense recreates the greatest spy story of the century—the Rosenberg case. **$10.00**

21300. GREAT COURTROOM BATTLES. *Edited by Richard E. Rubenstein.* Emotion charged stories of what happens when talented lawyers clash, fighting for their clients' lives and livelihoods in the most dramatic and significant trials of the last century . . . from Billy Mitchell to Lt. Calley. **$7.95**

21790. JUDGMENTS: Essays on American Constitutional History. *Leonard W. Levy.* Precise and pungent essays on a spectrum of constitutional issues: the influence of judges' temperaments on Supreme Court decisions, the battle over First Amendment freedoms and other rights. **$12.50**

20541. CORPORATE LAW DEPARTMENT PRACTICE. *Harold Vogel.* Steps in budget preparation and control . . . steps in preparing for, and handling, a government investigation and much more. **$12.95**



41650. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY. *Alan F. Westin and Michael A. Baker.* The first in-depth study of the impact of computers on the constitutional rights of privacy and due process. **$12.50**

55580. INSTANT ELOQUENCE. *James C. Humes.* The eloquent solution to finding the time to write a speech for podium or courtroom. A vast sourcebook of material that shows how to open your speech, plan your message, wind up with a dramatic finish. **$6.95**

55951. THE INTERNATIONAL MONEY GAME. *Robert Z. Aliber.* An indispensable and highly readable guide to the complex system through which the world's business is financed and our future determined. **$6.95**

Take any 3 books

(values as high as $53.45)

all for only $3.95

(you simply agree to join now and accept only 3 more books—all at handsome discount—over the next 12 months.)

(retail prices shown)

20210. BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. *Sandor Frankel.* The true story of the "Carwash Murder Case," which not only has the excitement of a whodunit, but the most realistic examination in years of how lawyers and police work. **$7.95**

20601. THE CRIMINAL LAW REVOLUTION AND ITS AFTERMATH. *The Editors of Criminal Law Reporter.* A quick-reference commentary and case-by-case review of over 400 sweeping changes and far-reaching decisions since Mapp V. Ohio, 12 years ago. Latest rulings on all aspects of criminal law: right to counsel, habeas corpus, self-incrimination, etc. **$10.00**

21370. THE GREAT REVERSALS: Tales of the Supreme Court. *Morris L. Ernst.* Heroic stories, dramatic stories, but always fascinating stories of the many times that the Supreme Court has reversed itself during its 200-year history. "Nothing reveals the Supreme Court so clearly as the way it changes its mind," says the author, and proves it in this important new book. **$7.95**

20520. CONGRESS v. THE SUPREME COURT. *Raoul Berger.* Meticulously documented study that illuminates one of the most controversial clauses in the Constitution—Article III. Includes a searching examination of the Constitution, and the pros and cons of judicial review. **$15.00**

81830. THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION. *Thomas I. Emerson.* An authority on the First Amendment formulates the legal foundations for an effective system of freedom of expression, weighing and analyzing the legal, political, and historical significance of recent—and pertinent—Supreme Court rulings. **$20.00**

21130. FELIX FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT. *Edited by Philip B. Kurland.* 54 admirably concise essays on the Supreme Court, its Justices and its business attest to the special quality of Frankfurter's mind; his precision and vigorous assessment of the role of law in a changing society. **$12.50**

21671. IMPEACHMENT: The Constitutional Problems. *Raoul Berger.* One of the year's surprise best-sellers gives a timely, on-target analysis of this sticky legal problem—outlining such concepts as limits of Congressional impeachment power, what constitutes impeachable conduct, impeachment vs. separation of powers. **$14.95**

20920. THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES. *Charles A. Bane.* What happened when giant corporations (like G.E., Westinghouse, and Allis-Chalmers) were charged with conspiracy to fix prices and rig bids? A lawyer involved in the ensuing litigation gives a blow-by-blow account of the legal maneuvers (both the government's and the corporations'), the federal rulings and relevant statutes. A boon to understanding antitrust law. **$17.50**

73640. REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT STRATEGY. *Maury Seldin and Richard H. Swesnik.* How to make money in building and land. **$10.95**

23590. THE RELEVANT LAWYERS. *Ann Fagan Ginger.* How cases are won that have a tremendous impact on the law. **$9.95**

57660. LANDLORDS AND TENANTS: A Complete Guide to the Residential Rental Relationship. *Jerome G. Rose.* A crystal-clear guide to all the law relevant to tenancy, rent, evictions, public housing, cooperatives and condominiums. Covers new court decisions affecting the landlord-tenant relationship. **$9.75**

21070. FEDERAL JURISDICTION. *Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals / **CRIMINAL SENTENCES.** Marvin E. Frankel, U.S. District Judge.* A basic, informed guide for taking action on the momentous problems of the explosive growth of the work of Federal courts. *Plus*—a distinguished jurist tells about the sentencing from his side of the bench and points out the way to major reforms on the local, state and federal levels. *The 2 books count as one.* **$15.95**



24380. TRIAL AND TERROR. *Edited by Joan Kahn.* Twenty-five riveting tales of legal fact and fiction. Witty lawyers, keen English judges, brilliant detectives all pepper this giant collection—the cream of crime and suspense writing—and will keep anyone who relishes the give and take of legal drama hanging to his seat. **$8.95**

70260. PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS. *Earl W. Kintner.* An expert distillation of the maze of cases, rules and guidelines for anyone affected by the new "merger wave." **$12.95**

If card is missing, write:
Lawyers' Literary Club
Dept. 9-73B, Riverside, N.J. 08075
and indicate 3 books you want.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"THE BIG SEND-OFF"

. . . is the heading *New York* magazine gave its Best Bets column on this unique series of postcards showing details of New York City's landmark buildings. Seven jumbo cards in superb color, three in velvety black-and-white gravure, faithfully reproduce original photographs by Mark Feldstein. The subjects include the lantern at the Players Club, a terra cotta panel on New York's only Louis Sullivan building, an angel overlooking City Hall from 150 Nassau Street, and a sampling of elegant stone and cast iron ornament that generally goes unobserved.

Use the cards for invitations, greeting cards, any correspondence you want to be remembered. Many people frame them. Packet of 20 cards (two each of ten subjects) only $3.



Cranford Wood, Inc.
310 East 75 St., NYC 10021

I enclose $_____ for _____ packs of postcards at $3 per pack (including tax, postage, and handling).

name

address

city, state & zip

figures (79 to 4 per cent in the Harris poll) do not refer to the question about U.S. aid but to a question about support for the joint Russian-U.S.-sponsored UN cease-fire.

What are the conclusions that one can draw from all this? Americans are prepared to support a strong and viable Jewish state, and will back the continued granting of U.S. aid to Israel if they can be convinced that this will not draw the U.S. into a Vietnam-type involvement or a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The implications for the peace negotiations are that any settlement should rely as much as possible on arrangements which the parties themselves can enforce.

Too heavy a reliance on United Nations mechanisms and great-power guarantees runs the danger that if, for example, there is a future Arab troop build-up in violation of a demilitarized zone (like the one that occurred west of the Suez Canal in August 1970) the Russians will be tempted to veto UN action and provide additional Soviet material support, while the United States may find it exceedingly difficult to act unilaterally on Israel's behalf. This U.S. reluctance will be due not only to public opinion but to such developments as the rapidly expanding Soviet naval capacity in the eastern Mediterranean and the unwillingness of our so-called NATO allies to provide logistical support for U.S. military movements designed to back up American diplomacy in the Middle East.

Although the American public has become considerably more disillusioned with the UN than it was in 1947, as evidenced by the 46 per cent who in October 1973 were skeptical about the UN's ability to "bring lasting peace" to the Middle East (as opposed to 25 per cent), nevertheless, only 14 per cent favored unilateral U.S. troop involvement and only 16 per cent approved of U.S. participation with the Russians in a Middle East peacekeeping mission.

There is thus the danger that when the going gets rough, as it did in May 1967, Americans will find it more convenient to weasel out of their solemn promises and respond as former President Eisenhower did when President Johnson asked him, after Nasser had evicted the UN Emergency Force and proclaimed an Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran, what the U.S. promises to Israel in 1957 had involved. Eisenhower said then that the U.S. had a "commitment of honor" to back Israel's maritime rights. But in a press conference shortly thereafter, on May 25, 1967, while reaffirming the U.S. duty to maintain the right of passage for American ships, Eisenhower weakened his statement by adding that it was a UN problem rather than a strictly American matter and cautioned that "none of us should hurry to become involved."

This was the dominant mood in the Congress as well. Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield called for "primary emphasis on the United Nations. . . . There should be no question of unilateral military involvement in the Near East." . . .

Consequently, if the U.S. government wants a genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East that does not contain the seeds of renewed conflict, then the U.S. should avoid the temptation of relying on formulas that paper over the real differences or leave vaguely defined areas of authority and responsibility to ultimately impotent UN agencies. Any Arab-Israeli agreements, if they are to work, must serve the interests of both sides and be carefully drafted in terms that are meant to be not only fool-proof but rascal-proof.

The most feasible and productive approach, it seems to me, would be to provide a series of reciprocal steps, each consciously designed to maximize the inducements to compliance and to progress to the next stage. This process—e.g., a measure of withdrawal for a measure of peace—would incorporate its own penalties for cheating. It would also be the kind of manifestly fair process for which it should be possible to obtain continued American popular approval.

GEORGE E. GRUEN
New York City

TO THE EDITOR OF COMMENTARY:

Earl Raab assumes that the National Council of Churches represents America. It is my understanding that, beginning with the disestablishment of the Colonial churches, the pastors and law vestries, deacons, and sessions represent the churches of America.

In countries that practice separation of church and state, like the Netherlands and the United States, members of the church seek political advice from political

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mr. & Ms. agree:

For closeness and smoothness with freedom from nicks – shaving with the two-bladed Trac II™ razors from Gillette is a whole new experience for both Mr. and Ms.



"THE GILLETTE TRAC II™ TWO BLADED RAZORS GILLETTE MADE THEM ONE BLADE BETTER"

Why so close?

The TRAC II™-razor Effect

(1) When you shave with the Trac II™ razor, the 1st blade stretches your whisker out for a moment just like your one-bladed razor.

(2) But then, before that extra whisker can snap all the way back—

(3) the second blade can shave it again—closer. With 2 blades you get a close, safe shave that no one-blade razor can match.

Why so nick free?

The Trac II™ is safe. The two Platinum-Plus® blades—the finest we make—are locked into place at a very safe angle, and the blade edges are shielded at both ends. This protects you even more.

The perfect razor for both men & women

The TRAC II™ razor delivers the really close shaves that men demand while the green handled **Lady Trac II™** razor gives the smooth, safe shaves that women need. In fact, the TRAC II™ and **Lady Trac II™** razors can give you both a close shave and a safe shave without having to compromise.

© 1973 The Gillette Company, Boston, Mass.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

leaders and religious advice from religious leaders. It is my understanding, in the words of the eighth chapter of Amos, that those who trust in priests for political judgments "will see famine, darkness at noon, sack-cloth upon all loins. . ."

The retiring executive secretary of the National Council of Churches, when he graduated from Union Theoiogical Seminary in 1933, sought to study theology in Germany, as the new Zion, and there he stayed for two years. Union Seminary, however, was fortunate to have Dietrich Bonhoeffer as a student and Paul Tillich as a professor in the 1930's.

During the Second World War the Federal Council of Churches, under George Buttrick's direction, refused to have any formal meetings in the White House; in 1969, however, the executive director of the National Council of Churches, preached from the White House, as did Rabbi Louis Finkelstein. . . .

CHRISTOPHER NIEBUHR
Albany, New York

EARL RAAB writes:

H. T. Rowe and I agree that the normal ability of politicians to shape American public opinion on foreign policy can be disrupted by special domestic moods and situations. Some instances were pointed out in my article. But we do not agree that the energy crisis has already proved to be such a special situation. So far, Israel is a low fourth on the list of those generally blamed. That obviously can change if the diplomacy turns very sour at the same time that the consequences of the energy crisis deepen. But it hasn't happened yet, as Will Maslow points out, and it apparently won't happen as easily as some feared it would.

In that case, as in others, the main caution seems to be: don't sentimentalize American public opinion, or opinion polls, about Israel. For example, George Gruen suggests that a shift in American public opinion "did not represent an abandonment of the principle that the creation of the Jewish state in Palestine was a just and desirable solution." But there is no evidence that there ever was such a "principle." In 1948, only about 10 per cent of the American people said that they sympathized with the Jews of Israel because "it's their country by religious, historical, legal right." For public opinion, the desirability of any given foreign policy has always been conditional upon internal American considerations like "burdens and risks" —as specifically evaluated by Washington, D.C.

That does not mean that the American public is stupid, or follows Washington policy blindly. Of course it is largely "aware of the global strategic implications" for the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It is precisely on the basis of that shared premise that the public is largely willing to accept those moves which Washington prescribes for any given situation.

There is a further example on that point. Mr. Gruen properly points out that the Harris poll which reported a preponderance of approval for American aid to Israel was the result of a double question. The question also included approval of joint Russian-U.S. sponsored cease-fire. The citation was made to emphasize again the effect on public opinion of a policy *accompli*; with the double question, the citation further emphasizes that effect. The radical increase in after-the-fact public approval for aid sent was evident in all the poll data (before the event, the polls had registered on the order of 13 per cent approval). Mr. Gruen suggests that this new approval was even higher when coupled with détente-like activity with the Russians. He makes a good case for the cumulative effect of the coupling, but he may again be a little sentimental about the reasons. The overall concern of the American public seems to be to deal with the threat of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Americans were willing to take Washington's cue on how to do that when the signal was a full military alert. Mr. Gruen's advice to the policy makers sounds good—but it probably has little relation to the formation of public opinion, whose primary concern in these matters is not —and probably should not be— such qualities as a "manifestly fair process."

The "Dean" of
KOSHER
QUALITY

POULTRY

Wholesome • Delicious

USDA INSPECTED

Dean Kosher Poultry; Bird-In-Hand, Pa. 17505.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Once, just once in your life, don't you deserve the priceless experience of a long ocean cruise with Holland America?

We think so. So we give you everything the unforgettable is made of. Consider the grand sister ships, s.s.Veendam and s.s. Volendam. Nowhere afloat can you find more outright luxury. The staterooms are posh and roomy, and 90% of them look out on the sea. The decks abound with every conceivable shipboard pleasure, including a swank Lido terrace and restaurant. Entertainment ranges from spectacular to intimate. Every meal is a feast. Every crew member knows what service is all about. No gratuities are required, so you could save from 5% to 10% of the cruise cost. You can sign for shipboard purchases, too. And charge the fare with a major credit card.

Now to name just a few storybook ports: Casablanca, Istanbul, Athens, Naples, Lisbon, Rio, Buenos Aires, Reykjavik, North Cape, Oslo, Copenhagen, Rotterdam, Leningrad (yes, we visit Russia too). Plus secret hideaways like Mahon, Aarhus, Mombasa. All told, a voyager's delight of not only celebrated capitals, but places the postcards never show.

Once in your life. Just once.



To the Mediterranean, to Europe and Scandinavia, to South America, to the whole wide world. To happiness.

March 28. Grand Mediterranean Spring Cruise, s.s.Volendam. 49 days, 29 ports from New York. From Ft. Lauderdale March 30. $2660 to $5960.
May 23. Spring Western Mediterranean Cruise, s.s. Veendam. 35 days, 21 ports from New York. From Ft. Lauderdale May 20. $1875 to $4210.
June 7, July 19. North Cape/Scandinavian Cruises, s.s. Volendam. 41 days, 25 ports from New York. From Ft. Lauderdale June 4. $2295 to $5130.
August 30. Western Mediterranean Discovery Cruise, s.s.Volendam. 35 days, 25 ports from New York. $1760 to $3955.
October 5. Mediterranean Explorers' Cruise, s.s.Volendam. 41 days, 21 ports from New York. From Ft. Lauderdale Oct. 7. $2225 to $4980.
November 12. South America Discovery Cruise, s.s. Veendam. 39 days, 16 ports from New York. From Ft. Lauderdale Nov. 14. $2290 to $4835.
January 18, 1975. Around the World Cruise, s.s. Rotterdam. 87 days, 31 ports from New York. From Ft. Lauderdale Jan. 20. $5040 to $16,110.
Throughout 1974. Every two weeks, the new m.s. Prinsendam cruises the East Indies from Singapore to Bali. 14 days, 8 ports. $940 to $1615.
See your travel agent or call Miss Martin collect at (212) 620-5101.

You may never want to get off.

Holland America Cruises

Holland America Cruises, Pier 40 North River, New York, N.Y. 10014. C-3

Please send brochures for the following destinations:
☐ Mediterranean. ☐ North Cape. ☐ South America.
☐ Around the World. ☐ Singapore/Bali.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Travel agent _____

Rates per person, double occupancy, subject to availability. All ships registered in the Netherlands Antilles. **Notice:** Fuel surcharge to be added to all above fares.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

La Corona is more than just a great cigar.



#400 #600

For more than a century, La Corona craftsmanship, quality and consistent excellence have been the standards other fine cigar makers attempt to achieve.

For more than a century, La Corona has blended expensive, imported tobaccos and used the most perfectly colored, fine textured wrappers to give discriminating cigar smokers classic flavor, rich aroma, cigar smoking at its most pleasurable.

For more than a century, La Corona has been a symbol of the man who knows what cigar smoking is all about.

And for more than a century, La Corona—with its wide variety of shapes and prices—has had one ambition: to give you the best possible cigar we can. That is our tradition.

It's a great tradition.

Shown: La Corona #400, #600, all natural leaf, long filler.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Specter of Eugenics

Charles Frankel

ONE of the often noted anomalies of our society is its capacity to develop extraordinary new technologies while failing to find ways to perform elementary services in a minimally decent fashion. Nowhere is this truer, or more painful, than in medical care. Hospitals visit tawdry indignities on patients even while their bills reach unimaginable levels; medical services are increasingly bureaucratized and depersonalized; competent doctors, nurses, and paraprofessionals are in short supply and not where they are most needed. In these circumstances a new theme has emerged to dominate the discussion of the moral and social responsibilities of medicine. It is not how to humanize medicine but how to re-engineer the human race.

The occasion for this preoccupation—which has affected the curricula of medical and law schools, led to the creation of new institutes and to proposed legislation in Congress,* and produced a stream of sociological, moral, and philosophical reflection†—is the advent of "biomedicine," a package of dazzling biological discoveries and new medical techniques. Biomedicine, we are told, is the harbinger, or portent, of the day when man will be able to say of himself, meaning it entirely, that, at last, he is his own greatest creation, and has got the weight of that other Creation off his back. Existentialist philosophers have accustomed us during the past generation to phrases like "man invents himself." But they have meant these dark utterances metaphorically, metaphysically. Biomedicine, it would appear, gives them a literal meaning. If what is said about it is true, mankind is on the verge of being able to make itself, in a quite physical sense, its own principal artifact.

If what is said is true. Biomedicine has been well publicized, and all sorts of people—geneticists, doctors, theologians, philosophers, social planners—have found it personally advantageous or socially desirable to talk the subject up and paint its importance in lurid colors. One who is not a geneticist or physician must speak with diffidence, but I am not myself persuaded that all the miracles that have been announced as at hand are really about to materialize. Nevertheless, even a restrained account of recent developments will suggest why people not excessively given to utopian or apocalyptic solemnities believe that biomedicine poses unprecedented issues. Indeed, whether or not biomedicine's immediate practical significance has been exaggerated, the hopes, fears, plans, and prophecies it has provoked are themselves an illuminating avenue of entry into some of the more important fads and fallacies of current moral outlooks.

II

THE excitement that biomedicine arouses begins with its fundamental achievement, the breaking of the genetic code, an accomplishment as stunning for its intellectual brilliance, and as important, in all probability, for the history of science as the first discoveries in nuclear physics. The manner in which the genes send out the "messages" that control the development of the organism is now basically understood. A large part of what used to be called "the secret of life" is therefore open for investigation, and presumably for manipulation and redesign. Human cells growing in tissue culture, for example, have been made to undergo inheritable changes when infected by a virus or treated with foreign genetic matter. To take another example, the first week of human fetal life has been reproduced entirely under laboratory conditions: sooner or later, we are told, test-tube babies will materialize.

CHARLES FRANKEL is Old Dominion Professor of Philosophy and Public Affairs at Columbia University and the author of, among other works, *The Pleasures of Philosophy* and *The Democratic Prospect*. Mr. Frankel's article, "The New Egalitarianism and the Old," appeared in the September 1973 COMMENTARY.

* A bill providing for the establishment of "A National Advisory Commission on Health, Science, and Society," introduced by Senator Walter Mondale, was passed unanimously by the Senate in the 92nd Congress, but failed in the House. It has been reintroduced once more in the present session of Congress.

† For recent examples, see Amitai Etzioni, *Genetic Fix* (Macmillan, 276 pp., $7.95), and Daniel Callahan, *The Tyranny of Survival* (Macmillan, 284 pp., $6.95).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Together with these fundamental discoveries, an array of experimental and clinical techniques has been developed that change practical perspectives on birth, maturing, aging, dying, sexuality, and the relations of parents to children, and that can alter or undermine the private rights hitherto associated with the most intimate areas of human experience. Prenatal diagnostic procedures have been discovered which permit the determination of the sex of the fetus and the presence in it of hereditary abnormalities. With the advent of legal abortion "planned parenthood" has thus acquired a new dimension: it comprises control not simply over the number of children but over their sex and physical and mental quality. At present it is possible through prenatal diagnoses to detect sixty genetically-caused defects, among which the best known and most widespread is probably mongoloidism, and it is expected that in a few years the list will be almost doubled. The advent of these diagnostic procedures has led to new ideas about the opportunities and responsibilities of preventive medicine and public-health programs. In a program of mass screening of pregnant women, for example, women diagnosed to be carrying genetically defective children would be advised—or, in some plans, required—to take corrective action, ranging from dietary changes through chemical therapy to abortion.

Methods of genetic diagnosis are now so advanced, indeed, as to permit the envisaging of systems of universal genetic examination, instituted well before pregnancy, to permit the detecting of individuals who, although themselves healthy, are the carriers of dangerous genes in a recessive state. Such people could be advised to stay away from people of the opposite sex who carried the same recessive genes; an alternative would be to recommend that they adopt children or have them by artificial insemination. Stronger measures could also be advised or required. The suggestion has been made by advocates of compulsory population control, for example, that boys and girls be inoculated against fertility at puberty.* A more modest variation would be to inoculate the carriers of recessive genes for certain diseases.

By such techniques the long-range purpose of reducing the proportions of troublemaking genes in the collective human gene pool could be accomplished. The pursuit of this purpose, according to many geneticists, is an increasingly urgent imperative. The advances in medicine over the past century have decreased the significance of "natural selection" in keeping the genetic heritage of mankind relatively uncontaminated. People afflicted by inheritable diseases live to pass them on, as do people who carry mutant genes. The result, some generations away, will be a "genetic load" of abnormalities and deficiencies painful and expensive for the species to bear. Fortunately, however, the scientific progress which has caused this problem also has presented us, it is pointed out, with the potential solution. The planned production of children is the alternative, in this perspective, to the degradation of the human stock. Nor need a sufficiently motivated society restrict itself to genetic planning for wholly negative purposes like reducing the contamination of the human gene pool. The technical capabilities already exist, enthusiasts for genetic planning point out, to set about systematically to improve the human breed. Artificial insemination using stored sperm is a well established procedure. Thus, all that is needed is a proper system of social planning, and women a hundred years from now will be able to have children by Nureyev or Henry Kissinger.

Other developments loom. In the near future, it is prophesied, it will be possible with relative ease to transplant a fertilized human egg from the womb of its biological mother to that of a foster mother who will bring it to birth. Working women will be able to have someone else bear their babies. Childless women will be able to have the experience of giving birth to their adopted offspring. Moreover, techniques are being perfected which will permit, it is hoped, the modification of an individual's genetic inheritance. There is evidence, for example, that the action of the gene for sickle-cell anemia can be suppressed by activating or deactivating other genes to which its functioning is linked. Again, experiments have been performed indicating the possibility of making up for genetic deficiencies by implanting the needed genes. Gene therapy, chemical or surgical, thus appears to be a quite possible, if not immediate, medical procedure.

Nor do the achievements in genetics and biomedicine quite exhaust the advances being made toward the understanding of the human organism, and the possible refabrication of it. Parallel to the discoveries that I have mentioned are those in the surgery of organic transplants, the pharmacological alteration of personality, and the study of the brain and nervous system. Electromicroscopy, in the words of Sir John Eccles, "gives us a look at the components of the brain, the living nerve cells, and the connections between them, the synapses, at a level that is commensurate with their properties," and neuropharmacology "gives us an exquisite understanding of the way the synapses are working with regard to the chemical transmitters and their antagonists, so that we have the potentiality to control the operation of the nervous system in a carefully designed manner."†

* Edgar Chasteen, "The Case for Compulsory Population Control," *Mademoiselle*, January 1970.

† "Science and Freedom," the *Humanist*, September/October 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finally, the story cannot be complete without mention of "cloning," a process which permits an indefinite number of genetically identical beings to be produced from a single individual, without blessing of sexual fertilization. Whether the cloning of human beings will be technically feasible in the near future is a matter of dispute, but the experiment has been performed successfully with frogs, from whom no complaint has been heard. Cloning would permit people to reproduce themselves in the literal sense, to duplicate themselves genetically with exactness, a more fulfilling procedure, it must be supposed, than the messy process of ordinary procreation, which leaves so much to the random fall of the genes. Since advancing research also indicates that aging is a genetically controlled process, and that the rate of aging can be significantly slowed by diet, drugs, and genetic recoding, a new prospect opens: a world populated by centenarians in glistening health, surrounded by preselected carbon copies of themselves of assorted ages. Gone are those children with the unexpected traits that make a man or woman wonder out of what nest they came. At last we will have the young just how, and where, we want them.

III

WHATEVER the potentialities of biomedicine, it is easy to see why it arouses the interest that it does. The subject forces a confrontation with Good and Evil: it is like the story of Dr. Faustus, or Adam and Eve's encounter, all over again, with the Tree of Knowledge. For it implicitly asks, what shall the human species make of itself? And in asking that question it exposes our ultimate convictions.

Most important technological innovations, to be sure, raise the same question about the designs of the human species on or for itself. As C. S. Lewis once observed, in discussing technology's so-called conquest of nature, "In every victory, besides being the general who triumphs [man] is also the prisoner who follows the triumphal car."* Even technological innovations that do not involve direct probings inside the human body produce changes in human thinking, feeling, and conduct. They present us with new options or enhance our powers to achieve old goals, but they also foreclose options, change our goals, reduce our powers. Technology, in general, is not only an extension of human power over nature but an experiment with human nature, a test of the modifiability of the human physique, mentality, and emotional equipment, and of the costs and consequences of placing new loads on them. Nevertheless, biomedicine differs in significant ways from other kinds of technology.

First of all, we have the experience of the past, which suggests that, of all forms of scientific and technological innovation, medical discoveries—the circulation of the blood, anesthesia, antiseptics, malaria control, the Pill—have had the swiftest and most far-reaching effects on people's lives and moral horizons. Even if we discount by a prudent amount the significance of the last generation's achievements in biomedicine and related subjects, they still represent a considerable change in some of the basic parameters of human existence. To take a simple example, the classic discussion of the roles of heredity and environment may be turned upside down. It has always been thought that the "environmental" explanation of traits like intelligence, for example, was the more liberal, hopeful, forward-looking. But the day may not be that far away when genetic manipulations to improve intelligence will be a cheaper and more practical means to get results than environmental reforms, which have already been proved to be more difficult to bring about, and more disappointing in their consequences, than was supposed. Under such circumstances, environmentalists would be the preachers of pessimism, inegalitarianism, and allied heresies, and hereditarians would be the bearers of glad tidings.

Secondly, biomedicine involves introducing changes in the human creature different in a fundamental respect from those that have followed technological and scientific innovations in the past. People did not intend to reduce the average height of the British lower classes when they introduced the factory system, and they had no plan to change the formative experiences of adolescence when they welcomed the Model T. Biomedicine, in contrast, involves the deliberate, not incidental or inadvertent, modification of the human organism; and it involves, besides, the making of changes that will be irreversible. Rightly or wrongly, people in the past could make decisions about the introduction of technologies without thinking about the consequences. In the case of biomedicine that fine freedom is gone. Its various techniques may be widely adopted, and the consideration of consequences may be minimal, but the process will involve a conscious and deliberate refusal to think. Biomedicine has eliminated the insouciance with which most people have embraced technological progress. It forces consideration not simply of techniques and instrumentalities but of ends and purposes.

IV

IT IS, therefore, a disorienting science. The reactions to it have been like the reactions of the contemporary American mind to other disorienting events. There have been calls

* *The Abolition of Man* (1965), p. 71.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for additional research; interdisciplinary teams and public commissions have been created; objurgations on the guiltiness of a nation that knows no limits have multiplied; and evangelistic utterances that at last renewal has come, and the greening of America, or of all mankind, may be at hand, have also been heard.

The evangelisms have a familiar sound. On the back of Amitai Etzioni's *Genetic Fix* there is a blurb written by Betty Friedan. Mr. Etzioni, in the book, approaches the social and moral problems of biomedicine with finickiness, but Mrs. Friedan is less cautious: "Beyond the fantastic implications of *Genetic Fix* itself, Amitai Etzioni's existential act of courage in writing this book seems to me to point the new political road we must all map for ourselves now—beyond scholarly dispassion, passive compliance, or radical rhetoric mechanically fixed to the past—to take active personal responsibility for the human future." Perhaps too much should not be read into a blurb. The words are entirely conventional. But conventional indeed they are.

They express an idea that weaves through large parts of contemporary intellectual culture, uniting B. F. Skinner's scheme for salvation through operant conditioning to Herbert Marcuse's version of Freud and Marx, and joining the programs of radical feminists with those of the theorists in international affairs who held, not so long ago, that with a proper dosage of social science plus the existential courage to use advanced machinery, Vietnam could be pushed, pulled, or pulverized into the modern world. The idea is that of a human animal wholly malleable; of differences between the old and the young, between the sexes, between nations and individuals with varying life experiences, as essentially superficial, like the dirt on a shirt collar that comes out in the wash. Society, the thought goes, entirely forms men and women. Provided only that people are willing to recognize the Good and do it—"to take active personal responsibility for the human future"—society is capable of wholly re-forming them. All that is needed, as used to be said about Vietnam, is the will. The great "breakthrough" of the last five years, I heard it flatly announced by a colleague from a department of literature at a recent university meeting, is the discovery that we are all born androgynous, and that the difference between the sexes is purely cultural—a concept which led me to wonder whether instruction in obstetrics should be transferred from the medical school to the department of sociology.

The new genetics, though it stresses heredity, has paradoxically proved to be capturable by this idea of the omnipotence of society. "Society" will simply engineer heredity. In the words of the late Hermann Muller, a Nobel laureate, programs of planned eugenics provide the opportunity to guide human evolution, to make "unlimited progress in the genetic constitution of man, to match and re-enforce his cultural progress and, reciprocally, to be re-enforced by it, in a perhaps never-ending succession."* Such hopes justify a certain impatience in the methods used to achieve them. With the harshness of a Lenin or Trotsky, Hermann Muller complained, for example, about the carelessness with which society allows people to procreate freely, and then deals with the unhappy consequences by therapy, surgery, or the abortion of defective fetuses. Soft methods such as these, in his opinion, were "a calumny on the rationality of the human race. It would be like supposing that in some technically advanced society elaborate superhighways were constructed to avoid defiling hallowed domains reserved in perpetuity for their millions of sacred cows."† Another Nobel laureate, Linus Pauling, not much more merciful to sacred cows, has recommended that people diagnosed as carriers of genes associated with serious diseases like sickle-cell anemia be prevented from marrying and be conspicuously marked so that they will be warned against falling in love.**

To be sure, Professor Pauling gives no guidance about what to do if, in this corrupt age, such people have children without marrying, or, though one hates to contemplate the possibility, without even falling in love. Nor does he discuss in detail the complications that would follow from the adoption of his proposal in a society guaranteeing certain basic liberties to all, regardless of their hereditary category. Nevertheless, such ideas should not be dismissed out of hand as so obviously simpleminded as not to be taken seriously. Simplemindedness is not a handicap in the competition of social ideas, and although the explicit supporters of an idea like Professor Pauling's may be few, the assumptions that produce it are widely prevalent.

There are mounting signs that the eugenicists' dream of a remade human breed, so long in disgrace in consequence of Nazi forays into the field, may be on its way to a comeback. (It has never, in fact, quite died. A few hundred compulsory

* "The Guidance of Human Evolution," in Muller, *Studies in Genetics* (1962), p. 590.

† "The Guidance of Human Evolution," in *Perspectives in Biology and Medicine*, 3 (1959), p. 37.

** "I have suggested that there should be tattooed on the forehead of every young person a symbol showing possession of the sickle-cell gene or whatever other similar gene, such as the gene for phenylketonuria, that he has been found to possess in single dose. If this were done, two young people carrying the same seriously defective gene in single dose would recognize this situation at first sight, and would refrain from falling in love with one another. It is my opinion that legislation along this line, compulsory testing for defective genes before marriage, and some form of public or semi-public display of this possession, should be adopted." ("Reflections on the New Biology," *UCLA Law Review*, Vol. 15, No. 3 [1968], p. 269.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sterilizations are performed each year in the United States, and about half the states still have compulsory sterilization laws, although they have not been actively enforced.*) In 1969 the legislature of liberal Oregon passed a law providing for a "State Board of Social Protection" to administer a sterilization program. The federal government is empowered under law to pay for the sterilization of minors—under certain conditions without the consent of their parents. And public discussion, on TV and elsewhere, of the desirability of sterilizing women on welfare increases. The notion has become respectable. Indeed, existing practices provide a setting in which the idea of broad eugenic planning may seem hardly more than an extension of what is known and accepted. We endorse compulsory vaccination and chest X-rays for school schildren. Why not mass genetic screening or other methods for avoiding the transmission of hereditary defects or for accomplishing the improvement of the human stock?

A host of gathering trends in our society favors this easy transition: the pressures for population control; the declining death rate; the growing costs of supporting the old, the sick, and the handicapped; the size of the welfare population and the resentments caused by its existence; the altered standards regarding abortion; the movements in law and morals which, with accelerating force over the last generation, have facilitated the decline of the family and of the marital idea. And to these must be added the growing disappointment or cynicism about the possibility of social improvement through institutional reform. On the Right, people can look with sympathy on eugenics, envisaging the program's being tried on others, not on themselves. And on the Left, biomedicine speaks to the hope, ever rising from the ashes, that the human race can still be made over by proper planning.

V

THERE are others who have responded to biomedicine with the view that it hasn't changed anything at all except man's chance to do evil: the old moral absolutes remain as valid as ever and had better be reaffirmed. The position taken by Father Robert Drinan on the specific issue of abortion is typical of the reactions of traditional moral absolutists to the more sweeping issues raised by biomedicine:

> The integrity, the untouchableness, the inviolability of every human life by any other human being has been the cardinal principle and the centerpiece of the legal institutions of the English-speaking world and, to a large extent, of every system of law devised by man. . . . It will be a tragedy beyond description for America if the question of legislation on abortion is resolved on sentiment, utilitarianism, or expediency rather than on the basic ethical issue involved—the immorality of the destruction of an innocent human being carried out by other human beings for their own benefit.†

Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits has been equally unbending in expressing the Orthodox Jewish view of the biomedical issue of aborting fetuses known to be seriously defective:

> Most authorities on Jewish law are agreed that physical or mental abnormalities do not in themselves compromise the title to life, whether before or after birth. Cripples and idiots, however incapacitated, enjoy the same human rights . . . as normal persons. Human life being infinite in value, its sanctity is bound to be entirely unaffected by the absence of any or all mental faculties or by any bodily defects: any fraction of infinity still remains infinite.**

Rabbi Jakobovits acknowledges that Jewish law has become a little more permissive recently, and that lenient decisions have been taken by the head of the Jerusalem Rabbinical Court. He believes, however, that these "rather isolated" developments do not change basic Jewish law as stated by the Association of Orthodox Jewish Scientists of America in 1971: "Jewish law prohibits abortion when its sole justification is to prevent the birth of a physically deformed or mentally retarded child. Abortion 'on demand' purely for the convenience of the mother or even of society is strictly prohibited and morally repugnant. . . ."

There is a less explicit, but probably even more influential, form of absolutism than that advocated in orthodox theological circles, which is espoused by a good many people who would use words like "liberal" and "progressive" to describe themselves. I do not know how large a portion of the literature on biomedicine produced in the last few years consists in the rehearsal of the fears expressed in *Brave New World*, but it must be quite large. There hovers about biomedicine the scent of ancient taboos broken, of entry into forbidden territory. It stirs to life fears that go back to the oldest myths in our civilization, and revives religious attitudes about sin, trespass, and tinkering with the delicate harmonies of the Creation that lie just below the level of consciousness even in agnostics and atheists. And so there is an impulse simply to condemn the dark powers that have brought the evil thing to be.

A few years ago it was a rare day when one

---

* See William T. Vukowich, "The Dawning of the Brave New World—Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Genetics," *University of Illinois Law Forum*, Volume 1971, No. 2 (1971).

† "The Right to Be Born," in David F. Walbert & J. Douglas Butler, eds., *Abortion, Society, and the Law* (1973), p. 137.

** "Jewish Views on Abortion" *ibid.*, pp. 109, 118-19.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

heard the suggestion openly made within the university world that certain kinds of purely theoretical research should be banned. But nowadays that recommendation is made daily, without apology or obfuscation, and among the avenues of inquiry nominated for this honor biomedicine rates very high. Its emergence is among the phenomena responsible for the heating up of the hostility to technology and science, and for the reawakening of suspicion toward the basic principles of intellectual freedom and rational thought.

Biomedicine, in sum, has psychic and moral reverberations that go far beyond its immediate subject matter. On the one side, it reawakens the impulse to regulate and control, to suppress the unplanned, the random, the offbeat. On the other side, it arouses the desire to stand on the unchanging truths of the ages, and to fear and resist the play of the mind for its own sake. The discussion of biomedicine has a hidden agenda as significant as its explicit one.

VI

THERE are some cautionary considerations which I have found helpful in interpreting the significance of biomedicine.

Despite advances in genetics, first of all, the debate about the relative significance of heredity as against environment remains unsettled with respect to the most important human traits. Moreover, settling it is impeded by the difficulty of separating environmental from hereditary influences. Is the slow-witted child of a slow-witted mother who ignored it when it was an infant a victim of heredity or environment?

Even when we know that traits are wholly inherited, like blue eyes, or partly inherited, like height, the recent developments in genetics do not necessarily put us in a position to produce inheritable traits by plan. Most of the most interesting of these traits are "polygenic": it is the copresence of a number of genes, not any single gene, that is responsible for them. Rectifying these traits is therefore a complex matter, and runs the risk of affecting whole clusters of traits in undesired ways.

There is, in addition, a fundamental difference between "negative eugenics" and "positive eugenics." "Negative eugenics" aims only to eliminate a genetic defect. It has a definable target, and the evil it seeks to combat is reasonably unequivocal. "Positive eugenics," in contrast, aims to produce a new breed possessing, for example, "on the physical side, more robust health; on the intellectual side, keener, deeper, and more creative intelligence; on the moral side, more genuine warmth of fellow feeling and cooperative disposition; on the apperceptive side, richer appreciation and its more adequate expression." (I borrow the shopping list from Hermann Muller.) Apart from the fact that we do not know that these characteristics are primarily genetic in origin, they represent intellectual pigs in the poke.

"Keener, deeper, and more creative intelligence" covers a variety of possibilities ranging from Mozart to Napoleon; "cooperative disposition" often shows itself in warmth of fellow feeling for one group and indifference or hostility to people in others; even "robust health" has a variety of meanings: shall we aim, in our eugenics program, at heavyweight prizefighters, or at wiry, resilient little men with the power to spend long hours at their desks without falling ill? In sum, "positive eugenics" aims at gross targets, and, in practically every case, at ill-defined and incoherent ones.

Moreover, "positive eugenics" makes no sense unless it is practiced on a broad social scale. It thus involves, at the least, the use of high-pressure propaganda methods, which its devotees are likely to call "education for social responsibility," and it probably necessitates legal coercion. It has the further inconvenience of inviting people to think of themselves as stud animals.

Even in the case of "negative eugenics," a distinction has to be drawn between individual action and a general program directed at cleaning out the human gene pool. It is one thing to say that people should have the right to make an informed choice concerning whether they will have a child suffering from Tay-Sachs disease; it is quite another thing to engage in genetic counseling or other measures with a view to reducing the proportion of Tay-Sachs genes transmitted to the human gene pool by people who carry them in a recessive state. The latter is surrounded by complications.

For example, some genes responsible for serious diseases are, in their recessive states, also beneficial. The gene for sickle-cell anemia appears to have been associated with heightened resistance to malaria. Further, the "dirtying" of the gene pool, as it is called, is a long-term process, for which medical progress may be expected to provide some remedies. Diabetes, a hereditary disease, is no longer commonly a lethal one. Most important of all, to speak of "undesirable" genes is to use an environment-relative term. Diabetes is a dangerous disease when diets reach a certain level of richness; it was not usually disabling for primitive hunters.

The lesson to be drawn is an old one, but it is characteristic of fashions in ideas to neglect such lessons: probably the greatest biological resource of the human species is its variety of genetic strains. Unless we can know precisely what the future environment will contain in the way of foods, germs, climate, work, and numberless other aspects of life, caution is advisable with regard to the adoption of plans for the elimination of

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

genetic traits whose present disutility may be a passing phase.

But if the facts of genetics make the effort to recast the human species inadvisable, the facts about human desires make it doubly so. For people are probably wisest, they understand their desires best, when they are aware that they do not know what they desire human beings to be forever and ever. In time of war, the qualities sought are resilience, discipline, loyalty, physical courage; in time of peace, people praise flexibility, independence, moral courage. Assuming that we had the requisite powers, shall the moods and needs of a decade or half-decade be permitted to affect the permanent temperament of mankind?

More prickly still is the consideration that a kind of systematic doubletalk infects most descriptions of morally desirable characteristics. "He is stubborn," I say, describing behavior which, in my own case, I call "acting on principle." "Cooperativeness" is a common candidate for moral praise; still, those who cooperated with the Nazis are called "collaborators." "Initiative" is praised but not "aggressiveness," "individualism" is admired but not "egoism."

As Aristotle observed in his *Ethics*, virtues are contextually defined. An action which, in one set of circumstances, is courageous is, in another set of circumstances, foolhardy. It is the characteristic of a fully virtuous man to know when, and to what extent, to give a particular disposition or attitude its expression. Judgment and emotional imagination are the crucial ingredients in this. Anyone who has a list of simple, unambiguous moral traits by which he would define the good man reveals that he lacks precisely these qualities. Yet they are the indispensable prerequisites for planning the future.

Indeed, even if people's moral desires were more easily definable than they are, there would still be a problem. They are woefully inconstant. The hopes for the regeneration of the race nurtured by enlightened people have moved from object to object over the last fifty years—the Russian Revolution, the war in Spain, Cuba, China, psychoanalysis as a cure for politics, politics as a cure for psychoanalysis, the encounter movement, the youth movement, the black movement, the women's movement. In 1935 Hermann Muller offered Lenin and Marx as examples of the kind of people whose genetic types should be propagated. Twenty-five years later, after the Lysenko affair, he took them off the list, and the names of Einstein, Pasteur, Lincoln, and Descartes appeared on it. Despite such changes of mind, his confidence that people knew what they were doing when they planned the genetic future of mankind remained unshaken. The intellectual and spiritual peregrinations of educated people in the last half-century do not inspire confidence in any plans they may develop for the remodeling of the species. "Oh, doctor, doctor!" says Jennifer in Shaw's *The Doctor's Dilemma*, "you . . . think you are a little god. How can you be so silly?"

Finally, all of these considerations say nothing about the classic political problem of distributing burdens and benefits. Biomedicine's techniques, however refined, cannot solve this problem. Consider even the relatively simple and easy-to-define issue of eliminating recessive genes for specific diseases from the human gene pool. A hundred such diseases will shortly be diagnosable by genetic screening, and many more, presumably, after that. A very large proportion of the human beings alive, perhaps all, will be found to be carriers of this or that dangerous characteristic. Who shall submit to biological nullification and who shall not? Genetic planning introduces a new reason for human quarrels but gives us no logic for solving them.

VII

If these considerations have any merit, there are no reasons for abandoning established principles of freedom of individual choice where biomedicine is concerned. The deliberate broad-scale regulation of man's procreative life requires powers of intelligence, imagination, and emotional perspective not within the human range. The observation applies equally, I believe, to those who would redesign the human species through eugenics and those who would place absolute barriers in the way of using biomedical knowledge to alleviate individual woes. In both cases, it seems to me, people are being asked to sacrifice the direct and immediate emotions that surround the procreating and bringing up of children to an abstract idea. It is not a prudent policy or a feeling one. Beyond the point of simpler economic budgeting, the ethical-political maxim that the present generation ought to sacrifice itself for an unidentified posterity has usually led to suffering not only profound but useless. People regularly do pay attention to the future, and make sacrifices for it, but for reasons of specific affection: they care for their children and grandchildren. I am inclined to think this a surer and sounder basis for choice than the hope for a new breed or the fear that absolute moral principles will be sullied.

I may appear unfair to apply these strictures against unrestrained abstractionism to people like Father Drinan or Rabbi Jakobovits, who seem to wish only that new scientific knowledge not be permitted to tear us loose from firm and tested ethical moorings. I confess that I feel considerably more sympathy with their views, with their creature caution, their sense of knowing what they know and preferring it, than I do with any eugenic Grand Design. Yet the reactions of Father Drinan and Rabbi Jakobovits seem to me unreal-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

istic. Positions like theirs are not likely to prevent the acceptance and widespread use of biomedical techniques; but they are likely, through their intransigence alone, to impede efforts to deal with biomedicine with prudent restraint. And most directly related to the present point is the consideration that, like eugenicists' plans, they allow an idea to soar away from any identifiable context. "The sanctity of human life," for example, undoubtedly expresses a value, but it doesn't exist alone. The duty not to cause avoidable suffering surely also makes a claim on us. So does the duty to use limited human resources discriminatingly. This sometimes involves making distinctions among kinds of life, including, if necessary, a fetus's life from an infant's. Recognition of the plurality of human duties is not properly described by words like "sentiment," "utilitarianism," or "expediency."

I do not find persuasive the first principle Father Drinan or Rabbi Jakobovits suggests—"the immorality of the destruction of any innocent human being carried out by other human beings for their own benefit." Like all such principles it fails as a guide in all cases. How does this principle apply to just wars, for example? Does it say there are none? Or that in war there are no innocents? How does it apply to common peacetime enterprises, like coal mining or bridge building, to which civilized and decent people give support every day, and which involve the predictable deaths of some human beings for the benefit of others? Admittedly, there is always, as classic arguments maintain, the danger of "the slippery slope." It can be said that once the decision has been taken that a fetal life can be aborted because it is unwanted, we are moving down the slippery slope that will lead to the taking of innocent adult lives because they are unwanted. But there are other slippery slopes. It seems to me also arguable, and somewhat more convincingly, that when people permit otherwise avoidable suffering to take place in the name of such speculative possibilities, they are halfway down the slippery slope that leads to the righteous punishment of their fellows for the sake of an abstract creed.

The fact is that any principle has its slippery slope. One meets that danger by combining it with other principles and not allowing oneself to be guided by it alone. Thomas Aquinas, no enemy to absolute values but not a moral innocent either, observed in the *Summa* (Qu. 94) that the law of nature, "as far as general first principles are concerned," is the same for everybody, but that when we get down to particular cases "it can admit of exceptions," and is applicable unchanged "only in the majority of cases." Few people who have looked closely at the concrete situations, each different from the next, in which, let us say, the parents of predictably mongoloid children have to decide about abortion, have been capable of coming up with unbreakable rules on the matter. Catholic and Jewish clergymen, even of orthodox views, have not invariably been as uncompromising in practice as their statements in theory would lead one to expect.

As for the notion of suppressing biomedical research because it involves playing with the ultimate secrets of nature, the impulse to adopt such a view is understandable but not the ease with which some members of the intellectual world are giving in to it. That biomedicine has given mankind powers which it is capable of using for ill is evident. Technologies of extraordinary power have been turned loose in contemporary society without even the simulacrum of thought about the consequences, and now we have one more. But the research that leads to test-tube babies is also the research that leads to a better understanding of cancer. Inquiry goes where nobody can predict, and technologies are useful for good and ill. These are truths that sound tired from being repeated, but they remain true and it is sad that they so often have to be repeated. For while technology is equivocal in its consequences, one thing is not —the damage that ensues, almost always very quickly, when a field of inquiry is banned because it is said to conflict with higher moral laws. The number of subjects that can come under this ax is indefinitely large. The character of the people who have ever wielded this ax is not reassuring.

Nor is the naiveté of eugenics planners. Professor Pauling, in a society that has run into some trouble in consequence of its habit of categorizing people by race, proposes that people be visibly marked when they carry bad genes! And others from Hermann Muller down envisage the planned production of a new human breed without facing the implications for their plan of the persistence of national sovereignties. Redesigning the species is not possible except under the strongest of world governments. If it were known that the object of such a government was to make a new breed, the arguments over which present breed should be the principal model would be likely to be considerable. There would probably be words like "genocide" thrown around. This would not facilitate the attainment of such a government, which, even under present circumstances, is not precisely easy to create.

The most astonishing question of all posed by the advent of biomedicine, probably, is why adults of high intelligence and considerable education so regularly give themselves, on slight and doubtful provocation, to unbounded plans for remaking the race. The factor responsible is not biomedicine; something else can be the catalyst tomorrow. It is the larger idea which has shaped

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the major traumatic events of the last three hundred years of modern history. What unites the Puritan radicals, the Jacobins, the Bolsheviks, the Nazis, and the Maoists is the deliberate intention to create a "new man," to redo the human creature by design. That is the modern idea of Revolution, an idea not entertained in the ancient world except as a matter of faith, miracles, and the destruction of temporal things. It is what has lifted revolution in the modern world above purely mundane concerns like overthrowing tyranny, or putting more capable or decent people into power, and has made it a process of transcendent meaning, beyond politics or pity, and justifying any sacrifice. These are the accents with which Sir Francis Crick, still another Nobel laureate, speaks, when he states his belief that no newborn infant should be declared human until it has passed certain tests regarding its genetic endowment, and that if it fails these tests it forfeits the right to live.

The partisans of large-scale eugenics planning, the Nazis aside, have usually been people of notable humanitarian sentiments. They seem not to hear themselves. It is that other music that they hear, the music that says that there shall be nothing random in the world, nothing independent, nothing moved by its own vitality, nothing out of keeping with some Idea: even our children must be not our progeny but our creations.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel After the War: 1

Peace With Egypt?

Walter Laqueur

ANY discussion of the current prospects for peace between Israel and the Arab countries has to begin by rehearsing the history of the Middle East between the Six-Day War of June 1967 and the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. Efforts to reach a peace settlement in those seven years were protracted, highly complicated, and ultimately futile. All the many plans that were proposed—the Rogers plan, the Jarring plan, and the nameless others—seem now of merely academic interest (although it is entirely possible that one or another of them will be disinterred for future use). The story of these negotiations is a melancholy one, not least for the question it raises of possible opportunities missed by the various parties to the conflict, especially Israel. Not that Israel ignored any genuine peace overture from the Arabs; there was none. But it is another matter whether an interim accommodation might not have been reached with Egypt alone, based on a demilitarization of the Sinai, and whether such an arrangement would not have lessened the likelihood of a new round of fighting.

After the Arab attack of October 1973 it was noted in Israel that the strategic depth offered by the Sinai was in fact a lifesaver; had the attack been launched from the pre-June 1967 lines it would have threatened Israel's very existence. This is very true. But the argument assumes that the 1967 borders were the only feasible alternative to the Bar Lev line, when in fact a demilitarized Sinai might have functioned as a more effective warning zone than did the Suez Canal. Nor can it be taken for granted that the attack itself was inevitable, since Egypt faced a great many problems at home and abroad, and had some sort of interim agreement been reached on the Sinai, the Egyptians might not have felt such an overriding urgency to recover all the lost territories.

Similarly, a settlement might have been made with Jordan; although not with Syria. Yet Syria in isolation could not have caused a great deal of damage. The same goes for Al-Fatah and its rival groups, who would anyway have kept up their sporadic attacks from across the border and the hijacking of airplanes. In the course of time, however, the Palestinians might have come to see that they could no longer rely on the Arab governments in their struggle and they too might have come to accept the existence of the state of Israel.

This particular line of thinking was dismissed in the late 60's as a dangerous delusion by those who claimed to know Arab political psychology. Yet it later appeared that the terrorist organizations were actually afraid of a more flexible Israeli policy, lest it put them out of business. "Thank God for Dayan," wrote Yasir Arafat in retrospect:

> After the 1967 defeat, Arab opinion, broken and dispirited, was ready to conclude peace at any price. If Israel, after its lightning victory, had proclaimed that it had no expansionist aims and withdrawn its troops from the conquered territories, while continuing to occupy certain strategic points necessary to its security, the affair would have been easily settled. . . .*

Arafat exaggerates: the affair would not have been easily settled. Still, there was a chance that de-escalation might have worked, and the truth is that those opportunities which did exist were not explored.

The reasons for this were manifold. Deep down the Israelis have always inclined toward a "worst-case" analysis of their situation, arising perhaps from a determination (which is hardly difficult to understand in the light of recent history) not to take any risks with Jewish lives. Arab leaders had threatened Israel with extinction for many years prior to 1967, and these threats could not easily be dismissed as idle. When in the wake of the 1967 war the Arabs officially opted at the Khartoum conference for a policy of immobility ("No peace, no recognition, no negotiation") it was only natural for Israel to react accordingly. Any other course would have been interpreted as evidence of weakness, and it was well known that

WALTER LAQUEUR is director of the Institute of Contemporary History in London and the author of many works on international affairs, including *The Rebirth of Europe*, *A History of Zionism*, and the forthcoming *The Middle East and World Politics* (Quadrangle). Among Mr. Laqueur's most recent articles in COMMENTARY are "Oil" (October 1973) with Edward Luttwak and "Kissinger and the Politics of Détente" (December 1973).

* Quoted in John K. Cooley, *Green March, Black September* (New York, 1973), p. 99.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Arabs respected strength alone. From a military point of view the 1967 armistice lines seemed ideal. Before the war, Jordanian territory extended to within 30 km. of Tel Aviv, Egyptian territory to within 80; now the Egyptians were many hundreds of kilometers away, and the Jordanians were beyond the Jordan River. Israeli planes could reach Cairo in a few minutes' time. A good case could be, and was, made for not withdrawing from these lines—quite apart from the biblical prophecies and other divine injunctions invoked by the few Israeli annexationists.

No one in Israel expected all the territories taken in the Six-Day War to be retained, at least at first. Immediately after the war Moshe Dayan came out against an Israeli presence at the Suez Canal, Abba Eban warned against an "intoxiction with victory," David Ben-Gurion on more than one occasion reiterated that a strong army, although vital, was no substitute for a political solution which in his view should include a return of the West Bank under agreed terms and a satisfactory settlement of the Sinai issue. Differences of opinion within the ranks of the Israeli government itself manifested themselves in such proposals as the Allon plan, recognizing the Palestinian Arabs' right to self-determination. But as time went on, Dayan, Golda Meir, Israel Galili, and other Israeli leaders became increasingly pessimistic about the prospects of a peace settlement. As long as the Arabs were unwilling to talk, Israel had to stand fast. A growing reluctance was felt even to discuss the possible terms of a settlement. The general attitude became that the Arab-Israeli confrontation, like every other conflict in history, had to run its full course. At some date in the future, when the Arabs were psychologically ready to accept the existence of Israel, it would be possible to find mutually acceptable solutions to all the outstanding questions —but for the time being Israel had to stand firm.

This policy had much to recommend it, but it also had several major flaws. It ignored the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not purely regional in character, and that with regard to the two superpowers involved, an asymmetry existed between American support for Israel and Soviet support for the Arabs: America had to consider its other interests in the Middle East whereas the Soviet Union could give all-out assistance to its clients. It underrated the effective force of the Arab armies built up by the Russians since 1967. It overrated détente. And, above all, it did not take into consideration the growing importance of the oil weapon as a means of isolating Israel on the international scene: as far as Western Europe and Japan were concerned, Israel was expendable but Arab oil was not. The international constellation, in brief, was changing, and not in Israel's favor. A major power might have stood by and watched these changes with some degree of equanimity; a small country did so at its peril.

With the end of the 1973 war came a new willingness in Israel to rethink the Arab-Israeli dispute, and to consider new ways of settling it. A spate of articles and speeches, symptomatic of the confusion caused by war, suggested all kinds of panaceas: a National Security Council, a mutual-defense pact with the U.S., a "charismatic minister of information." Only after an interval of several weeks were serious attempts undertaken to analyze the lessons of the October war in broader perspective and greater depth. This soul-searching coincided with the electoral campaign in which the parties had to clarify their policies for the future. The right-wing Herut claimed in its election propaganda that the people of Israel had won a magnificent victory on the battlefield and should not have to pay for the defeat of the Western world on the oilfields of Arabia; but Herut also denied that it was a "war party" and asserted that it was much better equipped than the Labor coalition to lead Israel toward peace. The Liberals, Herut's partners in the Likud coalition, advocated a more moderate line, suggesting Israeli concessions in return for peace; the debate among Liberals was whether these concessions should be spelled out or not.

As for the Labor alignment, it had to accommodate conflicting trends in its declared policy. The preamble of the 14-point program accepted last November stated that "Our platform must reflect the lessons of the Yom Kippur War." But what were these lessons, apart from the need (on which everyone agreed) to maintain the strength of the defense forces? The platform insisted on defensible borders based on a territorial compromise. There would be no return to the June 1967 boundaries; a peace agreement with Jordan would be based on the existence of two independent states—Israel, with Jerusalem as its capital, and an Arab state to the east; efforts would be made to continue settling Israelis in the occupied areas "in keeping with cabinet decisions giving priority to national security considerations." The last point was a concession to the "hawks" in the Labor alignment, but as a whole the Labor platform constituted a decisive victory for the doves and a retreat from the maximalist demands voiced before the war.

By sheer coincidence, the Labor platform was published on the same day the demands of the Arabs were made known at the Algiers meeting of Arab heads of state. These stated that the struggle against the Zionist "invasion" was a long-term historic responsibility which would call for many more trials and sacrifices. A cease-fire was not peace, which would come only when a number of conditions had been met, two among them paramount and unequivocal: first, the evacuation by Israel of all occupied Arab territories and above all Jerusalem; second, the re-establishment of full national rights for the Palestinian people.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Yet inasmuch as no objections were voiced to negotiations with Israel, something which the Khartoum conference in 1967 had expressly rejected, it appeared to many observers that the "moderate" line of President Sadat had won out in Algiers. The final communiqué stated that the meeting had been a great success, but since Iraq and Libya boycotted the conference, and Syria subsequently decided not to participate in the Geneva conference at all, Arab unity could by no means be said to be complete. As the weeks passed the Algiers resolution was shrilly rejected by Arab extremists. A broadcast emanating from Baghdad on December 21, 1973 (the day the Geneva talks opened) announced: "The masses will not be bound by the regimes of treason and defeatism at the Geneva conference." Radio Tripoli asked: "Has our Arab nation become so servile in the eyes of those leaders [i.e., Sadat] that they belittle its dignity and injure its pride without fearing its wrath?"

Israel's "khaki elections" took place on the last day of the old year.* If public-opinion polls published last September are to be trusted, the results would have been similar even if the war had not taken place. The Labor alignment, deeply split and under fire from within not only because of the military handling of the war but for the lack of flexibility shown by Mrs. Meir's inner circle in recent years, lost ground. Were it not for the obvious necessity to preserve the unity of the alignment in view of the international situation, it is quite possible that both Mrs. Meir and General Dayan might have had to resign under pressure from large sections of their party. But Likud had no cause to be overjoyed by the results of the elections either; if the party of Menahem Begin could not overtake its rivals in such nearly ideal conditions, it never would—unless, of course, the Labor alignment should disintegrate entirely.

The campaign was confused because the Israeli voter was not given a clear choice. As one Israeli commentator wrote, "Those who want to purchase Dayan must buy Allon. Those who want the Liberals must buy Begin." In the absence of a clear choice, the outcome of the elections was bound to be inconclusive: no clear mandate emerged for any one course of action. Menahem Begin may have been relieved not to receive more votes than he did; victory would have almost certainly compelled him to make concessions in Geneva contrary to what he promised during the campaign. Yet the absence of consensus—more accurately, the sharp polarization of public opinion—will make the task of the Israeli negotiators beyond the first stage of the talks very difficult. The effect of the vote, the London *Economist* wrote, was to block any government from making the vital decisions that the Geneva talks demand. Since such a state of affairs cannot continue for very long, the deadlock will probably be broken either by new fighting or by a new election, or perhaps both.

* On the Israeli elections, see also David Vital's article on p. 46 of this issue.—Ed.

II

Throughout history there has been one kind of war notoriously difficult to conclude: the war of faith, the holy war, the crusade. In these conflicts it is not the leader or the government of the other side that is the enemy, but every individual in the enemy camp.

To what extent do the Arabs regard their conflict with Israel as a religious war, or a war of national liberation, to use the modern parlance? The recent Algiers summit conference proclaimed that the war aim of the Arab states was the restoration of the national rights of the Palestinian Arabs, that the Palestine Liberation Organization was the only legal representative of the Palestinians, and that its interpretation of the "national rights" was binding. The PLO interpretation was in turn laid down in the Palestinian National Covenant of July 1968, which says that the establishment of Israel is "null and void." The Algiers resolution, in other words, as much as stated that the purpose of any peace conference would be to discuss the liquidation of Israel.

In the eyes of some, this means that it is pointless for Israel to attend the Geneva conference. Fortunately, however, even in the war aims of religious or quasi-religious movements a discrepancy often exists between the desirable and the possible. In theory Catholics and Protestants should not coexist to this day, nor should Muslims and Christians, or Communists and non-Communists. All such movements have come at one stage or another to the realization that with an enemy who cannot be defeated, temporary compromises have to be made. The old enmity, the *odium theologicum*, is itself subject to gradual erosion as such compromises become permanent; the formulas of hatred may linger on but they no longer carry the same conviction.

At the Geneva peace conference Israel will establish in due course whether, at this stage in the conflict, a readiness to compromise has been reached by the Arab states. With regard to Egypt in particular a peace conference may have been long overdue. So far as the psychological readiness of other Arabs to accept the existence of Israel is concerned, the conference may turn out to be premature. Geneva may be just the beginning of a long process, perhaps the first in a series of conferences that will be interrupted by crises, pressure, threats, breakdown, new fighting, new negotiations.

The Geneva peace conference opened on December 21 in an atmosphere of cautious optimism. President Nixon had said soon after the alert in October that the prospects for peace had

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

never before been so good. Dr. Kissinger, in his opening speech at the conference, spoke of a "historic chance for peace"; there were promising noises from Jerusalem, Moscow, and even Cairo. All this optimism was based, no doubt, on the undisputed fact that immediately after a war the prospects almost always seem brightest and formerly unacceptable conditions suddenly seem acceptable after all.

It was not by chance that the conference concentrated in its first phase on Israel and Egypt; and certainly the issue of troop disengagement, an issue speedily settled in the agreement signed on January 17, was not the only motivating factor. The Israel-Egypt "problem" does not at first glance seem insurmountable. If Egyptian sovereignty over Sinai were recognized and Egypt were to accept an effective system of demilitarization, there would then remain only the matter of a token Israeli demilitarized zone and the question of the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh. Neither side is particularly eager to accept responsibility for Gaza (though neither will admit it) and the importance of Sharm el-Sheikh to Israel has been somewhat exaggerated (the recent Egyptian blockade at Bab el-Mandeb almost nullified the strategic usefulness of an Israeli presence at Sharm el-Sheikh). Assuming that Israel were to withdraw gradually from Sinai and the Egyptians were to accept the principle of demilitarization, a settlement between the two countries could be envisaged—following hard bargaining, of course.

Israel, however, would hardly agree to withdraw in return for a mere armistice, and it is here that the real difficulties may set in. Egypt has assured its Arab allies that it will under no circumstances make peace with Israel unless Israel withdraws from all occupied Arab territories and unless the national rights of the Palestinians are restored. The official interpretation of this formula, as I have noted, means the liquidation of the state of Israel. There are, however, several other interpretations possible and there are, in addition, legitimate grounds for doubting the strength of Egypt's commitment to the cause of its allies.

For twenty-five years Egypt has borne the brunt of the struggle against Israel, yet pan-Arab feeling is less deeply rooted in Cairo than elsewhere in the Arab world. Even the late Gamal Abdel Nasser, the champion of pan-Arabism, recognized toward the end of his life that he had taken upon himself an impossible and thankless task. In the struggle against Israel Egypt has received a great deal of verbal aid and unsolicited advice, but when the hour of truth comes, as it did in October 1973, little more than token support is ever forthcoming from its Arab friends. Syria and Iraq harbor strong feelings of resentment toward Egypt; leadership in the Arab world, they maintain, should rightfully be theirs. Colonel Qaddafi of Libya has on many occasions decried Egypt's "decadence" and "corruption," and there is not much love lost between Egypt and Algeria either. The Egyptians for their part regard Syria and Iraq as semi-barbaric lands and they have contempt for the Palestinians.

All in all, there is a strong inclination inside Egypt today to put Egyptian interests first, pan-Arab interests second. The Six-Day War came as a great shock to Egypt, and there was universal agreement that the shame of 1967 had to be expiated on the field of battle and Sinai regained. But with these aims achieved, Egypt may no longer feel an overriding obligation to champion the further struggle against Israel. To be sure, one can find hundreds of articles and dozens of books published in Egypt all proclaiming the inadmissibility of a Jewish state in the Middle East. But these declarations should not necessarily be taken at face value. If Israel could be made to disappear overnight, no Egyptian leader would object, but the prospect of many more years of hard fighting and severe damage to the country has little appeal. The Egyptian army was eager to fight for Ismailia; it is not so eager to fight (much less to die) for Nablus and Tulkarm. When addressing their more radical Arab brethren, Egyptians will stress that the final goal is the total liberation of the whole of Palestine, but this, they are apt to add quickly, will happen only in a generation or two or perhaps three. In the meantime much water will have flowed down the Nile and the Jordan.

IT SHOULD have been Israeli policy after 1967—and especially after Nasser's death in 1970—to concentrate on a separate deal with Egypt, and this should be its foremost objective now. I do not wish to discount the difficulty of accomplishing this objective. Egypt is desperately poor, and financially dependent on Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states. These countries, for a variety of reasons, have a vested interest in the prolongation of the struggle against Israel, which for them is tantamount to an insurance policy against the radical forces in the Arab world that threaten their own existence. Sadat's position is stronger now than before the war, but this is not saying much. Nor would an Egyptian-Israeli deal mark the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the event of a new flare-up the danger would always exist that Egypt might be drawn into the campaign. Finally, an opening to Egypt on Israel's part would involve a basic psychological reorientation: since 1948 Egypt has been *the* enemy for Israel. Nevertheless, despite all these considerations, the fact remains that the interests of the two countries are not necessarily incompatible, and normal, if not friendly, relations between them should not be ruled out as a future possibility. There will be many realignments in the Arab world in the years to come and, unlikely as this may appear now, it is by no

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

means unthinkable that one day Israel will break out of its present isolation and align itself with one or more of the Arab countries against one or more of the others.

For if a settlement with Egypt entails grave risks, the two other alternatives are even more dangerous. One is not to give up anything, the other to tackle the problem at its core and strive for a settlement which would satisfy the Palestinian Arabs. As for the first, if one assumes (as some do) that any Israeli withdrawal is bound to be just the first step in the gradual dismemberment of the country as a whole by its Arab neighbors, it would of course be preferable in every respect to make a stand now, rather than later when the boundaries will be harder to defend. Israel is already isolated, according to this view, and there is no further point in trying to appease world opinion by capitulation. The U.S. in the last resort can be counted on to remain steadfast, for its prestige is deeply involved and Israel is by now a cornerstone of its foreign policy. This line of thought, if put into action, would almost certainly bring about a new war in the Middle East, perhaps within a few months, for Sadat is under considerable domestic pressure to show results or to renew the fighting. But the prospect does not deter the advocates of such a policy. A new war, they argue, might be a protracted and hard struggle, but in the end Israel would win and this time the victory would be decisive.

A more sophisticated version of the hard-line argument maintains that since the deck has been stacked in advance, it would be fatal for Israel to act "reasonably" and "responsibly" in the present situation, as it is being urged to do on all sides. A superpower like the Soviet Union can swallow whole countries and go uncriticized, while Israel is denied the right to defensible borders and is expected to conform to the wishes of the great powers. Since the game is fixed, why not behave "irrationally"—like the Arab oil producers, say, or the Arab terrorists? There would be much general indignation, the Russians would issue threats, a few more countries would break off relations, pressure would be exerted by Washington, but nothing much worse would be likely to happen. The coming years will in any case see far-reaching changes in world politics—perhaps the total collapse of Europe, or, less likely, the reassertion of Europe's power. War might break out between the Soviet Union and China. International relations are increasingly being dictated by the law of the jungle, and unless Israel adapts itself to these conditions, the argument concludes, its chances of survival will be slim. Israel should be tough, unpredictable, and to a certain degree irresponsible.

This reasoning cannot be dismissed out of hand (for the simple fact that anything is possible in politics) but the chances of such a policy in the real world cannot be rated high. It underestimates the extent of Israel's military and economic dependence on the United States, and exaggerates American readiness to help Israel in the future. But even more decisively, it is not a policy that the government of a democratic country can easily pursue.

Then there is the alternative of an accommodation with the Palestinians—in every way the ideal solution. If Palestinians and Israelis could reach agreement on the basis of the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank, Israeli willingness to take back some refugees, and the resettlement elsewhere of those for whom a home could not be found, an end would be put to the conflict once and for all. For the fate of the Palestinian Arabs is the heart of the matter; without a solution of this issue, the wider conflict will not be solved.

Unfortunately, however, the Palestinian issue is also the least tractable by far of all the issues of contention between Israel and the Arab world. A Palestinian Arab state would not be economically viable, and would be heavily dependent on the other Arab countries and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the policy of such a state would most likely be dictated not by the forces of peace but by the radical elements, which would consider the West Bank merely a base for the continuation of the armed struggle against Israel. Nor does the domestication of the terrorists seem a likely prospect for the near future. The main Palestinian organizations, Fatah and PLO, deny the Israelis' right to national self-determination, and their aim is the destruction of the "Zionist state." When they speak of the "democratic secular Palestinian state" that will replace Israel, they mean an Arab state in which Jews would have the right to be buried in their own cemeteries.

THUS, whatever the Geneva conference may achieve, it will almost certainly not bring an overall peace to the area. But if the chances for overall peace are remote, there does exist now (as after 1967) an opportunity for defusing the conflict, for rendering unlikely the renewal of fighting on a large scale. This can be done principally by Israel's meeting the basic demands of the Egyptians—gradual withdrawal of Israeli forces from large parts of the Sinai and the recognition in principle of Egyptian sovereignty there, in exchange for demilitarization. Unless this demand is met, a new outbreak of hostilities seems likely, with the almost certain outcome a peace settlement dictated by the superpowers and even more detrimental to Israel's interests.

III

THE prospect of an imposed settlement by the superpowers to the detriment of Israel raises the specter of the infamous Munich conference of 1938. And, in fact, Czechoslo-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vakia in the late 1930's has been invoked rather frequently in the last few months as offering an instructive analogy to the situation in which Israel now finds itself. A small democratic country in the center of Europe, Czechoslovakia was dismembered in two stages following a decision dictated by the powers. "Munich" and "appeasement" have become part of our political vocabulary, shorthand words connoting a sellout à la 1938. There are those who see such a sellout—of Israel—shaping up in today's Middle East.

Drawing historical parallels is always dangerous and sometimes downright misleading, but there is no denying that a comparison with Czechoslovakia is of some help in understanding the present situation. Though democratic in character, Czechoslovakia contained a substantial minority—3,500,000 Germans—which, from the very beginning, did not want to be part of the Czechoslovak state formed after World War I, gravitating rather toward Germany; the stronger Germany became, the stronger the pull toward Berlin. Hitler demanded the "return" of the Sudeten regions, where the German minority was concentrated; the Czechs maintained that these regions were economically and militarily vital to Czechoslovakia.

All through 1938, while the Nazis were stepping up the pressure on Prague, a great deal of sharp criticism was being voiced in the West about the state of affairs inside Czechoslovakia. The British and French press published scathing condemnations of the Czechs for their treatment of the German minority. The Czech state, it was claimed, was an artificial creation, founded a mere twenty years before in what was now seen to have been a regrettable error. The idea that France should "commit suicide," or that a "single Frenchman should die for this misbegotten state" was grotesque. Not surprisingly, the Jews too were brought in; Léon Daudet, son of a famous father, wrote in 1938 in *L'Action Française*: "Peasant or worker, the average Frenchman is expected to commit suicide at the merest nod of a Jew who detests him, in some obscure and faraway village of which he hasn't the vaguest idea." Later that same year, Neville Chamberlain echoed these sentiments in similar terms: the Paris treaty-makers had committed an error, he declared, and the treaty should have been revised long ago; it was unthinkable to Chamberlain that Britons should go to war for a faraway land about which they knew nothing.

The anti-Czech comment of 1938, which bears an uncanny resemblance to remarks in the Western press, particularly the British and French, during the recent Middle East crisis and after, was by no means limited to the Right or to proponents of *Realpolitik*. The Left too castigated Czechoslovakia for not being a genuinely neutral country like Switzerland; France and Britain after all could not play the role of international policeman forever. Czech policy was called a danger to world peace; although the term "détente" had not yet been invented, the phrase used at the time was just as expressive: *"Conciliation entre les états totalitaires et les états democratiques."* The only alternative to such conciliation was the unleashing of war. What the world needed was disarmament, and in the long run Czechoslovakia too was assured it would find security in a disarmed world.*

The status of Czechoslovakia was supposed to be settled by the agreements reached in Munich. The Sudeten regions were returned to Germany in exchange for an international guarantee of the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression. Yet when, six months later, German troops invaded what remained of Czechoslovakia after Munich, no one came to the rescue.

MUNICH provides some highly instructive lessons about the psychology of appeasement and the value of international guarantees, and as such it is useful as a warning in the present negotiations. But there is a danger in pushing the analogy too far. Not every peace treaty in world history has been violated, after all, nor every international guarantee ignored. The lessons of Munich, that is to say, are of limited value as a guide for the future and cannot in my view be used as an alibi by those who oppose any concessions whatsoever on Israel's part.

The international constellation and the balance of power in the Middle East do not resemble Europe in 1938. Czechoslovakia faced a relentless enemy who could not possibly be deflected from his course. Israel, on the other hand, confronts a coalition of states that have neither the cohesion nor the power of Nazi Germany. That this coalition should have come into being at all was unusual—to a certain extent it may have come into being as a result of Israeli diplomatic inflexibility—and it will last only by a miracle. Hitler was reasonably certain that Czechoslovakia, facing the overwhelming power of the Reich, would not fight. And as for the Czechs, surrender meant the loss of independence, in itself a national disaster but not the end of the Czech people. For many centuries the Czechs had survived under foreign rule, and the conviction was strong that sooner or later Hitler's policy would lead to a war in which the Germans would be defeated, and then an independent Czechoslovakia would rise again —as indeed it did seven years later. No such hope exists for Israel, and this in itself precludes an Israeli surrender. But Israel is not only more resolute than Czechoslovakia, it is also infinitely stronger. Even Hitler would not have attacked

* Michael Harrington in a recent article has offered the current version of this argument. See his "Israel, the War, and American Politics," *Midstream*, December 1973.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Czechoslovakia if, for argument's sake, it had meant risking the destruction of Berlin, Munich, and other German centers.

FOR Israel, the years to come, fraught as they will be with danger, will require not only constant military preparedness, a high degree of flexibility, and economic sacrifice, but also, very likely, political concessions. Nevertheless, and despite the efficaciousness of the oil weapon in Arab hands, the outlook is not all that unpromising. As long as the "Zionist menace" overshadowed all other factors in the Arab political consciousness, a certain degree of unity prevailed in the Arab world. But as the "enemy" assumes a lower profile, all the suppressed dissensions among Arab nations and Arab ideologies are bound to reassert themselves. The fact that some Arab countries will earn fabulous riches during the years to come while others will not is going to exacerbate existing divisions; sooner or later, there will be a free-for-all for the spoils. The oil-producing countries are already becoming increasingly unpopular all over the world because of their extortionist policies, and they are going to have to defend themselves and their riches against more immediate dangers than Israel. Assuming that the global balance of power does not radically change in the next decade, that America does not become substantially weaker, and that some sort of détente continues to hold between the two superpowers, the risk will be reduced of an all-out Arab attack.

But in the final analysis, Israel's fate will depend on its own policies and on its own inner character. It certainly cannot afford the luxury of an internal factional war such as once before in history caused the destruction of a Jewish commonwealth. Israel in the days to come will need unity, strong nerves, and a readiness to compromise combined with a firm resolve to repel any new threat to its existence.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel After the War: 2

Back to Abnormal

Hanoch Bartov

YOM KIPPUR in Israel will never be the same again, at least not for my generation, whose sense of the world came from two decisive experiences: first the Holocaust, then the establishment of the Jewish state. And not for our children either, the eighteen-, and twenty, and twenty-five-year-olds to whom those experiences had always seemed irrelevant, part of a past which scarcely touched on their own situation in a thriving, self-confident society—the only Israel they had ever known. Suddenly on the afternoon of Yom Kippur 1973, that situation changed drastically, as they found themselves not only fighting for their lives, but almost breaking under a burden they had been asked to carry virtually alone—that of the very survival of the State of Israel.

The memory of this past Yom Kippur will be with us for a long time, and not just as another scar from a battle bitterly fought and gallantly won. As I write this, many weeks have elapsed since the initial shock of the war, yet things show no sign of returning to the way they were before October 6. Rather, I have the impression that the experience was a kind of national trauma, that the Yom Kippur War may well become a turning-point in the formation of Israel's identity; or, to put it more precisely, in the formation of Israel's *Jewish* identity. Whether such a change is dream or nightmare depends on one's point of view, but in any case the trip to "normalcy" is over, for the time being at least. We are back to abnormal.

The invasion launched simultaneously on the 6th of October from both Egypt and Syria was meticulously planned—there are indications that even the assaults on individual outposts of the Suez Canal had been rehearsed dozens of times. Exactly which elements in that rather complex operation were devised by the Egyptian and Syrian general staffs, and which should be credited to their Soviet mentors, will take a while to sort out—in the meantime we can ponder the remark of the Soviet ambassador to Egypt, as quoted by the editor of *al-Ahram:* the Yom Kippur assault, said Ambassador Vinogradov with tears in his eyes, was the happiest day of his three years in Cairo, and the culmination of his efforts there. Some journalists have even speculated that the very decision to attack on Yom Kippur was a Soviet contribution. If so, it was the wrong decision—laden with symbolism though it was. Indeed, of all the days of the calendar, Yom Kippur was possibly the worst of all for achieving the grim objectives of that onslaught—though our enemies, misunderstanding the nature of Israeli society, could not have known that.

Of all the Jewish holidays, Yom Kippur is the one that has been least affected by its encounter with Zionism. Passover, Shavuot, Hanukkah, as well as a host of other occasions and customs, have all been changed in one way or another by the effort—going all the way back to the first settlement in Palestine almost a hundred years ago—to reinterpret Jewish traditions both in terms of the biblical past (the "return to our sources," as the old phrase had it), and the new society being forged in Palestine. Only Yom Kippur resisted all attempts at change. It remained the one purely religious holiday—the Day of Atonement, the Day of Judgment, the one day of the year set aside for the encounter between man and God. One could either accept it as such, or not accept it at all.

In the early radical days of the frontier generation, the tendency was to forgo Yom Kippur altogether; indeed, the supreme test of one's "liberation" at that time was how far one could go in ostentatiously ignoring the day. But this particular brand of militant secularism has long since vanished from the Israeli scene. I cannot date its disappearance exactly, but in my mind it is linked to the terrible Yom Kippur eve in the autumn of 1939, when the approaching doom of Europe's Jews could no longer be denied. That year, the makeshift synagogue in my boyhood town of Petach Tikvah—hastily improvised out of two classrooms in the local girls' school—was overflowing with people who had never been seen there before: young, sunburned kibbutzniks from various settlements in the vicinity, resolutely secularist, whose fears for their families in Eastern Europe proved weightier than ideology. That day we had heard the news that Poland was all but occupied, that Warsaw was burning, and that final capitulation to the Germans was a matter of hours. It was not only my father, wrapped in his

HANOCH BARTOV, an Israeli novelist whose works include *The Brigade,* is on the staff of the afternoon daily, *Ma'ariv.* This is Mr. Bartov's first contribution to COMMENTARY.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prayer shawl, who wept during the service that night in Petach Tikvah; so did the kibbutzniks, in their white shirts, all of them sensing that the fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters they had left behind were lost to them forever.

I have never forgotten that Yom Kippur of 1939 when the Yishuv first mourned its European brethren, and perhaps it left its mark too on the collective memory of Israel—or at least on that part of it which came of age when I did. From then on, Yom Kippur and the Holocaust were in some way linked inextricably in our minds, whether or not we had—as I had—long since given up going to the synagogue.

Be that as it may, the nearly full Yom Kippur moon of October 1973 shone over a muted country, its radio and television stations already off the air, its restaurants, theaters, and cafés already shut down. Here and there, a lone car was still to be seen, hurrying to its destination, but in a few minutes the streets would be empty, and the country at a standstill. On any other holiday, the whole population would have been on the move—hiking in the woods, climbing Mt. Hermon, swimming in the Gulf of Eilat; on this particular day people were either at the synagogue or in their own homes, observing a kind of voluntary curfew appropriate to the spirit of the day. This factor was to prove of enormous importance in the emergency mobilization that would begin in the morning hours of October 6. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see now that only on Yom Kippur, on no other day but Yom Kippur in fact, contravening the murderous intentions of our enemies, could tens of thousands of Israeli civilians have been transformed so quickly into an army. Only on that day could the reservists have been located so quickly in one of two places; only on that day could they have been sped with so few delays over highways that were virtually empty, to the assistance of that besieged handful of men who were attempting to hold back the invaders against overwhelming odds.

At Suez, along the eastern shore of the Canal, a few hundred reservists from Jerusalem and an even smaller number of conscripts had been under massive artillery fire since 1:50 that afternoon, trying in vain to hold the Bar-Lev line against wave after wave of Egypt's best-trained commando and infantry soldiers. Before twenty-four hours had passed, about a thousand Egyptian tanks would have succeeded in crossing the Canal. In the Golan Heights, enemy penetration would be even swifter, threatening the heavily populated settlements throughout the Upper Galilee. Some 1,400 tanks, it has since been estimated, launched the offensive there along a line only a few dozen miles long, with odds of more than ten to one against the Israelis.

The devout spend the eve of Yom Kippur in the study of holy texts; my wife and I spent it, as usual, talking politics with friends late into the night. The elections were just around the corner, and we all agreed that there were only two real issues in the campaign, and both of them were internal. First, there was the "social issue," as it had come to be known: could measures be found to redress that growing sense of social inequality—itself, ironically, a product of unprecedented economic success—which was threatening to tear Israeli society apart? A special committee appointed by the Prime Minister two years earlier in the wake of the "Black Panther" demonstrations had just issued its report, and it seemed to bear out the general sense that the material prosperity which the country had been enjoying since the Six-Day War carried with it a burden of dangerous social tension. There seemed to be a growing gap between the haves and have-nots. It was not that the poor had grown poorer; rather, that the sudden emergence of a conspicuously affluent "new class" was generating increasing resentment in Israeli society. Old-timers were openly envious of new settlers; young couples begrudged the help being given to immigrants from the Soviet Union. And nowhere was this resentment more keenly felt than in the lower third or quarter of the population, those low-income families with many children, originating mainly from the Jewish communities in the Arab countries of Asia and North Africa, who were still poorly housed and deprived of educational opportunities.

THE second issue before the electorate was the question of the territories held by Israel since 1967 and what was to be done with them, a question which, it was growing clearer by the day, could not be avoided for very much longer. It was over this issue that the National Coalition broke apart in 1970, as Likud took the view that the Land of Israel could never again be divided up, and this break was to cast a long shadow over all subsequent political developments. Some six months before the scheduled election, the Labor party had been dragged into a public debate on policy in the territories, a debate which was intensified by the reiterated demands of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, within whose province the territories fell, for an ultimate policy statement on the question. Dayan's own proposals for developing the territories, coupled with the prospect that he might even test these proposals by running for office on a separate ticket, and on top of other pressures both internal and external, had finally culminated in the goverment's first official policy statement on the territories since the Six-Day War. Known as the Galili Document, it provided for development and some purchase of the Arab territories within the next four years. Nothing perhaps so well symbolizes the state of Israel's unawareness of its own situation in the fall of 1973 as the preoccupation with this document, imbued as it was with the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

confident assumption that the status quo could continue long into the foreseeable future.

WHEN my wife's mother telephoned the next morning, it was shortly before noon, and we were still asleep. Did I know anything about what was going on? For the past two hours people had been leaving the synagogue in the middle of the service. Some had simply taken off their prayer shawls then and there, jumped into cars that were waiting outside, and driven off. Could fighting have broken out somewhere? It seemed unlikely. The only possibility that came to mind—some sort of military operation in response to the terrorist hijacking of the Moscow-Vienna train—was ruled out by the fact that it was Yom Kippur. Surely no reprisals would be undertaken on that particular day. As we talked, I opened the shutters and looked out the window. For the first time in memory, the Yom Kippur streets were heavy with traffic—and traffic of every conceivable kind: army trucks, buses, commercial vans, everything on wheels had been pressed into service. From the small airfield that was within sight of our windows I could also see planes taking off every few seconds. Something was indeed going on, but I was still more puzzled than alarmed, unable to imagine anything like the cataclysm that was to begin in less than two hours—one which, as we now know, had been in preparation for a long time, possibly years. I turned to the radio, but there was still nothing being broadcast.

Even when the radio finally came alive and we heard the official announcement that heavy fighting had broken out along the Syrian and Egyptian fronts, we were not unduly alarmed; surely the tide would turn in a few hours. I went over to my office at *Ma'ariv*, where a bit more information was by this time available, and where a similar mood prevailed. Dayan, on television, seemed rather tense, to be sure, but no less confident than usual. Even the fact that nothing was being said about actual battlefield positions seemed, at the time, encouraging. It called to mind those first hours of the Six-Day War, when the extravagant propaganda claims of the Arabs were deliberately left unchallenged.

Like almost everyone else during those first few hours, I tried to figure out a way of getting to where the action was, but my laughable military record did not help much—after long years as a sergeant, possibly the oldest living sergeant in the Israeli army, I had finally been transferred two years ago to a sedate "educational" unit. Finally, on Sunday night, after a day of pulling strings, I was able to get myself assigned to the Sinai front as a military correspondent. The next morning, I took off in my own car for Beersheva, from which point I eventually managed to reach the Northern Command Post of the Canal front, arriving there late Monday night. The full moon had turned the desert into a surrealistic dreamland: mute, flashing lights on the horizon, endless convoys, tanks galloping madly across the dunes, and from a distance the muffled roar of guns. Was I too late? Was the war already over? Had I missed out on the last phase of yet another victory against our would-be destroyers?

By now we all know how wrong I was. The situation that Monday night two-and-a-half days after the outbreak of the war was worlds away from what it looked like to me at the time—the tide was still very far from turning. Yet I do not altogether blame my own faulty powers of observation for the error. I had more or less discharged my duties as a journalist, running here and there to gather impressions, talking to officers and men in an effort to size up the situation. Rather, there was simply no way at that point to assess the full magnitude of what had happened—how grave the danger to Israel had actually been, and still was; how high a price had already been paid in the lives of those who absorbed the first shock of the attack and how high a price was still to be paid, before the tide did eventually turn in our favor.

Much has already been written about this war, and much more is still to come. In terms of tanks, guns, fire-power, and the numbers of soldiers thrown into battle, it was a far fiercer and bloodier encounter than any we had known in the past. Israel's spectacular victory in the Six-Day War, for example, was child's play compared to the stunning reversal she was able to achieve in those eighteen days—with a force arrayed against her that staggers the imagination. The number of tanks alone deployed against Israel in this war (2,700 by the Syrians and 2,600 by the Egyptians) was twice that used by Montgomery in the battle of El Alamein. When one considers, in addition, the use of missiles on a scale hitherto unprecedented, the factor of total surprise, the vast initial superiority of the attackers in sheer numbers, and their continued advantage in both amounts and kinds of weaponry, the fact that the Arab armies were close to total collapse by the time the cease-fire went into effect seems nothing short of stupefying.

When the full story of this war is written, we will be in a better position to see what went into the making of those eighteen days: the myriad small encounters whose outcome was determined by the bravery and tenacity of a handful of soldiers in an encircled outpost; the many instances in which a single tank succeeded in destroying dozens; the innumerable examples of brilliant tactical ingenuity in the face of sudden reverses on the battlefield; the total, unquestioning involvement of Israel's civilian army. Only then will we be able to appreciate the astonishing fact that an undertaking so carefully and secretly prepared, and so brutally launched, achieved—militarily—almost nothing.

But my purpose here is less to talk about the war itself, than about the changes it has wrought

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the inner life of Israel. Not for nothing have the events of October 6 been dubbed, in popular parlance, the "Earthquake."

Scarcely had the cease-fire been accepted when a great public debate was under way in Israel over the causes of that inexplicable failure of vigilance—the "Breakdown" as it has come to be known—which provided the enemy with its long-awaited chance to strike at an unguarded Israel. The "hawks," under Menahem Begin's leadership, charged gross negligence by the government in failing to alert the political leadership to warning signals of an Arab buildup during the pre-war period. The "doves," in turn, countered with the charge that the negligence was of prior origin—a failure to realize long ago that neither strategic depth nor military deterrence capacity could substitute for a peace settlement, however tentative. Yet a third faction pointed out that intelligence reports may themselves have been influenced by previous expectations and preconceptions, and may have been rejected by the political leadership when they failed to conform with them. This has happened before in history—for instance when Stalin failed to heed repeated warnings of a coming invasion of Russia in 1941—and it was no doubt the case also when the government of Israel made what the Prime Minister herself called "the fatal error" of misinterpreting intelligence reports that war was imminent.

Oceans of ink have already been spilled in this debate, which will no doubt be going on long into the future. What started out as a political argument, however, and an attempt to assign immediate blame for the war, has since deepened into a discussion that goes far beyond the question of technical responsibility for the surprise attack, or the question of whether the hawks or the doves were proved right by the events of last Yom Kippur. On those questions, nothing like a consensus has as yet emerged, and even the recent election results are difficult to read clearly in this regard. What more and more people do seem to be saying, however, is that the causes of the recent cataclysm precede by far those "ten days between Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur"—as the Likud campaign slogan put it. They go back at least to July 1972 when, following the expulsion of the Russians from Egypt, it became possible to believe that a kind of de facto peace—a period that might last as long as ten years, Dayan had said—was about to settle on the Middle East during which Israel could set about consolidating her gains.

Whether Dayan and other military leaders actually believed their own reassurances there is no way of knowing, but in any case their views had a great impact on a nation which was steadily growing more complacent. The constant prophecies of how devastatingly the Arab armies would be defeated if they ventured to attack Israel seem now like a tragically perverse case of a self-fulfilling prophecy. And to say this is not necessarily to take a "dovish" view—in the sense of posing imaginary alternatives of "peace" and "territories"—but only to cry out against that state of euphoria which had existed for too long in Israel, causing even seasoned veterans of the labor movement to lose their sense of reality. The main distinction, after all, between Zionism and the false Messianic movements had always lain in Zionism's refusal—even when stretching possibility to its utmost boundaries—to cross the line into the illusory realm of the impossible.

I REPRESENT the middle-aged Israeli, a generation—many of whose members are now in uniform for the *fifth* time—that still remembers when there was no Israel. Those of us who were born in the country grew up with the vision of Jewish statehood as something to be achieved at the end of a very long and arduous road. It happened much sooner than we had expected, though only after bitter fighting which, quite literally, decimated our generation—more than 6,000 fell, out of a Jewish population of 650,000. We were sure we would never forget the magnitude of the achievement, and indeed, it took years for the members of my generation—especially those who had come to Israel as refugees—to get used to the sheer matter-of-factness of Israel, which our children took so for granted. But if one never really gets used to privation, nothing is easier to get used to than success. After a while, it begins to seem natural.

What finally did us in, I'm afraid, was the Six-Day War, in whose glowing aftermath we lost all sense of reality, all sense of what it still means to be Jewish in a hostile world. That "normalization of the Jewish people" for which we had so long yearned, that Zionist promise which had for so long eluded us, seemed finally within our grasp. Insecurity gave way to ease, a feeling that the sky was the limit. A nation which had always taken pride in achievements of the spirit felt entitled, for the first time in its history, to a share in the good things which come with material and military success.

As in Joseph's dream of the fat and lean cows, we had our seven good years, shadowed though they were by the war of attrition, and the birth of guerrilla terrorism. New immigrants were arriving by the hundreds and thousands, there was an economic boom, the continued Arab refusal to settle for nothing less than total capitulation left us, or so we let ourselves believe, no choice but to enjoy the present to the fullest.

In the meantime, a new generation was growing up whose sense of the world had been formed almost entirely by the heady climate of the post-1967 period. To them, the early struggles for statehood, and all that they entailed, seemed as remote a part of the past as the story of King David, or the legend of the Maccabees. When they pictured the future they could see it only as a continuation of the glistening present. And an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

older generation failed in its duty to remind them of the lessons of Jewish history.

Now we are all on the other side of Yom Kippur, and the important questions being asked today have little to do with party politics, or the issue of whether the country has grown more "hawkish" or "dovish" in the aftermath of its recent experience. Even while the political pundits have been busy proving how right they had been all along, the country itself has been engaged in a far deeper kind of self-examination. A clue to its nature may be found in the curious fact, noticeable from the very first days of the war, that the popular hit songs of the 70's—so beloved of the younger generation—seemed all at once to have faded from earshot. Instead, the army was suddenly singing the old tunes from the War of Independence that had not been heard in Israel since the late 40's and early 50's—the songs of their parents' generation. Even before these young soldiers told us—as they would again and again—that the life-and-death struggle of the Yom Kippur War had made the War of Independence real to them in a way that it had never been before, we got the message from the songs they sang.

Many other things have changed since last October. Suddenly, the style of life that came into being with the new affluence of the late 60's and early 70's seems to be on the wane. The new bars, coffee shops, and boutiques, so much in vogue only a short time ago, are half deserted these days. People stay at home more, and spend more time with friends. A new mood of introspection has taken hold. Over and over again, in one way or another, one hears the same sentiment expressed: something has gone wrong, we must return to ourselves.

How long this new mood will last, or how deep it goes, it is impossible to say—prophecy is always hazardous, especially where such intangible questions are concerned. For the moment however, the evidence seems unarguable that a genuine inner change has taken place in Israel as a result of the war. One sees it in the way this war has come to be identified with the ordinary soldiers of Israel's army, rather than with the generals. One sees it in the absence of the kind of self-glorifying souvenir books and albums that flooded the market after the Six-Day War. One sees it in the quiet dignity and determination with which the populace reacted to the heavy casualties. One sees it in the uncomplaining acceptance of heavier taxes, and the willing submission to extended military service by many who had been called up on Yom Kippur morning and were still—as of this writing—on active duty for an indefinite period.

This side of Yom Kippur is an Israeli who seems quite different from the jaunty prototype of recent years, closer in spirit to the Israeli of an earlier day when the state first came into being. This side of Yom Kippur is an Israeli who awoke from a pipedream, only to find himself trapped in a nightmare. Perhaps the shock will yet prove to have been salutary. The new Israeli may be more willing than before—acknowledging the realities of his situation—to strike some sort of bargain with his adversary. But whatever he does his eyes are open at last, and he will not soon be caught dreaming again. I am reminded of an exchange which took place in what seems now like the far distant past—it must have been about two years ago or so—between a young, aggressively dovish writer, and Prime Minister Golda Meir. "Do you ever have a dream?" the writer asked Mrs. Meir. The question seemed apt at the time, but now her answer seems more so. "I have hardly a moment for dreams," she replied. "They wake me up nights."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Israel After the War: 3

The Need for Political Change

David Vital

Jerusalem

DAVID BEN-GURION was dying before the fighting had stopped, and there were few in Israel—at any rate among the older half of the population—who failed to comment that his death marked the end of an epoch with almost sublime precision. What kind of epoch it was in contrast to the one that had now begun it is still much too early to say. But the contrast may come to appear a sharp one. Soon after Ben-Gurion's death, one who had been very close to him for many years was asked on the state radio how he thought the Old Man would have acted in the circumstances of the October War. He thought for a moment and then said, "The first thing that he would have done would have been to tell the truth, all the truth."

The shadow of the great man hangs over recent events here in other respects. It was Ben-Gurion who, more than any other man, set the mold into which the public affairs of this country have long been cast—for all that he himself rebelled against the system in his later years and tried to demolish it. And it was Ben-Gurion again, more than any other, who sought to confirm the preeminence of the political leadership of Israel throughout Jewry, who reduced the Jewish Agency Executive to the status of junior partner of the government, and who was at one with non-Zionists abroad in going a good way toward dissolving the autonomous political role of Diaspora Jewry which it had originally been the major work of Zionism to establish.

I

THE present crisis of society in Israel is one of great complexity, but it is, in the first place and most dramatically, a crisis of the political system and of the machinery of government. The men and women who possess the broad powers of control in all the major political parties have, virtually without exception, lost their old capacity to inspire the almost automatic confidence of the greater part of the public. And they have lost it by a dramatic and, indeed, tragic demonstration of their inadequacy as makers of policy. For it must be understood that despite the gallantry of front-line soldiers and commanders and the belated, but nonetheless truly commendable, saving capacity of the army's high command to pull itself together, stop the slide toward a debacle, and inflict a stunning military defeat upon both invading forces, the conclusion is inescapable that in its political aspect the war was lost. Lost because the Egyptians achieved their stated purpose of getting a foothold in Sinai and reopening the whole Middle East question; lost because the Arabs were able to show a capacity for unified and effective action without precedent; lost because it was demonstrated for the fourth time (to Arabs as well as to Jews) that the great powers will not allow Israel to defeat the Arab armies conclusively, no matter what the circumstances or provocation; and lost, finally, because the sour taste of failure lingers on all but the most insensitive tongues and there is nothing on Israel's present diplomatic menu to suggest that it will be swept away by something sweeter.

The immediate causes of defeat—redefined necessarily and quite properly as the government's and the army's state of unpreparedness for the Yom Kippur invasion—are the subject of a quasi-judicial inquiry. It is being conducted by a distinguished committee headed by the President of the Supreme Court aided by one other Justice, the State Comptroller, and two former Chiefs of Staff. No one would dream of questioning the probity of those five gentlemen, but what the public impact of their labors will be is another question. The committee's proceedings are conducted *in camera*, its full report is unlikely ever to be published (the minutes of evidence may in fact be buried in the archives for a century), and, most serious of all, the absence of a historian or political scientist on it at least suggests that it will tend to ask technical questions, rather than consider the underlying social forces that were at work in the years since the Six-Day War. For what one would like to understand is why so many eminent and gifted people allowed themselves to live for so long in a fool's paradise. (Of course, the committee may yet astonish us.)

DAVID VITAL, professor of political science at the University of Haifa, contributed "Zionism Revisited: Herzl" to our May 1973 issue.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meanwhile, the government has left the country without the means to make up its mind about the workings of the full complex of foreign-affairs and defense machinery, despite the huge and unprecedented outcry which the handling of events at the outbreak of the war aroused. And lest it be thought that the government was alone in resisting an inquiry into its conduct of affairs, it must be noted that the significant part of the opposition—the Likud bloc under Menahem Begin and E. Rimalt—did not press very hard or very long for a public inquiry either.

In actual fact, the genesis of the committee of inquiry owed a great deal more to the public anger of private persons, to the press, and to rebellious murmurs of junior politicians than to the cries of an outraged opposition. It thus accorded fully with the established pattern of political behavior in recent years whereby the nominal parliamentary opposition to the government had left the business of sharp and consistent attack to others, notably to the mavericks, Shmuel Tamir on the Right and Uri Avneri on the Left. Indeed, Gahal had gone a great deal further as a self-denying opposition by regularly joining the government parties to defeat every serious attempt to make institutional political change possible.

Given the rules of the political game in Israel, all this has served to keep party machinery largely intact in all major cases. It has also had the effect of making the interpretation of election results peculiarly difficult. In Israel it has always been hard to know just whom and what one was voting for when one slipped any particular ballot into the envelope. (Asked whether a vote for the Labor alignment was a vote for Yigal Allon or for him, Moshe Dayan's response was, "You'll know two weeks after the election!") Of course, the problem predated the war and applied to all parties. Did a vote for the new Likud mean a vote for the Liberal businessmen who generally played along with Pinhas Sapir in his capacity of economic super-minister, or did it mean a vote for Shmuel Tamir who had dared to oppose him? Or did it mean a vote for Herut's Menahem Begin who had no known economic policy at all? But the problem was intensified a hundredfold by the events of the war. Who now was dove, who was hawk; and indeed, what could such terms mean in December 1973? Above all, how did one register a vote *against* anyone, particularly against the government? Suppose one were a socialist, or a dove, or both—whom did one vote *for* in order to vote against a government to whose policy one was antipathetic on either count, or both? Obviously not by voting for the Likud, despite its being the official opposition nor, in most cases, by voting for one of the many fringe groups that had appeared in recent years. In short, there was no clear way of expressing general dissatisfaction without going over to the far Left or the religious-Right. And thus one had the spectacle of a group of fairly well known, mostly dovish university and ex-army people within the Labor party first doing the hitherto unheard of thing, calling for Golda Meir's and Moshe Dayan's overthrow, and then, less than two weeks before the elections, turning most of the way around and asking the public to join them in voting for the Labor alignment (headed, of course, by Mrs. Meir and Dayan) after all. This, as they explained in a paid newspaper advertisement, because the "justified bitterness and disappointment" of the public might strengthen the Likud and "even bring it to power." For, they stated, it is the parties of the Likud who promote the political conception of things "which has brought us to the present pass," while there is within the Labor alignment a potential for change in the right direction which could "bring about a renewal of policy and leadership in the near future." The confusion of government and opposition and of the notions of actual and moral responsibility and commitment could not be greater. And no better illustration is needed of the very real dilemmas facing the politically conscious citizen of Israel.

II

The essence of Israel's political system is that it is one of minority government. No doubt, in a large sense, all government is minority government. But the government of Israel has invariably been one of a minority in a narrow and specific way. As is well known, the government has invariably been that of a coalition. But it has never been a coalition of equals; and it has never been a coalition of even the approximately like-minded—except, perhaps, for the national coalition of 1967 which was agreed on the single, simple issue of the defense of the country and collapsed when matters facing it became more complex. Within each coalition the central and continuous element has always been that of the Labor party (Mapai-Avodah) which has monopolized the Ministries of Defense, Finance, and Foreign Affairs (and, of course, the Premiership), but which has never been able to attract more than about a third to two-fifths of the electorate.

But that is not all. As with a set of Russian dolls, each enclosing one smaller than itself, effective control within the Labor party (which is to say, the old Mapai with Ahdut Ha'avodah and the returning prodigals of Ben-Gurion's Rafi) is always to be traced to a group smaller than the one the observer happens to be looking at. The parliamentary party is controlled by the whips and the ministers; the central committee by the "bureau" and the secretariat; the bureau and the secretariat, in effect, by a handful of extremely powerful individuals who have come to be called "Golda's kitchen" and at whose very center, today, stands Pinhas Sapir himself, the real head of the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

party, more powerful than ever since the discomfiture of his hawkish rivals. These same individuals in turn have a commanding voice in a whole series of parallel major national institutions: parliament, the government machinery proper, the great publicly-owned corporations, the Histadrut, and, to a lesser extent, the Jewish Agency.

There are, however, areas of public activity—the press, for example—which largely escape their grip. Nor are the members of the virtually congruent leading circles of the government, the party, and the Histadrut spared public criticism in the press. Furthermore, there are major institutions—the universities, notably—which do operate independently of them. Still, the shadow of the strong men and women of the Labor party is there for those who have the sense to look for it. It would be an incautious university board of governors that did not at least consider whether its prospective president was capable of getting on with, or knew how to talk to, Pinhas Sapir.

None of this is to argue that Israel is unique in having a very tight, very powerful governing group which makes all major political and economic decisions itself and which has to be reckoned with in a variety of subtle ways by all those who are concerned with lesser matters. What is remarkable about Israel's ruling oligarchy (and unique, I think, in the Western world of parliamentary democracies) is that it is perfectly contemporaneous and continuous with the state itself: the country has never been governed by anyone else. For the oligarchy has been supremely successful at perpetuating itself at the two levels that count: within the party, which it leads; and through the party, in the country at large, which it governs. Its great talent, in other words, has been for politics in the narrow sense of the term—for maintaining itself in power. It has never admitted defeat; it has never seriously had to. In fact the rarest of all events in Israel is the resignation of a major personality as a direct and admitted consequence of failure or severe error of judgment. So when Dayan did offer to resign after it had become clear what the state of the national defenses was on October 6, that in itself can be seen as a measure of the extraordinary gravity of the situation. But—and it is a decisive "but"—Mrs. Meir did not want him to resign; nor did Dayan think it fit to insist.

It is only fair to add that the dogged determination to hold on to office and power which the leading members of the Labor party have shown over the years cannot be reduced entirely to a fondness for the vulgar fruits of politics. Their immensely long and uninterrupted residence inside the halls of government has not only habituated the inhabitants to their surroundings; it has given them a by no means unreasonable sense of accomplishment and, indeed, of creation. At all events, it has long been genuinely difficult for them to conceive of moving out to make room for anyone else. Certainly, Mrs. Meir told a Jerusalem audience a few weeks before the war, certainly a transfer of power was a desirable thing—provided only there was someone to transfer it to. "But the realities in Israel," she continued, were such that "the Labor alignment had no one in whose hands it could safely put the leadership [of the country] and, accordingly, it was the sole force capable of governing."

III

IT WOULD surely be wrong and, indeed, rather wicked (if so old-fashioned a word may still be employed today) to condemn the men and women who governed Israel in the first twenty-five years of its existence as having been entirely (or even in the main) bad at their jobs. It would be absurd to see the material and social record of their labors in the shape of agricultural and industrial enterprises, systems of communications, medical and educational services, social-welfare institutions, and, of course, the armed forces, as betokening anything but a pretty remarkable uphill climb against difficult odds. Nevertheless, within the limits of what it has been reasonable to expect, the performance of government in Israel has been poor in recent years, and it may be stated with confidence that no competent observer of the scene has failed to note the ensuing public malaise. The handling of social problems (problems of poverty, housing, education, crime) has been notoriously unsatisfactory. The mismanagement (and worse) of publicly-owned enterprises has not been cured. The fading respect in which the law is held by official and citizen alike is blatant.

But however much it may have been criticized on its handling of social and economic issues, the Labor party has always held unquestioned authority in the fields of foreign affairs and defense. It is that same, hitherto unquestioned, authority in foreign affairs and defense that has now been lost by the Labor party. Hence the profundity of the crisis of confidence; and hence the common conviction that things cannot—certainly, should not—ever be the same again. For whatever the Committee of Inquiry may eventually report, nobody, least of all the government itself, seriously questions the common judgment that there was a failure of the machinery of government and decision-making of the first order.

It is perhaps worth noting that the loss of administrative effectiveness was in the nature of a slow process, not a sudden breakdown, and the decline was by no means limited to the military side of things. It was at least as marked on the diplomatic side, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, and, unfortunately for the ministry, a great deal more apparent to the naked eye. The most dramatic development in the last year or so has been the extinction of diplomatic relations with all the countries of black Africa.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The role of Israel in African development had long been a source of satisfaction and the basis of a minor, but not negligible, lever of international influence. Political defeats do not have the same hard outline and the same immediate and bloody consequences that military defeats have, but a defeat it was. Similarly but less dramatically, Israel has suffered a serious diminution of its position in and vis-à-vis Europe, and while it is unlikely that the countries of Western Europe will sever diplomatic relations with Israel, the specter of near total political isolation is no longer as remote as it once seemed. One consequence of these developments has been to help fuel the Arab will to maintain the struggle with Israel, just as they encouraged Egypt and Syria to resolve on war in October.

So far as the foreign ministry is concerned, two questions might be asked. Was the ministry aware of what was happening and did it warn the government; and did the government, if it was warned, pay any attention? But these questions presuppose a foreign ministry which plays a key role in the general process of decision-making and enjoys an appropriate measure of prestige—a foreign ministry analogous in function and status to that enjoyed by the Foreign Office in London or, at any rate, that of the State Department in Washington, even the department of the pre-Kissinger days. Yet nothing could be further from the realities of foreign policy-making in Israel, where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has long been a weak body headed by a weak minister and where, in consequence, its influence on major policy has always been small and uncertain and the collective wisdom and experience of its officials rarely sought for.

Two recent examples should suffice. The successive national-intelligence estimates which played such an important (though by no means decisive) role in allowing the Arabs to achieve surprise in October were wholly the work of army intelligence. The foreign ministry had long since given up trying to put its own view of things across. And further, it was plain enough that at the talks at Kilometer 101, the first attempt at bilateral negotiation with the Egyptians in twenty-five years, the foreign ministry was totally excluded from the picture—unlike its Egyptian opposite number and in contrast to the situation at Rhodes in 1949.

There are several explanations for this odd state of affairs. One is the lingering suspicion in which "diplomats" are held in Israel. More important is the prestige of the army and its readiness to take over political tasks whenever the opportunity presents itself. But most important of all is the fact that it is precisely in foreign affairs that the members of the inner circle of the Labor party leadership (and, indeed, the leaders of Herut among the opposition parties too) have always been most interested and are best versed. There is no official in the foreign ministry who can compete with Mrs. Meir (who was Foreign Minister herself for many years) in sheer length of experience in the field. Abba Eban was one of the original members of the foreign service and has no equal in it for just the type of technocratic abilities that foreign-service officers traditionally bring to the service of their political masters.

This phenomenon of the ostensibly expert minister is a common one in Israel. The Minister of Defense was himself a general. The Minister of Labor was a trade-union man. Towering over all there is Pinhas Sapir who has been Minister of Finance for a decade (apart from a spell as Minister without Portfolio and party secretary-general) and Minister of Commerce and Industry for many years before that. In short, it is the minister, rather than the civil servant, who is the relatively fixed and knowledgeable component of the administrative landscape.

IV

THE Jews, it may be worth reminding ourselves, are an old people with great experience in some fields and little in others. In some ways they are peculiarly fitted for democratic government. They are a people virtually devoid of a hereditary class structure; they are habituated to the free expression and exchange of opinion; they are highly self-critical; they cohere loyally and comparatively easily for communal and national purposes; and they are anything but apathetic to political issues and political events. Yet for a variety of historical reasons of which our understanding is still imperfect, but which seem to have their main roots in the structure of communal life within the old Russian Pale of Settlement on the one hand and within the Islamic lands of the Middle East and North Africa on the other, the national aptitude for government is poor, and the organized political forces which have emerged in Israel have proved to be singularly impervious to pressures for change. To take one last example, the lack of movement in Israel's foreign policy between June 1967 and October 1973 was not due simply to the acute dilemmas and uncertainties with which the government was undoubtedly faced. It was at least partly a product of a system of politics, government, and administration which severely inhibited imaginative departures from past and agreed-upon courses of action.

Among the questions which now face the country, accordingly, are whether, whence, and how the move for reform and renewal is to come now that the results of the elections have confirmed the powerful roots of the established political system—for by and large the voting public has voted for the party-political status quo. Sapir's oligarchy has been reinstated—admittedly with some clipped feathers—and considering the background of the elections, this can be regarded as a famous victory. For what Sapir did was to hold

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the party together for the period of the elections and thus keep the formal choices before the voters roughly in the old pattern. The conservatism of the Israeli voter did the rest.

The auguries for change are therefore poor. For change cannot fail to involve those who have directed affairs these past many years and whose collective voice is still decisive. True, the shock of recent events was very great and is unlikely to pass completely for some time. Signs of a readiness to consider minor institutional change—such as the setting up of a National Security Council—were already visible before the elections.

Slightly more potent in its long-term effects—and, indeed, the short-term ones too—is the attitude of the voters. What have you done and what will you do are the questions which candidates in the recent elections were asked as never before. All this may seem elementary to those who are accustomed to the Anglo-American system of single-candidate constituency elections. But in Israel's system of coalition government and of proportional representation, the question of an individual politician's actual success or failure at his job has never been crucial; and the assessment of any given party's record has never been easy or even, in some cases, possible. For, of course, there are parties that have never had a taste of power at the national level and no record to stand upon. Above all, the voter is in effect debarred from voting directly for a government. He can only vote for one or other of the parties and interest groups and hope for the best. The making of a government is then in the hands of the negotiating professional politicians. Accordingly, so long as the electoral system remains intact, there can be no major breakthrough here. But there might be some change of atmosphere.

THERE is a third possible source of pressure for change, one which is necessarily indirect, uncertain, subtle, and somewhat dangerous to handle: the influence which Jews outside Israel—and organized Jewry in particular—can bring to bear upon the structure and quality of social life, politics and government included, in Israel. This is a difficult subject which one would be foolish to raise without a sense of the complexity of what is involved, to say nothing of the high risk of being misunderstood.

The Zionist movement began by claiming the right to lead Jewry for those purposes which concerned the whole of the Jewish people. Let any who were uninterested in those purposes abstain from interfering, was Herzl's argument. It was a claim which was bitterly contested, usually on the twin counts that there were no all-Jewish concerns beyond those of the faith itself and that, if there were, they were not what the Zionists claimed them to be. The Zionist victory in 1947-49 was as much a victory over their opponents within Jewry as over those, the British and the Arabs, who were outside. For since the establishment of the State of Israel two things have happened. First, the supremacy of the Zionist leadership within Jewry has been recognized, willy-nilly, by all major tendencies and communities. Second, the significance of events in Israel for the fortunes of Jewry at large has also been accepted—with good grace or ill, as the case might be. This has, of course, been further enhanced by the special authority which those who shoulder the responsibility for the management of Israel's affairs possess among all Jews, in Israel and outside it.

The process by which Jerusalem has become the center of gravity is now virtually complete. The process is unlikely ever to be reversed, for the world before 1947 cannot be reconstituted. There can never, for example, be any question of a direct intervention by non-Israelis in the governmental process in Israel. It would be constitutionally and politically disastrous for both sides if such a thing were to occur. Apart from anything else, it would amount to a hard blow at the status of Israel as an independent and sovereign state.

Nevertheless, I can see no reason why the partnership between public institutions in Israel and Jewish organizations abroad should not be greater than it is, broader in character, more closely intertwined. Nor do I see why we in Israel should not get more accustomed to, and actually encourage, the free expression of views by non-Israelis on our own internal affairs and arrangements. It is, in any case, an inevitable product of the perpetual trickle of immigrants from the Western countries and the greater stream of visitors, volunteers, and short-term residents. The picture-postcard view of Israel has worn very thin by now, and its loss is not to be regretted.

Beyond all this there looms the great question of whether new forms of consultation and collective decision-making on matters of high importance to all Jews should not be reconstituted. The uses of a great congress of Jews or of the Jewish people have been discussed in a limited way in the Israeli press in recent months, but clearly the issues entailed by such an enterprise are complex and delicate in the extreme. Still, the trend toward thinking along such lines is evident.

Most thoughtful people in Israel will readily agree to the proposition that its inhabitants hold it, in some sense, in trust for all other Jews. Perhaps the time has come to reconsider how the special relationship between Israelis and non-Israelis should work. To what extent Jews outside Israel, and American Jews in particular, are prepared to undertake unprecedented kinds of responsibilities is, of course, another question.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

England in Crisis

Rudolf Klein

THESE are exceptionally gloomy and exceptionally perplexing days in Britain. Indeed, the gloom and the perplexity are linked. This is not the first time in the past two decades that Britain has appeared to be on the edge of an abyss of economic stagnation, industrial self-destruction, and social friction. There have been earlier periods when the pound has had to be given international first aid, when strikes have brought about a confrontation between the government of the day and the trade-unions, and when a revival of the politics of class conflict has seemed imminent. But now there are some new elements. The various crises, industrial, economic, and financial, have been superimposed on, and aggravated by, the international oil situation, worldwide inflation, and fears about a global recession. There is, too, the simmering civil war in Ulster. Perhaps more important, however, is the sense of perplexity currently prevailing in Britain, a sense of bewilderment about what is happening and why it is happening, a suspicion that no one quite knows what ought to be done, and a feeling that the ship is out of control. The abyss is familiar enough, but it is beginning to look rather deeper and steeper than in the past, and the path around it has never seemed more slippery or quite so wreathed in mist.

Ten years ago there would have been no problem in analyzing the condition of Britain. In 1964, in the age of intellectual innocence about issues of social change, it all seemed very simple. If Britain was becoming the sick man of Europe—in terms of a slow rate of economic growth, chronic industrial troubles, and recurring balance-of-payments crises—the explanation was self-evident. The country, in Dean Acheson's much-resented but accurate phrase, had lost an empire without finding a role. There was the continuing pretense that Britain was still a world power, diplomatically, militarily, and financially. British politicians insisted on acting as middlemen between the United States and the Soviet Union; British soldiers were still scattered around the globe; British financial commitments, in the shape of the sterling area, meant that whenever the international monetary system caught a cold, the British economy suffered from pneumonia—and the patient's constitution was weakened by the drugs administered.

From this sort of diagnosis, it was easy enough to proceed to the cure. If Britain would only reconcile herself to being a second-class nation without any pretensions about being in the same league as the superpowers, the country would be able to liquidate its extravagant international commitments—cut down its defense spending which had for so long imposed an extra strain on sterling, and extricate itself from its role as banker to the sterling area. Britain would then—like Germany and Japan—be free from the ball-and-chain of inherited, anachronistic policies. The country would be able, for example, to allow the pound to devalue or float—instead of treating its parity as a sacred symbol, and giving the domestic economy the cold-water treatment of deflation every time it was threatened.

Domestically, also, this analysis carried conviction. Once again, there seemed to be no difficulty about going to the root of the country's recurring problems: a failure to readjust to the circumstances of the second half of the 20th century. Symbolic of this failure was the fact that the Conservative Prime Minister of the day, before the general election of October 1964, was Sir Alec Douglas-Home—the 14th Earl of Home until he gave up his title to become leader of the Tory party. What could be more absurd than to have a government headed by a man who seemed to be a walking parody of the traditional English aristocrat—chinless, a dunce at numbers, and more familiar with the grouse moors than with the problems of running a technologically advanced society? His position appeared to symbolize what was wrong with British society: a continuing obsession with the values of the country gentleman at the expense of those of the engineer and the salesman on whom Britain's prosperity depended, and the smug amateurism of civil servants, bankers, and business directors who had achieved their positions of power because of their social or educational background. In these circumstances, it was only natural that the trade-unions should be uninterested in economic efficiency and preoccu-

RUDOLF KLEIN, who has written for COMMENTARY, the *Public Interest*, the *Observer*, and other periodicals, is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Studies in Social Policy in London. Mr. Klein contributed "The Stalemate Society" to our November 1973 number.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pied with the slogans of the class war; after all, they were only mirroring the rest of society in their amateurishness and their out-of-date organization and tactics.

It was in these circumstances and in this atmosphere that Britain voted for Harold Wilson's Labour party in the 1964 general election—a victory which had long seemed inevitable, though it turned out to be surprisingly narrow in the event. For here was a party which promised to combine science and justice, economic efficiency and social equity—the party of the engineer and technologist, led by a man who knew all about the economy and statistics. Instead of Home's aristocratic drawl, there was Wilson's gritty North-country accent—the voice of someone who could talk the same language as trade-union leaders and who, if not quite a working-class lad himself, had at least lived in the grim slums bequeathed by the 19th-century industrial revolution. Here was a young, dynamic political leader in the Kennedy image—an image which in the Britain of 1964 was exciting and glamorous.

To the political commentators of what might be called the radical center—myself included—it was therefore self-evident that the solution to Britain's long-term problems was the election of a Labour government which would not only transform the technological infrastructure and the social superstructure, but also carry out the transformation of the country's international role. There would be economic planning on the French model, since France had shown that such planning encouraged a faster growth rate. Some of us also argued that Britain should become a member of the European Common Market, both as a recognition that it was no longer an international power and as a means of improving the domestic economy through the stimulus of competition; otherwise, Britain would become an introspective backwater.

TEN years later, in the middle of another round of economic and industrial crises, reconstructing the intellectual atmosphere of 1964 is not just an exercise in nostalgia. For what is so puzzling about the state of the nation in 1974 is that the current crisis has come about despite the fact that most of the policies thought necessary ten years ago to modernize Britain, and to tackle the causes of her economic and other difficulties, have actually been carried out. Britain no longer has a military role east of Suez; sterling was not only devalued but allowed to float; a five-year national plan was produced, and abandoned; Britain became a member of the European Community; and Edward Heath, the Tory leader who succeeded Sir Alec Douglas-Home, was a self-made man from a lower-middle-class background, who was deliberately chosen by his party because he was the antithesis of the aristocratic Sir Alec. All this (and a great deal more) happened, and yet the mixture of economic problems and industrial strife does not appear to have been affected.

Hence the somewhat baffled way in which one views the 1974 situation. It is as though an automobile had been stripped and reassembled, with every item checked in the process, and yet it still will not start. The simile is not too far-fetched, for the changes of the past ten years—many of which had indeed begun earlier—do amount to a sort of refurbishing of Britain, with every institution, from the civil service to local government, being scrutinized by committees of inquiry and reformed. There is nothing new about strikes, about balance-of-payments crises, about inflation, about cuts in public expenditure, or about confrontations between governments and trade-unions. What is new, and disquieting, is that this should be happening—if anything in an accentuated form—despite the changes of the past decade. Unless, of course, it is precisely these changes which have helped to create an unstable situation—because, in fact, the mold of British tradition has been broken and a new, more unsettled era has begun.

Paradoxically the strongest evidence in support of the latter view can be found in the evolution of that bastion of British tradition, the Conservative party. For it can be argued quite plausibly that the cause of Britain's present troubles—in particular the rise of trade-union militancy—are traceable directly to the policies of the Heath government. In 1970, the Conservatives came to office with a program which deliberately and specifically repudiated the sort of broad-based paternalism which had been developed in the 50's and 60's. Heath, in contrast to Harold Macmillan (Tory Prime Minister, 1956-63), had not grown up with memories of pre-war unemployment. He believed in capitalism and, with his colleagues, argued for fewer cushions in the shape of state subsidies and for more incentives to make private business more efficient. Life was to be made tougher and more competitive for businessmen. Similarly, the law affecting trade-unions would be changed to make contracts legally enforceable, to allow compulsory ballots of members, and injunctions to stop strikes while negotiations were continued (the sort of provisions which have been accepted for decades in the United States and elsewhere but which represent an innovation in the British context). It was therefore not difficult to see the Tories as the party of hard-faced management consultants—the party not so much of the traditional wealth-owning ruling elite as of the new, wealth-controlling ruling elite of self-made men, in the image of Edward Heath himself. While the Tory of previous generations may have been tamed by a sense of obligation to the less fortunate, and even by a sense of guilt, the Tory

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the 70's seemed a much more aggressive, more radical creature.

On this interpretation, everything that has happened since flows from the starting point. Given the arrival of an aggressively Tory government in office in 1970, it is inevitable that an aggressively left-wing trade-union movement should develop in a dialectic of extremes. And indeed, the evidence of the first year of the Tory government lends some support to this view. There were large-scale tax cuts which tended to favor the middle classes (though these could be supported on the sound Rawlsian grounds that, by offering financial incentives to the managers of industry, they would in the long run make the poorest people better off through encouraging the creation of extra wealth). There were also considerable cuts in public expenditure. The promised trade-union legislation was pushed through despite fierce opposition. This, it seemed, was a government not of national conciliation but of confrontation.

But events soon pushed the Tory administration into the traditional stamping ground of British governments since the war—the middle. As unemployment rose, a result of tough financial policies inherited from the previous Labour government, the Conservatives switched course. They did not argue that unemployment was preferable to inflation, as they were urged to do by Enoch Powell, the apostle of Milton Friedman's economic doctrines in the Tory party. They increased government expenditure, and indeed improved considerably on the Labour government's record of spending on social services like health and education. When bankruptcy threatened Rolls Royce and other firms, they did not follow the logic of their commitment to efficiency; instead, they rescued the lame ducks. Unlike the previous Labour government, they gave priority to growth; they allowed the pound to float and borrowed money from abroad to cover Britain's swelling balance-of-payments deficit, instead of deflating the domestic economy on the model of previous postwar British governments.

Almost certainly these policies have benefited the working class more than if the Conservatives had stuck to the traditional formula. On one side of the balance sheet, there has been a slight redistribution of income in favor of the middle classes (who, in financial and tax terms, however, overlap with the working class; I remember a visiting American economist being astonished to find a Labour politician denouncing government measures as favoring the wealthy—defined to mean anyone earning over $5,000 dollars a year). There has been, too, a much-resented cut in the subsidies for the 40 per cent of the British population living in municipal housing, while the tax concessions to middle-class buyers of houses were left untouched. But on the positive side of the balance sheet, there has been the all-important emphasis on full employment—the single most important guarantee of working-class prosperity—and increased spending on social services.

On all these issues, it is possible to argue about the precise effect of the various policies. What it is not possible to maintain, with any respect for the evidence, is that the Tories are grinding the face of the working class. Yet this is a widespread view in the Labour party and in the trade-union movement—or, at any rate, it provides the rationalization for the unions' opposition to the government's policy of wage controls (yet another reversal of initial positions, since the Tories came to office pledged to allow free bargaining with no socialist nonsense about interfering with negotiations between unions and employers).

There may be a number of explanations for Labour's attitude. It is possible to take a conspiratorial approach and argue that this line is being propagated by the Communists for obvious reasons of their own, since it is in their own interests to create an atmosphere of class conflict. Clearly, this is an element in the present situation which it would be silly to ignore simply because in the past the Reds-under-the-bed bogey has been so misused; the fact that there is strong Communist representation in the leadership of the troublesome miners' union obviously has a bearing on what has happened. But while this may be part of the explanation, it is certainly nothing like the whole of it. For one of the crucial elements in the present situation is the importance of political myths and symbols: not what is happening, but what people *believe* is happening.

In part this reflects, I think, one of the neglected psychological consequences of inflation. In real terms, Britain's national income has been rising at what is for this country a rapid rate—somewhere between 4 and 5 per cent for 1973. Normally, this would be expected to produce a reassuring sense of prosperity. But because of inflation, the rise in living standards is not perceived as such; it becomes difficult to attach precise meanings to wage and salary increases, since much of these will be swallowed up by rising prices, and no one knows quite how much. The result is a sense of financial weightlessness which is disorienting and disquieting, and which is unlikely to be dispelled by statistics showing that in fact the standard of living has been going up. Now indeed the threat is that in 1974, prices but not real earnings will go on rising. So it is not entirely surprising that the politics of financial self-interest seem to be giving way to the politics of symbolic confrontation.

The most striking illustration of the politics of symbolic confrontation is the trade-union legislation introduced by the Conservative government. In no sense does this legislation cripple the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

freedom of the trade-unions—though it does impose limitations on their immunity from the ordinary law of the land which are accepted as a matter of course in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere. In no sense, either, is it punitive: trade-unions have been fined under the new legislation only when the unions insisted on boycotting the courts—and were then treated in much the same way as any individual or body who insists on ignoring the authority of the law. This is not to argue that the legislation was well conceived; it may well be that the hopes of its sponsors—that a more sharply defined law would compel the unions to exert more discipline over their members and therefore stick to deals once negotiated—were unrealistic, and that it was a mistake to try to transplant American institutions into an unresponsive body. The real point is that the legislation was, at worst, irrelevant and in no sense a threat to the power of the trade-unions.

However, the new industrial-relations law is now part of the national mythology. It was introduced by the Tory government as a tough measure designed to force the trade-unions to put their house in order—the previous Labour government having been forced to abandon similar legislation in the face of trade-union opposition. It was resented by the trade-unions as an attempt by a Tory government to curb their power. So the legislation became a symbol. For one side it was the symbol of the government's determination to show that the unions were not above the law, but were subject to regulation like other organizations or bodies. For the other side it was the symbol of the trade-union movement's determination to resist any change in its unique status. And so the issue—of no great practical importance, one way or the other—has continued to embitter relations between the government and the trade-union movement, with the latter insisting that the legislation be repealed.

Another example of symbolic politics is the issue of the profits made by property speculators. It is something of a national scandal that no way has so far been devised to curb the monopoly profits made by developers out of the planning permits authorized by public authorities: the paradox is that profits are high precisely because Britain has developed a tight system of control over city building in an admirable, well-intentioned attempt to improve town planning. A variety of ways have been tried, by both Labour and Tory governments, without very much success: one favorite method, restricting the number of planning-permits granted, simply increases profits by making existing property more valuable. In terms of the amount of money involved, the profits may be only a drop in the ocean of the national income—even though individuals become multimillionaires as a result of successful speculations. But the profits have become a symbol of rampant capitalism, of a Toryism which allows millions to be made while old-age pensioners die of cold in the winter. The fact that ending all property profits would not help old-age pensioners is irrelevant; the symbolic, emotional contrast is what counts.

The importance of symbolic politics helps to explain, I think, the increasingly bitter and frustrated atmosphere in Britain. On practical issues it is possible, after all, to compromise. But how can one compromise over symbols? It is easy enough to split the difference when negotiating a wage agreement. It is much more difficult to split the difference when the issue is wage controls as such—and with it the authority of the government. This is more than a matter of ideology. Symbols may be linked to ideology, but they may also be independent of it. After all, one of the great symbolic confrontations over wage controls came in 1966 under the Labour government of Harold Wilson when he refused to compromise with the seamen's union. As he put it in his memoirs:* "The seamen's struggle was a test of government determination to preserve the criteria we had laid down for incomes policy." The result was a seven-week strike which, in Wilson's words, meant that Britain's economy was "blown off course" and that, in the outcome, taxes had to be increased, government expenditure cut, and a variety of other economic controls imposed.

This last example emphasizes that symbolic politics is not the product of the past three years of Conservative government alone. And it also points to a missing factor in the analysis so far: the British Labour party. Its development is crucial to any attempt to understand the present situation. Traditionally, the Labour party is radicalized by being in opposition. Or, to put it more accurately perhaps, the restraints imposed by office—restraints which reflect the real-life problems that have to be tackled by any government and which, as already noted, compel right-wing as well as left-wing governments to take up a middle-ground position—tend to wear off. This was certainly the pattern after the defeat of the 1945-51 Labour government; it is now the pattern following the defeat of the 1964-1970 government.

But there are a number of significant differences. In the 50's, the trade-unions—who control four-fifths of the votes cast at the annual Labour conference which, in theory at any rate, determines the party's program—were dominated by bosses who backed the leadership of Clement Attlee. Now most of the trade-unions have swung sharply to the Left, and their bloc votes, which once went automatically to back the party leader-

* *A Personal Record: The Labour Government 1964-1970,* Atlantic-Little, Brown, 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ship, now go equally automatically to back the views of the Left.* Hence the decisions of the most recent Labour party conference to back demands for the large-scale nationalization of industry and the redistribution of wealth and income—decisions which are not necessarily indicative of what a Labour government would do, but which do accurately reflect the demands of the party's Left wing. The Left—which in the 50's used to denounce the bloc votes of the trade-unions for the monstrous parody of democratic methods that they actually are—now benefits from them without complaint.

The interesting question about this swing is whether or not it represents a change at the grass-roots level. Today's union leaders argue, disarmingly, that in contrast to the bosses of the 50's, they do not impose their own views but take their cue from the rank and file. Their duty is, quite simply, to represent the views of their members. It is a doctrine which chimes nicely with the current emphasis on the benefits of participation, and certainly the union bosses of the 50's would these days seem rather crude bullies; their uncouth habits—like shouting "Shut yer gob" at people who dared to interrupt them at conferences—and merciless arm-twisting would not be acceptable today. If the present leaders are right in their claims—and the increasingly radical views and demands of the unions simply reflect the growing radicalization of the rank and file—then indeed it would seem that Britain is entering a new era of industrial conflict and ideological dispute.

But on present evidence it would be premature to accept these claims. Or, rather, it is important to distinguish between two different kinds of grass-roots radicalism: the economic and the political. Almost certainly, union members have become economically radicalized; that is, their expectations of rising living standards have sharpened and they expect their unions to be militant in pressing wage claims. But there is very little evidence of any political radicalization of the rank and file; rather, it would seem that the permissiveness of the leadership creates a vacuum which is then filled by radical groups (to whom some of the leaders are, in any case, sympathetic). Trade-unions, as is well known, are run on the basis of apathy. The question is whether the indifference of the majority will be exploited by the official leaders or by minority groups.

The view that it is the role of union or party leaders simply to articulate the opinions of their members has wider implications still. It rests on what seems to me to be a basic fallacy: the idea that opinions on most policy issues are something fixed and settled—and that therefore the proper role of leadership in a democratic society is to act as a mouthpiece, and nothing more. The evidence of the public-opinion surveys does not support this view. It shows that on some issues there is indeed remarkable consistency over time: a majority of British voters, for example, always have supported hanging. (Fortunately, this does not prevent even those Labour party members who are most insistent that the proper role of the leadership is to reflect majority opinion from voting against capital punishment.) But on other issues, such as Britain's membership in the Common Market, there have been equally remarkable fluctuations over time. To a large degree—though varying with the nature of the issue involved—opinion is not fixed in marble, it is actively created by the political sculptor.

But although this view of the leader-as-spokesman, rather than as a creator of opinion, rests on a fallacy, it has gained increasing acceptance within the Labour movement as a whole, as well as within the trade-unions. Indeed, it has been encouraged by Harold Wilson's style of leadership in opposition. Wilson has a curiously recessive style, perhaps because his confidence was undermined both by his period as Prime Minister, when he had to abandon one policy aim after another, and by his electoral defeat. Also, Wilson is a master of ambiguity. In the last resort, he is a man of the middleground in politics both by conviction and for the sake of expediency—since it is only by appealing to the center that Labour can hope to win office. But temperamentally, he likes to keep his options open, to pretend that Labour could run an incomes policy based on voluntary cooperation with the trade-unions rather than compulsion, to maintain that nothing extraordinary has happened when the Labour conference votes to support councilmen who are deliberately breaking the law in an attempt to sabotage Tory housing policy, and so on. There are some advantages to this sort of tactical flexibility: it avoids unnecessary confrontations (Edward Heath falls into the opposite trap: he sometimes gives the impression of deliberately trying to harden issues when these might be better left blurred or ambiguous—an understandable reaction to the Wilsonian style but one which often results in a damaging rigidity and a lack of political empathy). But this plasticine style of leadership has meant that Labour's public stances have, for much of the time in recent years, borne the imprint of the trade-union bloc vote. Moreover, there has been a shift to a new form of populism—as epitomized in the role of Anthony Wedgewood-Benn, who renounced his family title of Lord Stansgate and now prefers

* The votes of trade-unions at the Labour conference are determined by the number of members for whom each union pays a subscription to the party. Assuming a union pays subscriptions for 250,000 members, it will cast the entire 250,000 votes one way or the other—even if the decision to vote that way has been reached by 51 per cent to 49 per cent.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be known by the more proletarian and chummy appellation of Tony Benn. A minister in the last Labour government, Benn is now acquiring a new role as a sort of tribune of the people: consistent only in his search for policies which will reinforce his image as the champion of grass-roots radicalism and his willingness to drop any policies which do not contribute to this end.

Yet to dismiss grass-roots radicalism out of hand would be as wrong as to take its claims for representing a new mood among the British people at face value. The British political system has always been based on paternalism. The Tory version, which can be traced back to Disraeli and beyond, is the paternalism of the squire. The Labour version, elaborated by the Webbs and their disciples, is the paternalism of the bureaucrat; it is the inspiration behind the creation of the welfare state where enlightened professionals —doctors, teachers, and social workers—confer the benefits of their know-how on the patient or client, informing their ignorance and guiding their steps.

But it is difficult to reconcile the attitudes based on the father-knows-best principle with what has been happening in the past ten years or so. This has been the decade, as already noted, of critical self-examination in which one British institution after another has been refashioned. The result has been—to quote Tocqueville, writing in 1835 soon after the passage of the Great Reform Act which began the long march toward voting rights for all and introduced the 19th-century era of institutional change—that:

> In past times what most distinguished the English people from any other was its satisfaction with itself; then everything about its laws and customs was good in its eyes. . . . Today everything has changed. In the England of our times a spirit of discontent with the present and hatred of the past shows itself everywhere. The human spirit has fallen into the opposite extreme. It only looks for what is wrong around it, and is much more bent on correcting what is wrong than in preserving what is good.

It is therefore not surprising that a recent survey, carried out on behalf of the Royal Commission on the Constitution (whose very existence is yet another example of the prevailing self-criticism), found that only 5 per cent of those interviewed thought that "the present system of running Britain works extremely well and could not be improved," though 43 per cent thought that it "could be improved in small ways but mainly works well." The survey also showed a widespread feeling that public authorities were not responsive enough—a feeling which may or may not indicate a desire for greater, direct participation in decision-making. The wind of participation—the pun is intended, since much of the talk is rhetoric—has not bypassed Britain, and populism feeds on distrust of the discredited paternalists.

TO THIS general trend in Western society must be added some specifically British factors. The first of these is the record of the 1964-70 Labour government. The Labour party is, in a sense, the repository of British idealism: people tend to vote for the Tories because they expect them to deliver the goods but for the Labour party because they expect it to deliver the millennium. (The generalization must be qualified: most of the working-class voters, who provide the bulk of Labour's support, see it as the party which will defend its own interests—the idealism tends to be that of the middle-class Labour supporters who deviate from the class pattern of British voting precisely because of its ethical aims.) The Labour government, because of its unwillingness to devalue the pound and its reluctance to liquidate Britain's overseas commitments, staggered from economic crisis to economic crisis. As a result, many of the party's ambitions for a program of social reconstruction had to be abandoned, and disillusionment set in among the party idealists—a disillusionment which can be explained as much by their excessive, unrealistic hopes as by the actual failures of Labour. For, as the most authoritative study of Labour's record published* points out:

> To have promoted a measurable improvement in the distribution of income against the background of the deplorably slow rate of growth of output . . . was one of the Labour government's main achievements—though, ironically, one that has received very little recognition from many of Labour's own supporters.

In consequence of this failure of recognition, criticism which ought to have been directed against the economic strategy of the Labour government—notably against its fanatical defense of the parity of the pound—has been directed against the "system." Soured idealism has turned to demands for measures designed to transform the economy through an extension of public ownership.

But the Labour record is interesting from another point of view as well. A swelling theme at present is that it is futile, indeed dishonest, to expect trade-unions to show any restraint in their wage demands if the government does not pursue policies designed to bring about more social justice. But this is to ignore the evidence of the Labour government's experience that social justice, on its own, does not cut much ice with the trade-unions. As the study just quoted argues: "It may well be that the Labour government's success in achieving a greater equality in the distribution

* Wilfred Beckerman, ed., *The Labour Government's Economic Record,* Duckworth (London), 1972.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of consumption (including public consumption) has been partially responsible for the slower rate of growth of investment and hence the slower rate of growth of national product." The Conservative government has found it particularly difficult to restrain demands for higher wages—at least partly because of the frustrated demands for higher standards of living bequeathed by Labour, demands which were not suppressed by various tax strategies employed to "soak the rich."

For the British political system might have been specially designed to promote the revolution of rising expectations—in the sense of encouraging belief both in the inevitability of rising standards of living and in the capacity of governments to bring this about. Unlike American parties, the British ones are organized on a permanent basis with the result that they are in a position to conduct what is essentially a permanent general election, an ongoing campaign of criticism and counter-bidding. For twenty-five years, ever since the potentialities of Keynesian economics for maintaining full employment were realized, the Conservative and Labour parties have been seeking to outbid each other in their promises of being able to promote economic growth. It is therefore hardly surprising if the outcome is an unappeased hunger for more.

Looking at Britain's economic performance in the context of postwar international history, one understands this sense of pervasive dissatisfaction. Between 1961 and 1971 Britain's Gross National Product rose by only 2.6 per cent a year, on the average, as compared with 10.2 per cent for Japan, 5.8 per cent for France, 4.6 per cent for Germany, and 4.1 per cent for the United States; similarly, average wages and salaries (in real terms) went up by only 50 per cent in Britain between 1958 and 1971, while they rose by 127 per cent in Italy, 105 per cent in Germany, and 90 per cent in France. The picture is one of a steady slide into genteel poverty, with Britain becoming Europe's Jamaica—an offshore island offering cheap labor and picturesque sightseeing to tourists from more prosperous nations.

BRITAIN therefore is an example of relative poverty in the international setting: a prosperous country with high and rising standards of living which yet *seems* poor when compared with other, similar nations. Its position resembles that of deprived minorities within national communities: the black minority in the United States, for instance, may also have high and rising living standards compared with two-thirds of the world's population, but it is relatively poor in terms of its own reference group—the white majority. In Britain's case the deprivation may be felt all the more acutely because it represents a reversal of roles, from imperial pack-leader to European underdog. Still, the British experience does raise a rather large question about one of the assumptions of the advocates of no-growth. If a sense of deprivation is relative, then it is foolish to think that a standstill on growth would be equally acceptable to all nations irrespective of their position in the world table of income per capita. To the extent that the world may be moving into a period of involuntary limited growth, one can expect a sharpened battle among nations for their shares of such growth as can be squeezed out of the world economy—unless, that is, limited growth is assumed to be a formula for preserving the existing economic pecking order among nations.

But if this point is valid for different nations, may it not have even more force when applied to different sections of the same nation? Could it be that part of the explanation of Britain's special difficulties lies in the extra strains imposed on a society when only a very limited amount of extra wealth is available to be shared out among sections of the community and among competing claims? In short, is it possible to diagnose Britain's troubles as a sort of social vicious circle in which the competitive scramble for scarce resources makes it more difficult to effect those structural changes required if extra resources are to be created?

If this is so, then indeed the coming months and years—assuming that the international crisis created by oil shortages and price rises continues to bite—will prove exceptionally difficult for Britain. At the turn of the year, a correspondent of *Le Monde* concluded a series of articles about Britain by describing the country as the one European nation where the "ideological battles and the struggles of conscience of the past fifty years have left the least doubts and bitterness . . . an oasis of *la douceur de vivre*." There is going to be precious little sweetness left in British life if the expectations created by the competition of the political parties over the past twenty-five years are frustrated by a prolonged period of economic stagnation.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Literary Terrorism

Renee Winegarten

"AFTER the national toasts had been given, the first official toast of the day was the *Old Man of the Mountains*—drunk in solemn silence. . . . The next toast was—the *Jewish Sicarii*. Upon which I made the following explanation to the company: 'Gentlemen, I am sure it will interest you all to hear that the Assassins, ancient as they were, had a race of predecessors in the very same country.'" This is the opium-eater Thomas De Quincey speaking, the harbinger of the Decadents, describing a dinner attended by members of a (possibly imaginary) club who, like himself, are fascinated by all forms of murder. That De Quincey is seeking to disguise his own fascination with violent death beneath a mask of quirky humor and sardonic irony need not put us off the scent. His daughter would say in an aside that "the excitement of terror was a real delight to him." Twice, in 1839 and again in 1854, he added to the essay he wrote in 1827 on "Murder Considered as one of the Fine Arts," that odd outpouring of an eccentric and introspective spirit.

What particularly impressed De Quincey about the Jewish Sicarii, so called from the weapons (*sicae*) they carried beneath their robes, was the novelty of their method, the fact that they struck down their eminent victims in broad daylight, in crowded places, at religious ceremonies, and escaped under cover of the crowd. Thus they were not only audacious but—a factor of vital importance—they were also successful in evading discovery. When these urban guerrillas, or Resistance partisans, as they might now be called, fought against Imperial Rome, they provided "perhaps the only case on record where a regular army of murderers was assembled, a *justus exercitus*. . . . Heavens, gentlemen, what a sublime picture! The Roman legions—the wilderness—Jerusalem in the distance—an army of murderers in the foreground!" Here we have the unresolved paradox of a lawful army that is made up of murderers (and no pussyfooting about the word), although De Quincey does not appear to regard the Sicarii as a "radical sect," the term recently employed to describe them by a modern historian.

Now, as for the subject of the first toast at De Quincey's club, the Old Man of the Mountains or Hasan-i-Sabbah, 11th-century founder of the Ismaili sect known to Europeans as the Assassins—he and his followers have haunted the imagination of the West since the time of the medieval chroniclers and troubadours. The writers of the Middle Ages were the first to be astounded by the unswerving loyalty of the Assassins to their master, who was thought to obtain it by intoxicating his devotees "with such a potion that they are plunged into ecstasy and oblivion." The daggers with which they set out to kill by ruse their lord's enemies "are, so to speak, consecrated to this affair," wrote a German chronicler. According to Bernard Lewis in his book, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam*, Hasan-i-Sabbah may well have invented the method of political terrorism, and the Assassins themselves "may well be the first terrorists."

It is nonetheless suggestive to find in G. A. Williamson's fairly recent Penguin translation of Josephus's *The Jewish War* that the word "terrorist" is anachronistically substituted where Whiston, whose translation appeared in 1737, has "robbers" or sometimes simply "these" for the Sicarii. In Whiston's version, the Sicarii are given as ruffians, *banditti*, as well as zealots. When they attack and burn the homes of their fellow Jews who submit to or collaborate with Rome, their vaunted libertarian patriotism is viewed as a cloak for barbarism, plunder, and power-seeking.

Already, then, the attitude of the wretched Josephus displays the ambivalence associated with this knotty theme. On the one hand, he can scarcely find words harsh enough to characterize those who, unlike himself, resisted the might of Rome, going so far as to accuse them of homosexuality as well as sordid motives and barbarous crimes. On the other hand, he does not know whether their suicidal resolution and their heroism in the face of torture should be called folly or desperate fortitude. Of course, much less is known about the Sicarii than about the Assassins. Yet whether the Sicarii actually behaved in the manner described by Josephus, as some now take leave to doubt, is immaterial for our purpose: an

---

RENEE WINEGARTEN's new book, *Writers and Revolution*, is to be published by Franklin Watts later this year. Mrs. Winegarten's articles in COMMENTARY include "On the Love of Suicide" (August 1972), "Malraux's Fate" (November 1971), and "Literary Revolutionism" (June 1970).

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attempt to probe the attitudes expressed about them and more particularly about those who resemble or derive from them.* It was in 1910 that Péguy (the devout Catholic nationalist who demanded the blood of the pacifist socialist Jaurès) made the celebrated remark: "Everything begins in mystique and ends in politics." Today we have no difficulty in recognizing that myth is as potent, maybe even more potent, a source of inspiration and motive for action than bare fact. Nowhere is this more evident than in the world of the terrorist and his sympathizer and apologist.

We are told, for instance, that the modern Arab fedayeen (or "self-sacrificers") take their name from the followers of the Old Man of the Mountains, those members of the Ismaili sect who were organized as a secret society (with oaths, initiation rites, and a strict hierarchy), and who were not expected to survive their murderous mission. According to Walter Laqueur in his *A History of Zionism,* moreover, it was not so long ago, during the 30's, that Abba Achimeir (a leading theorist in the neo-Revisionist group which included the poet Uri Zvi Greenberg) wrote a pamphlet in which he defended the Sicarii as "unknown heroes who chose as victims central figures of the established order. They were not murderers, since they were not out for personal gain. What mattered was not the action but the purpose behind it. . . ." This last proposition is, of course, central to the terrorist outlook.

And the historian adds, "In Achimeir's political thought . . . death and sacrifice are cardinal motifs, returning with monotonous regularity. . . . But he was essentially a *littérateur*. . . ." The protagonist in Koestler's controversial novel, *Thieves in the Night,* a convert to terrorism, reminds us that Avraham Stern, head of the Stern Gang (who was also a poet of sacred guns and days of wrath) took the alias Ya'ir from Eleazar ben Ya'ir, the commander of the Sicarii at the fall of Masada. Thus we find modern theorists and activists drawing moral sustenance from equivocal ancient models, and we cannot help being struck by the apparent paucity of the scenarios of "historico-mythology" or "legendary history" available for imitation. What matters, however, is not their number but their imaginative pull, what De Quincey with prophetic aptness called their "scenical effect" or "scenical features." For we are not far from high drama in its association with sacred ritual.

WE MAY readily surmise that terrorism, as a systematic policy employed by the few to impose their outlook or their will through the intimidation of the passive many or the powerful antagonist, is very much older than the word for it, which is relatively modern. To get what one wants by frightening others must be as old as man himself. Apparently, in primitive communities, the initiatory rites of male secret societies included actions intended to terrify non-initiates or enemies. In the latter case (so Mircea Eliade tells us) the young warrior-initiate would "transmute his humanity by a fit of aggressive and terror-striking fury, which assimilated him to the raging beast of prey . . . it was a sort of demonic frenzy, which filled the warrior's adversary with terror and finally paralyzed him." This frenzy seems to have resembled a kind of ecstasy from which the warrior was eventually roused. Such a process was essentially of a magical or sacred nature.

Still, faint lingering traces of the inculcation of sacred terror may be found much later in the initiatory rites of 19th-century Carbonarist secret societies and their offspring, with their paraphernalia of skulls and axes and their bloodcurdling oaths, and in those of modern terrorist organizations which blend the sacred with violent death in their oaths sworn on Bible and gun. Ceremonial initiation, once an attempt to assimilate the experience of death through a kind of fictitious or symbolic death, remains linked with the twin ideas of death and regeneration.

However, to return to the word "terrorism" itself as we know it: it arose directly out of the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution, and after 1793-94 came to mean either government by intimidation or the use of methods of intimidation. This double sense has proved a fecund source of confusion lasting to our own day. Some tend to notice only government terror, others only acts of terror by individuals or groups. Some approve the first and condemn the second. Others accept the second and condemn the first.

In the late 1790's the word "terrorism" would have been used to express the feelings of those who disapproved of the Jacobin Terror and who could speak of "hell-hounds called terrorists." But there already existed another body of men who were intent on justifying the Terror (that is, government terror), namely, the Jacobins themselves and their defenders and descendants. Marat had anticipated them by calling the September massacres in Paris acts seemingly indispensable for frightening and discouraging traitors and conspirators (in large part, the helpless priests, beggars, teen-agers, and ordinary people who were numbered among the fifteen-hundred victims). "When I find that, in order to spare a few drops of blood, one risks shedding floods of it, I am indignant, in spite of myself, at our false maxims of humanity," thundered the Friend of the People, who has been named as the first revolutionary to envisage organized terror by a dictator as a method for removing a class enemy and establishing egalitarianism.

Marat was to be followed by "Gracchus"

* For another discussion of Josephus and the Sicarii see "The Masada Complex," by Robert Alter, July 1973.—ED.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Babeuf, urging men to "Cut without pity the throats of the tyrants, the patricians, the gilded millions, all the immoral beings who might oppose our common happiness"; and by the tireless plotter Buonarroti with his apology for Robespierre and his conviction that terror was an inescapable necessity of the Revolution. Exponents of terror like these, or like Blanqui who intended to abolish capitalism under the cover of a revolutionary reign of terror, had their imitators in Russia who aimed (like Zaichnevsky) to "go further . . . than the great terrorists of the 1790's," and whose descendants did so. Ultimately, Trotsky, actively defending terrorism in 1920, was only echoing Engels who wrote that if the victorious revolutionary party does not wish to have fought in vain, it must maintain its authoritarian rule "by means of the terror which its arms inspire in the reactionaries."

Thus the word "terrorism" can carry the weight of the endorsement (whether pained or gloating) of a policy of terror as well as the horrified disapproval of it. Nor should it be forgotten that terrorism was not only to be found in the line that runs directly from the Jacobins via the 19th-century Russian terrorists to the Bolsheviks, but was used by the armed gangs of Mussolini and of Hitler (one of the modern masters of the primitive art of paralyzing opponents through instilling fear), and their numerous imitators. The terrible fate that overtook the poet Lorca and thousands of others in Granada in 1936, at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, was the result of a system of Nationalist terror aimed at intimidating the local population and forestalling any resistance. Terrorism, then, is not the sole prerogative of any particular ideology. Ideology is the mantle covering the nakedness of terrorism.

At this point it becomes essential to distinguish between forms of intimidation carried out by political assassination or tyrannicide, especially in the past, and the indiscriminate terrorism which has grown into so common a feature of our own day. In antiquity, in Greece and Rome, in ancient Israel with Ehud and (significantly) two women, Jael and Judith, in Persia and Syria at the time of the Assassins, and later in Europe during the period of absolute monarchy, important changes might be expected to follow the death of great princes, statesmen, and mighty men of war. The pious Judith, adorned for seduction, by cutting off the head of the sleeping warlord Holophernes, causes panic among the enemy soldiers who immediately flee in disarray and are routed. She meanwhile proclaims herself sexually unsullied, and remains in art a symbol not only of chastity but of the purity associated with the high-minded, patriotic, liberator-murderer down to the present.

In contrast, the attempt to justify the killing of lesser fry in the name of some future greater good, is already evident in Marat, and in Babeuf envisaging the murder of "all the immoral beings who *might* oppose our common happiness" (emphasis added). The implication here is that such vaguely defined beings are no less noxious than tyrants and are to be cut off *before* they can have the chance to work any harm. The extreme limit of this attitude would be exemplified toward the end of the 19th century by the implacable intellectual French anarchist Emile Henry, who threw a bomb into a café crowded with clerks, artisans, and small shopkeepers. At his trial he proclaimed: "There are no innocent people." He saw his deed as a means of retaliation against a society which allowed innocent children to starve to death in the slums. Emile Henry's line of defense introduces a cruel nuance, not because innocents failed to get hurt or slain before, but because their mutilation or death is now justified in the name of other innocents and of their own collective guilt—guilt by supposed association with the haves.

If none of the victims of terrorist acts is innocent, then the assassin cannot exactly be regarded as a criminal and a murderer. Rather is he the avenger of the people's wrongs, the sacrificer, the instrument of national regeneration, the executioner who removes the guilty and dangerous antagonist left unpunished by the established system of society and its laws. "I punished him, and my act was the symbol of a new day," wrote the assassin of Jaurès with pride and satisfaction. The anarchist-terrorist of the 1880's and 90's, the member of the IRA, and their like, do not kill, they "execute." It sounds better, more righteous, legal. Consequently, J.-M. Domenach, a New Left commentator discussing terrorism in *Le Monde* in March 1973, put the word itself in quotation marks. It is almost as if there were really no such thing. Terrorism, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.

Speaking of the victims of hijacking, J.-M. Domenach coolly put the words "innocent people" in quotation marks too. There are no innocent people in wartime, he avers, nor are there any in peacetime, he insinuates, when children are dying of hunger in underdeveloped countries. "As beneficiaries of a system whose empire and prosperity are based on the permanent threat of atomic holocaust and on the exploitation of the poor, we can scarcely pretend that we are not its accomplices." This argument resembles that of Emile Henry, of Merleau-Ponty (who, however, was writing shortly after the years when the Nazis treated the Resistance partisans as terrorists). The idea seems to be that the nastiness of society releases one from being too fastidious about acts of terror.

There is something distinctly odd about this now widely held view, which bears a close relation to Karl Jaspers's concept of metaphysical

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

guilt, quoted by Frantz Fanon, the apologist and eulogist of Algerian terrorism in the 50's. According to Jaspers, defiant opponent of Nazism, men because of their very humanity share responsibility for every injustice committed in the world, for all the crimes of whose existence they cannot claim to be ignorant. If a man does not do whatever he can to prevent them, he becomes an accomplice in them. If he has not risked his life in order to prevent the murder of other men, if he has stood silent, he feels "guilty in a sense that cannot in any adequate fashion be understood juridically, or politically, or morally. . . ." Others can adapt this view of complicity to whitewash terrorism simply because the word "terrorism" is not regarded as synonymous with murder. So long as you do not kill for personal gain, so long as you kill "without pleasure" (as Merleau-Ponty puritanically expressed it), so long as you risk your own life, you are not a murderer but a heroic idealist and martyr.

The peculiarity that immediately strikes us is that the apologists of terrorism apply the argument of metaphysical guilt to killing in one sense, but not in another. For if everybody is guilty of the deaths of atomic victims, starving children, and exploited colonials, then why is not everybody guilty of the deaths inflicted by terrorists, whether these terrorists be rulers claiming to act for the good of the state or individuals and organizations purporting to act for the highest ideals of national liberation and public welfare?

THE reason for the sleight-of-hand is not far to seek. It lies in the profound ambiguity not only at the core of the concept of terrorism itself but also in the hearts of men whenever they are confronted with idealistic bloodletting. Where terrorism is concerned, each person draws the line where it suits him. Your terrorist gangster is my heroic liberator. Delilah seen from the standpoint of the Hebrews equates to Judith seen from the standpoint of the Assyrians. Nowadays, the film director Jean-Luc Godard praising the destructive intentions of Al-Fatah reveals his affinity with the novelist Ben Hecht whose rejoicing over British victims of Jewish terrorism was once notorious. A more complex response can be found in Koestler who mingled admiration for the "chivalric" ideals of the terrorists with a certain distaste, while at the same time despising those who lacked the "courage" to resort to terrorist methods.

Recently, in connection with his latest novel, *The Honorary Consul,* which turns on a bungled kidnapping by Latin American guerrillas, the leftist and heterodox Catholic Graham Greene observed that he could perfectly well envisage situations where he would approve of kidnapping, including—chilling euphemism of the sort so beloved by *littérateurs*—"its ultimate consequences." One of the conditions he had in mind was the liberation of political prisoners in a country like Stroessner's Paraguay where torture is practiced. "And, above all, it depends on the hostages." Graham Greene does not appear to disapprove of the view of one of his characters, Dr. Plarr, that an American ambassador is fair game, since "the Americans have killed plenty of men in South America." For the novelist, "everything depends on the circumstances"; and he now declares that he would have found it difficult to condemn, say, the kidnapping "and even the execution" of a German ambassador between 1933 and 1939 in the era of Hitler's concentration camps. Yet it is worth remembering that the assassination of a minor German diplomat by a desperate young German Jew in Paris in 1938 provided the Nazis with a useful pretext and had disastrous consequences for the Jews of Germany.

Even among distinguished and humane historians who might be expected to keep cooler heads and to be more discriminating than either filmmakers or novelists, there persists a deep respect for the ascetic idealism, fanatic devotion, and noble self-sacrifice of many 19th-century terrorists. This respect often seems to balance and even in some instances to outweigh any disapproval of terrorist acts or pity for the victims. A very ancient current of feeling feeds this response.

There is little doubt that the modern terrorist has inherited not only the cloak of the dashing pirate and bandit—how many released lady hostages comment on the chivalric courtesy and idealism of their captors?—but also the toga of Brutus, the noble conspirator and tyrannicide. Cutting through the centuries-old tyrannicide controversy and the dramatic complexities, A. W. Schlegel, lecturing in Vienna in 1808, found Brutus unquestionably the hero of Shakespeare's play: "The completion of his [Brutus's] great resolve does not consist in the mere assassination of Caesar (an action ambiguous in itself, and of which the motives might have been ambition and jealousy), but in this, that he proves himself the pure champion of Roman liberty, by the calm sacrifice of his amiable life." However, the critic felt that such purity of mind and love of justice rendered the man who finished the job of stabbing Caesar to death unfit for political leadership. Here are assembled the essential elements that recur. The deed itself may be seen as questionable (but is rapidly passed over), while the doer appears as an unworldly idealist governed by lofty principles whose purity is demonstrated by his self-immolation. The deed may be disapproved, but the doer excites sympathy.

At the time when A. W. Schlegel was lecturing on drama in Vienna, there arose in Spain the now legendary war against the French from which the word guerrilla is derived, characterized in at least one of its aspects by the historian Raymond Carr as a form of "patriot terror." It was not long after, when the Carbonari-type con-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

spiracies against the Bourbon restoration were at their height in France, that opposition to the death penalty for political crimes became vocal, because such crimes were seen to be morally ambiguous and relative. Advanced spirits felt that political idealism, even when mistaken, should not suffer the opprobrium associated with common crimes. The key word here is idealism, the underlying assumption being that "sincere" idealists must always be pure, noble, disinterested, like Brutus, whereas the experience of our own age should remind us that they may very well be perverted on occasion.

THE process whereby loving, nonviolent idealism is perverted into an idealism of violence and hatred received its most extraordinary expression shortly after the guerrilla war in Spain came to an end, in a work by the twenty-two-year-old Shelley which has lately aroused a good deal of interest. *The Assassins,* a romance of which the poet (an acute observer of the political events of his day) completed only a few chapters, begins in Jerusalem with the desperate Jewish resistance against Rome. At that dread moment, a number of peace-loving and austere Christians, who place reliance on "individual judgment," flee together to the wilds of Lebanon where they would no longer be poisoned by a diseased civilization. Meanwhile, Jerusalem lies in ruins, and eventually Rome too falls into decline. The Assassins, for so this band of nonsuperstitious Christians is surprisingly called, live secure in their isolated valley, absorbed in love and lofty thoughts, devoted to mutual happiness. "They were already disembodied spirits; they were already the inhabitants of paradise," sings Ariel ecstatically.

But soon the poet goes on to speculate about what would happen if the sheltered Assassin were to come into contact with the outside world where justice and benevolence do not prevail. Plainly, the Assassin's benevolent intentions toward humanity would be beyond the understanding of "the corrupt and slavish multitude." Besides, Shelley notes, the Assassin would be bothered about the means to be employed to fulfill these benevolent intentions. "To produce immediate pain or disorder for the sake of future benefit, is consonant, indeed with the purest religion and philosophy, but never fails to excite invincible repugnance in the feelings of the many." In this odd sentence Shelley seems to be proposing that idealism actually permits suffering which more prosaic and benighted types, who will presumably be the main sufferers, dislike—not unnaturally it may seem to us.

So Shelley's idealistic Assassin "would find himself compelled to adopt means which they would abhor, for the sake of an object which they could not conceive that he should propose to himself." Though spotless and assured of the superiority of his convictions, he would be the victim of calumny and persecution and he would suffer, like the Christian savior, an ignominious death.

Here the tone darkens, and there follows one of the most revealing passages to be composed by the apostle of love as he evokes the thoughts and motives of the pure idealist on encountering the corrupt world. "Who hesitates to destroy a venomous serpent that has crept near his sleeping friend, . . . ? And if the poisoner has assumed a human shape, if the bane be distinguished only from the viper's venom by the excess and extent of its devastation, will the savior and avenger here retract and pause, entrenched behind the superstition of the indefensible divinity of man?" Others might bear with what they regard as transitory ills, but the Assassin could not do so without sharing in the evil he abhors. It is extremely curious that the corrupt are in one respect viewed as airy nothings, yet in another they are seen to have blood in their veins to be shed by the humanitarian Assassin. Indeed, the latter's "path through the wilderness of civilized society would be marked with the blood of the oppressor and the ruiner." The tender idealist has subtly become transformed into the bloody instrument of retribution and redemption.

Shelley then yields to his morbid obsession with death and putrefaction: "How many holy liars and parasites, in solemn guise, would his savior arm drag from their luxurious couches and plunge in the cold charnel, that the green and many-legged monsters of the slimy grave might eat off at their leisure the lineaments of rooted malignancy and detested cunning." Yet immediately after this grim passage, Shelley can remind his reader of the gentleness and lovingkindness of the sect. As yet, nothing has happened. As yet, "Courage and active virtue, and the indignation against vice, which becomes a hurrying and irresistible passion, slept like the imprisoned earthquake, . . ."

An invaluable key to the motivation of the assassin and, by extension, the terrorist, is provided by the lyric poet drawing upon his own secret fantasies. The isolated band of brothers, united in perfect love, on coming into contact with the evil, hypocrisy, and oppression that rule in the world at large, would not be deterred by the "superstition" that human life is sacred. On the contrary, armed with the very best intentions, they would kill without a qualm. Starting out from reliance upon "individual judgment," they would end in the grip of the uncontrollable passion of righteous indignation that demands human blood. Paradoxically, they are innocent but "capable of more than innocence" (a sinister phrase). Above all, they are convinced of their own superiority. It is fanatic self-righteousness and sadism that Shelley offers for our contemplation in an unlovely brew.

One further element remains to be considered in this strangely resonant sado-masochistic frag-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment. Wandering through the forest, a young man named Albedir discovers a naked body impaled on a cedar branch. It was "maimed and mangled horribly." Nonetheless, from this "breathing corpse" issues an exultant cry: "The great tyrant is baffled, even in success. Joy! joy! to his tortured foe! Triumph to the worm whom he tramples under his feet!"

After the horrible account of the mangled body of the tortured victim who, though seemingly powerless, can ultimately strip the tyrant of his power, it is surprising to find in the next chapter that the "breathing corpse" (whom Albedir has carried home) is busy at sunrise the next day "adorning the lattice of his chamber with flowers from the garden." At this point, Shelley's vision is difficult to resist: the moral triumph of the apparently weak, the worm that turns, the defeated who won't lie down, the death that is no death. One of the most enduring elements in the discussion of terrorism will be the ease with which men speak of death while proving incapable of regarding death as real and final. It is as though a poetic trope has magically shifted from the world of imagination to that of action, where one day men suddenly awake to find that the death they dealt a shadow in a dream has slain a real victim or is to be meted out in retribution to themselves.

INDEED, the aesthetic aspect of terrorism demands inquiry. De Quincey spoke of "the aesthetics of murder," and nobody is likely to be deceived by his flippant tone. He thought that "the final purpose of murder, considered as a fine art, is precisely the same as that of tragedy in Aristotle's account of it; *viz.* 'to cleanse the heart by means of pity and terror.' " Few short phrases have occasioned quite as much debate as Aristotle's on dramatic purgation through pity and fear, and it is difficult not to agree with A. W. Schlegel that "it remains to be proved how it is that we take a pleasure in subjecting ourselves to such an operation." All the same, one of the distinguishing marks of the aesthetic of the "romantic agony" was an appreciation of the pleasure and the beauty to be found in terror, pain, and horror.

Not that writers and artists had failed to find pleasure and beauty there before, particularly in religious subjects yielding scope for sado-masochism, but they now freely expatiated upon the fact. From Shelley speaking of "the tempestuous loveliness of terror" when describing the hideous aspects of the Medusa, right down to the drug-addict Francis Thompson, a poet who came under Shelley's sway, dreaming of "Beauty which cannot separate itself from terror, terror tainted by beauty, . . . ," and beyond the Decadents to our own day, there is a kindred obsession. Some even went so far as to say that the purpose of art is to inspire terror, without any reference to tragic purgation. A devout French novelist and polemicist who was probably more than a little mad, Léon Bloy, wrote of a Symbolist painting in 1892: "The visionary artist . . . selects the most appropriate mode of extermination by torture for all the passive Christians, for all the satisfied people, for all the sowers of bitterness and the growers of ignominy. Henceforth no more pity for the spectator who has been struck with terror! This painting, designed to create panic and friction, does not attempt for one moment to stem the terrible fear of the multitudes, . . ." Such an apocalyptic note of artistic terrorism announces the Futurists and Surrealists and their varied offspring.

Uniting beauty with terror, many writers, poets, and artists of the *fin de siècle* and after, from Wilde to Kafka, sympathized with or were fascinated by bomb-throwing terrorists. Kafka, for instance, whose childhood and youth spanned the *fin de siècle*, was haunted by Ravachol, the mysterious murderer-*cum*-anarchist who perished on the guillotine, to the point of identifying with him in feelings of irredeemable guilt. The author of *The Trial*, who was acquainted with some of Léon Bloy's writings, also conceived art itself as a form of terror.

Appreciation of the beauty associated with extreme dread could scarcely be confined to artists alone. It was in the air. The lofty Russian-Jewish terrorist, Salomon Wittenberg, who took part in the first armed demonstration organized in Odessa to rescue a comrade sentenced to death, said: "Throughout that terrible night I stayed in the streets. . . . A terrible night, but beautiful. . . ." On the eve of his own execution (he had plotted to kill Czar Alexander II), Wittenberg would see himself fulfilling the spirit of the Christian savior. He too dramatized himself as a Shelleyan "savior arm," but in reality not in romance.

Another high-principled Russian, the revolutionary Venus, Vera Figner, who like so many others made the Shelleyan crossing from saintly laboring among the peasants to active terrorism, declared: "Terror was intended to create opportunities for developing the faculties of men for service to society." From the justificatory idea that terrorism was inevitable, it was but an easy step to the idea that it was necessary, that without the agony of terrorism the new social or national birth could never come about. Not the birth itself but the agony appeared as the creative process. Hence arose the weird notion that terrorism itself can be creative—and here too it links up with art and beauty.

Perhaps the most consummate expression of the union of beauty, creation, and terror is to be found in Yeats's complex poem on the Easter Rising of 1916, that moment in the history of modern Ireland which has attained the sanctification of myth. That event continues to inspire Irish terrorists and their supporters today, for

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one of whom it meant that violence was the ideal and death the ultimate sacrifice. The haunting refrain of Yeats's poem—"A terrible beauty is born"—is surely the mysterious culmination of the tradition that runs from Shelley's "tempestuous loveliness of terror," its apotheosis in the real blood, death, and sacrifice of an action which transfigures ordinary, disregarded, even scorned fellow creatures and transforms them into mythic heroes.

The poet may even venture to inquire whether the death of Connolly and MacBride, of the poets MacDonagh and Pearse, was "needless." He may even go so far as to consider the possibility that England "may keep faith" in spite of everything, and to wonder whether the rebels acted mistakenly through "excess of love." But whatever the answers to questions of practical politics may be, the national heroic myth remains immortal. The paradox of a "terrible beauty" remains unresolved. Those potent words resound in the imagination almost independently of their meaning, uniting beauty with blood, suggesting even that bloodshed is the catalyst of beauty.

WHAT if the terrorist himself is viewed as a hero (whether consciously or unconsciously) not in spite of but because of the terror he inspires? What if some people secretly find in the excitement, awe, and beauty of terror a delight that lifts them momentarily out of their boring routine? What if the image of the terrorist as savior and implacable avenger resembles that of the tragic hero who deals death and suffers death in a beautiful representation, thus providing the equivalent of a tragic catharsis? What if, in his transitory power of life and death over his fellow men, he stands as a substitute for the individual who has to live at the mercy of power, and so acts out those sadistic fantasies which may sometimes lie concealed under the mask of noble compassion for the suffering underdog?

There is so much in the terrorist mystique that can appeal to private fantasies. The idea of a secret conspiracy of initiates has long thrilled countless imaginations with delicious horror. The conspirator, the tyrannicide, the assassin, the terrorist, all know something that their antagonist-victim and the passive and "slavish multitude" they despise but profess to benefit, do not know. Despite their apparent powerlessness, this knowledge gives them a deep sense of power; and it is surely significant that secret societies tend to be organized on a basis of strict hierarchy and to aim at power for an elite. If De Quincey is to be believed, Coleridge, that connoisseur of power, was once thrown "into a profound reverie upon the tremendous power which is laid open in a moment to any man who can reconcile himself to the abjuration of all conscientious restraints, if at the same time thoroughly without fear." To break the taboo on shedding human blood, and to do so in the name of the highest ideals, is to have the best of both worlds: one performs the forbidden act (which others yearn to do but dare not), and one receives the martyr's crown as a reward for it.

While terrorist movements with their oaths and initiation rituals, and their dread act of commitment from which there is no return, would seem to hark back to the dark aspects of primitive communities, to ritual murder with consecrated daggers, they also have a play-acting or operatic side. Something of this is still visible in the names terrorist organizations choose for themselves: from the Russian student body of the 1860's named "Hell" whose members were to poison themselves on accomplishing their mission, to the so-called counter-terrorist Israeli band who killed the wrong Arab in Norway under the forbidding and blasphemous name of "The Wrath of God" or "Finger of God." Such titles are obviously meant to mystify and to make the blood run cold.

Buried deepest of all, perhaps, is the Wagnerian death wish, the unconscious longing to ride into the tragic funeral pyre in a single redemptive act that immediately purifies all one's errors and all the wrongs of the world. The union of death and self-sacrifice has already been noted in terrorist theorizing. In many instances the terrorist mission is conceived as virtual suicide: this was the case with the Assassins, with many of the 19th-century Russian terrorists who knew that there was little chance of escape. Yet volunteers for suicidal terrorist missions never seem to have been lacking, and this may well be attributed to a death wish which arouses an echo in many hearts.

Doubtless that is one reason why terrorist movements often attract a fair sprinkling of poets, among whom should be numbered not only Avraham Stern, shot down in February 1942, but the womanizing Kemal Nasser, riddled with "counter-terrorist" bullets in Beirut in the spring of 1973. The terrorist (as distinct from the brigand-outlaw) tends to be an intellectual of sorts, that is, someone with a certain degree of education, some ideals, and a lot of dissatisfaction at the gap between those ideals and reality, as well as the conviction that this gap can be swiftly closed through violent deeds. He often appears to observers to be quiet, shy, scholarly, just the opposite of what they might expect a terrorist to look like from their reading. But soon the desperate fury at injustice, the hatred, and the dedicated fanaticism grow visible. The terrorist has the self-importance and the arrogance to believe that it is up to him to prod the cowardly, uncomprehending mass, and to terrify the enemy into submission. He sees himself among the elite of the vanguard, and in this as in other things he resembles a certain kind of poet—the Shelleyan kind.

Even today, however, remarkably little seems to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be known about terrorist motivation, although many memoirs by activists and sympathizers exist, and perhaps a careful analysis of these might yield some information. When seeking to explain or excuse terrorism, Koestler claimed that one of the assassins of Lord Moyne had as a boy of fourteen witnessed the blowing up of the *Patria* in Haifa harbor and had seen through binoculars—this suggests a certain element of morbid deliberation—the mutilated corpses in the water. Yet others must have been present at the same appalling disaster without later resorting to terrorism. Are some basically more predisposed to it than others?

The notion that terrorists are unstable individuals or mentally sick, is again current. This does not take us far: artists also are often unstable individuals. Doubtless terrorist movements (whether of the state or the opposition), like armies, do include brutes and psychopaths who just enjoy killing. But as is well known, the terrorist spectrum can embrace the loftiest disinterested spirits as well as the strictly criminal type, though the one often blurs into the other. Moreover, if terrorists are simply mentally sick, then what are those who sympathize with or justify terrorism? The Argentinian Bengochea, who perished with his weaponry and his followers in a Wagnerian explosion, said: "We dehumanize ourselves so that, by being inhuman, we can achieve what is human"—words that have a Sartrean ring about them. Certainly it makes the observer feel better if he can reduce terrorism to a purely pathological phenomenon: it elucidates the mystery, eliminates the disturbing element of ambiguity, and removes the nagging paradox.

One noteworthy factor is the terrorist's sense of detachment from the victims, who resemble Shelley's airy nothings. A university graduate and would-be actress, Maria McGuire, who after a failed marriage joined the Provisional IRA, drifted into an affair with one of its leaders, and later spectacularly defected, confessed that she "did not connect" with the people who were being killed or injured in explosions. After her enthusiasm cooled, however, she observed: "Whenever such casualties had occurred before, there had always been the pressure of events to take my mind off them. But now, *almost for the first time*, I wondered about the crippled and the widowed and the lives that had been changed forever" (emphasis added). It is as if there were a sudden awakening from a hypnotic state, like that of the warrior-initiate roused from his animal frenzy. It is as if the drugged potion (or hashish) with which the Old Man of the Mountains was supposed to win the blind obedience of his Assassins were really a symbol of enduring significance, pointing to a form of ecstasy. And if some have remained coldly unmoved, others, like the Algerian terrorist who killed ten people with a bomb he placed in a café, suffered afterward from suicidal obsessions, if not remorse, according to Fanon.

WHAT causes terrorism to proliferate? Is it due to despair, as some maintain, or, as others believe, does it arise when the despairing begin to hope of changing their condition? Is it the result of social and political blockage, when people feel there is no room for maneuver, no way for them to make themselves heard? Should it be regarded as a plebeian way of settling accounts, after Marx, or simply as the weapon of the humiliated for drawing attention to a cause that is neglected? It has been said that terrorism is counter-productive, and so it has occasionally turned out, but especially where liberation from a foreign power is at stake it has often proved effective. Yet terrorism does not even have to be successful to serve as a model. Its equivocal appeal runs too deep for that.

Only too frequently the individual or relatively small group which adopts terrorist methods immediately wins the sneaking sympathy that attaches to any desperate cause where the small fellow takes on the big fellow against the odds. He is Shelley's worm crying "Joy! joy!" and prophesying the oppressor's downfall. It is surely for this reason that state terror appears to many to be so much worse than individual terror, although the difference is only one of scale, and from the victim's point of view, the result is the same. Terror is terror, no matter who uses it, and whatever the ideal in whose name it is employed.

So long as a noted historian of Spain and Cuba like Hugh Thomas can find "moral authority" for the use of terrorism, even if only in conditions of unquestionable tyranny where there is no hope of otherwise changing an oppressive system, we are not going to see the end of terrorism or of sympathy for it. For what constitutes tyranny is no longer "unquestionable" at a time when innocent bystanders are assimilated to tyrants.

The trouble is that it is as invidious to try to define the limits of terrorism as to define those of war. Each person tends to admit terrorism in certain circumstances if not in others, recognizing it as an acceptable or regrettable aspect of the sacred right of resistance. Each sees the mote in the other's eye but not the beam in his own. Outrage is consequently misplaced. At present it seems pretty unlikely that everybody would be prepared to reject, condemn, and outlaw all forms of terrorism, including counter-terrorism, whatever their source and perpetrated for whatever noble-sounding cause. Yet at least it should no longer be enough to adduce idealism in order to excuse terrorist acts. For as the highly equivocal but nonetheless penetrating Yeats once told us: if we feed the heart on fantasies it will grow brutal from the fare.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COMMENTARY GIFT SUBSCRIPTION FORM

Use this form to specify when you want each gift announced and when each of the subscriptions should actually begin

1. SUBSCRIPTION GOES TO:

Name

Address

City, State & Zip

Announcement card should be mailed-date

and signed

Start subscription with issue of-month & year

2. SUBSCRIPTION GOES TO:

Name

Address

City, State & Zip

Announcement card should be mailed-date

and signed

Start subscription with issue of-month & year

3. SUBSCRIPTION GOES TO:

Name

Address

City, State & Zip

Announcement card should be mailed-date

and signed

Start subscription with issue of-month & year

4. SUBSCRIPTION GOES TO:

Name

Address

City, State & Zip

Announcement card should be mailed-date

and signed

Start subscription with issue of-month & year

5. SUBSCRIPTION GOES TO:

Name

Address

City, State & Zip

Announcement card should be mailed-date

and signed

Start subscription with issue of-month & year

6. SUBSCRIPTION GOES TO:

Name

Address

City, State & Zip

Announcement card should be mailed-date

and signed

Start subscription with issue of-month & year



☐ My prepayment of $54 for six subscriptions is enclosed—entitling me to a free copy of The Commentary Reader.

☐ My prepayment for _____ subscriptions is enclosed.

For both economy and convenience it is worth your while to order several COMMENTARY gift subscriptions at once. An order for six subscriptions (your own renewal can count as one of them) enables you to save $3 on each. If you pay for your six-subscription order in advance we will send you a free copy of the 763-page *Commentary Reader*, containing the best COMMENTARY articles and stories of two decades.

You can, of course, use this form to order fewer than six subscriptions. The rate for one is $12, $11 each for two or three, and $10 each for four or five. (Outside U.S.A.—add $3.00/yr.)

Commentary 165 EAST 56 STREET NYC 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spinoza and the Colonel

Milton Himmelfarb

A FEW SUMMERS ago a Jewish scholar was in Germany, doing research in the family papers of a former colonel in the Wehrmacht. When he was through, the scholar prepared to leave and thanked his host. "Not at all, Professor," said the colonel, "not at all. But before you go, perhaps you would be kind enough to answer a question. Tell me, do Jews still pray in—what do you call them?—synagogues?"

The curiosity was understandable, in a descendant of Moses Mendelssohn.

No such story is possible about a descendant of Mendelssohn's rival for the title of father of Jewish modernity, Spinoza. Spinoza never married. That in itself gives Mendelssohn the better claim to fatherhood, for since the question is one of history—which is to say, the succession of generations—we naturally prefer the claimant who was also a father literally.

Always a Jew, never an ex-Jew, Mendelssohn was the leader of the Jewish community—defender and teacher of the Jews. Reform invokes and Orthodoxy still uses him: the Orthodox annotators of the Hertz Pentateuch frequently cite his *Be'ur*. In one degree or another, therefore, we are all his spiritual descendants. Is he responsible for his actual descendant having been a German army officer in 1939-45? Almost certainly not.

Almost—for if we judge Mendelssohn with a rigor suitable not to ourselves but only to the highest and best, we may ask whether for him that should have been altogether impossible to foresee. If Spinoza had lived in Germany rather than Holland, and if he had had children, and if one of our contemporaries were an Oberst von Spinoza, we would have less right to ask whether Spinoza should have been able to foresee that.

Mendelssohn wrote in German—the first memorable Jew to do so. (In those days the German Jews spoke Yiddish.) A century earlier Spinoza had written not in the language of his country, Dutch, but in Latin—the first memorable Jew, or ex-Jew who had not become a Christian, to do so. By the 18th century the national tongues had superseded Latin not only for literature but also, or as near as makes no difference, for scholarship, philosophy, and science. (In our time an introduction to a classical text may still be in Latin, and very rarely a work of Bible scholarship. The introductions to Nestle's New Testament and Rahlfs's Septuagint are in Latin but also in German and English, and to Kittel's Biblia Hebraica in Latin but also in German.) In the 17th century Bacon and Hobbes wrote in Latin and English, Descartes and Leibniz (a German) in Latin and French. Spinoza wrote in Latin.

Yet unlike the Gentile philosophers, Spinoza had not had a classical education and was not steeped in the Latin literary tradition: his Latin is serviceable rather than elegant, says his English translator. Not even the worldly Sephardim of his milieu gave their children a classical education. Instead the children were taught Jewish things, on the one hand, and things useful for commerce, on the other. (A few ambassadorial types, defenders and apologists of the Jews, wrote in Latin—which they had learned in Spain or Portugal while still outwardly Christian—for reasons like Cromwell's in appointing Milton to write Latin defenses of regicide England.) To the Jews of Christendom, Latin had been *leshon kemarim*, the language of the idolater-priests; and it has been said that in Spain the Jewish dislike of Latin contributed to the ascendancy of Spanish.

Spinoza's circumstances, outlook, and interests differed from those of the Jews, medieval or contemporary. For him the ecclesiastical character of Latin was less marked, if only because he lived after the Reformation and in a Protestant country, where the vernacular was also the church language. Latin was the language of the international republic of learning, and that was more important to him than to the Jews, then or earlier. He did not leave Judaism and the Jews to become a Christian, or even a Dutchman. He left to become a citizen of the world—the world of philosophy. Latin must have been more than merely useful to him, it must have been positively attractive. It was universal not local or particular, ecumenical not parochial. In good faith the ex-Jew could take Latin's universality as evidence that choosing to be a citizen of the world was neither illusion nor opportunism. After Latin had been abandoned, Schopenhauer was to be harsh about that chauvinist betrayal of the international republic. (Now some American medical journals publish abstracts of their articles in Interlingua, an artificial language largely based on

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Latin that has been devised for communication among scientists across linguistic borders. Normally not a very cheerful soul, Schopenhauer would nevertheless have appreciated the joke: first we abandon the millennial interlingua, then we have to invent Interlingua.)

Two objections can be made against exculpating Spinoza on such grounds. The first is that an assertion of Latin's universality is itself provincial and chauvinist. What is or was Latin to the non-European, non-Western world? Even in Europe what is or was Latin to the peoples whose very alphabets are not Latin but Greek or derivatively Cyrillic? (Until a hundred years ago Rumanian, though a Romance language, was written in Cyrillic. The change to our alphabet was a Westernizing gesture.) This objection is anachronistic. In Spinoza's time, what was not West European hardly counted, intellectually.

A variant is that in Western Europe itself Latin was not evenly universal. After all, Latin is closer to Portuguese than to Danish. The language of an ode to Venice, of no great literary merit but of a daunting ingenuity, is both Latin and 17th-century Italian; and Gaston Paris used to begin his lectures on Old French at the Collège de France by declaring, "*Nous parlons latin*"—in speaking French, we speak Latin. True enough, but Latin seems to have been no less at home in the Germanic North than in the Romance South.

The second objection is that nothing in Latin from those days compares with the French writings of Ronsard and Racine or the English of Shakespeare and Milton—which is to say that if we think not of philosophy and scholarship narrowly but of culture broadly, then by Spinoza's day it should already have been obvious that Latin was declining and would soon fall. May it not have been some apprehension of this which persuaded Bacon and Descartes and Hobbes to write in their vernaculars things no less philosophical than the things they wrote in Latin?

If so, the apprehension was easier for a Christian or ex-Christian than for the ex-Jew. Spinoza assigned a much lower place to the imagination and the work of the imagination, poetry, than to reason. So did those other philosophers. (So did Plato and Maimonides.) Still, Spinoza was—he had to be, one may say—more single-minded and uncompromising about it than the Gentiles. For him, brought up a Jew, poetry was the Bible, and the Bible was contrary to reason. Because none but the few could lead lives guided by reason, the many needed the Bible—poetry, revealed religion's carrot of the hope of heaven and stick of the fear of hell—to keep them from murder and tumult. But the Bible, revealed religion, also bred sectarian war and the persecution of philosophers. Hence Spinoza's advocacy of the secular state, in which the citizen's adherence to one or another revealed religion must be a private matter, of no interest to the state provided the citizen also subscribed to the civil religion, which taught virtue and duty. (In the 18th century as well, freethinking *philosophes* like Voltaire would remain convinced that there could be no such thing as a polity of atheists and that the common people required a civil religion, complete with belief in an afterlife.) The philosopher and ex-Jew would not be safe, could not live in honorable security, would never cease to be an outsider, so long as reason and philosophy had not tamed the imagination and poetry.

For Christian or ex-Christian philosophers too the Bible might be, while necessary for the many, dangerous and merely imaginative and poetic; but it was not identical with poetry, nor was poetry intrinsically quite without value even for the few. Gentile philosophers also knew and might still enjoy Ovid and Arthurian romance and Petrarch. Besides, they knew and enjoyed Lucretius, from whose example they had learned that poetry need not be the certain enemy of reason and philosophy but could be a powerful ally. Nor would Christians or ex-Christians experience all the urgent intensity of the ex-Jew's desire to transcend the status of outsider.

Consequently, apart from any consideration of fluency, it is not to be wondered at that Spinoza abstained from writing in a vernacular, while those others did not. And he was consistent. He did nothing for which even a Spinoza, whom we have the right to hold to standards of the utmost rigor, must answer to us. His seeming preference, in the *Tractatus theologico-politicus*, for Christianity over Judaism? It is only a seeming preference. Philosophical eyes, which knew how to read a political philosopher, could see that Spinoza had little regard for either, and probably less for Christianity. He could hardly know that after him philosophy would value the imagination and poetry. He could hardly know that he was to be the last great philosopher, except his younger acquaintance Leibniz, to write in Latin. Some may say that he ought to have understood what was portended by such things as the Royal Society's publication of its *Philosophical* (= scientific) *Transactions* in English. However that may be, Spinoza could hardly have foreseen Romanticism.

To Mendelssohn, a hundred years later, the linguistic nationalisms of the learned might by themselves have sufficed to reveal how hollow was the internationalism of that famous international republic. Mendelssohn lived at the beginning of Romanticism, when it could no longer be taken for granted, even by those who earlier would have supported Spinoza and Hobbes, that reason was everything and poetic imagination almost nothing. (John Stuart Mill, sickening on a diet of Bentham, would recover by taking Wordsworth and Coleridge.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

With the change in the status of the imagination and poetry came a change in the status of the folk. The Romantic doctrine that *das Volk dichtet,* the folk is a poet, would neither have surprised Spinoza nor raised his estimate of the folk. He stood in the tradition that had long known the folk to be ruled by the imagination: it was ruled by the imagination because it was incapable of reason. In a Romantic age, *das Volk dichtet* meant an enhanced respect for the folk. That did not contradict Romanticism's exaltation of the solitary genius. The Romantic solitary genius was not Descartes, alone in his chamber and spinning thought from his unassisted intellect. The Romantic genius, though solitary, yet had an infinity of connections, subterranean and unconscious, with the folk which had borne and nurtured him. Though the genius's poetry and art were higher than folk poetry and art, his were connected with theirs undeniably, however obscurely. Somehow he represented them and spoke for them. Well into the 20th century, the Artist as a Young Man could say, "I go . . . to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race."

For ex-Jews this was to cause difficulties. Religion a private matter? At most, only if religion were understood narrowly. If understood to stand also for much else that is imaginative and poetic and traditional, how could it be private? How could it be kept distinct from culture and memory? In what country are the national literature and history not taught in the schools? If ex-Jews had to take the folk's imagination seriously, what were they to make of the Grimm brothers' tales, in which Jews are hateful, evil, uncanny, alien? How could ex-Jews *honorably* identify themselves with the folk whose spirit revealed itself in such tales? Could it be enough to say you were a Jew no longer? In Weimar Germany, both ex-Christians and ex-Jews could register as *konfessionslos* (of no formal religious affiliation), but the term was commonly understood to mean "ex-Jew." (In the United States, when respondents check "none" in answer to a question about their religion, the proportion of Jews among them, or of would-be ex-Jews, exceeds the proportion of Jews in the population.) The folk was Christian. To be related to the folk, you had to be Christian, or at least ex-Christian.

The ex-Jew Spinoza was never Christian, the ex-Jewish Mendelssohns were. Thirty and forty years ago German Mendelssohns whose families had been Christian for generations had some unpleasant moments—and, it is said, recourse to genealogies unflattering to the chastity of ancestresses—before they could be certified as Aryan, fit for service to the Third Reich. Long before Nuremberg there had been difficulties. Felix Mendelssohn, wrote Wagner in his *Judentum in der Musik,* was an estimable Christian gentleman of the highest musical gifts, but he was not a great German composer, or a great composer simply. He could not be. He had no roots in the folk. Of course Wagner, genius that he was, was also a disgusting man and a vile anti-Semite.

The German-speaking Jews were never more than one or two in a hundred of all German speakers. Toward the beginning of their history was Heine, perhaps the greatest 19th-century writer of German, who had a premonition of what was to come. Toward the end was Kafka, perhaps the greatest 20th-century writer of German. Kafka had questions about his relation to German. He asked himself whether it was fitting for a Jew to call his mother *Mutter,* in German, when the Yiddish is *mamme.* Yet he had heard German from his mother, not Yiddish. His situation was complicated by his belonging to the Jewish minority of the German-speaking minority in mostly Czech Prague, but if he worried about German it was less because of present Czech than past Yiddish. The Jews had left behind their own folk quality without being able—without having the right to be able—to enter into another. The problem was folk quality, not citizenship.

But that had to do with German culture, and of Western cultures the German was least modern, most linked to a medieval, folkish past. It was otherwise with French culture. Of the one, Barbarossa and the Grimms' tales and Wagner were emblematic; of the other, 1789 and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. Yet there is that passage in Sartre's *Anti-Semite and Jew*:

> To the anti-Semite, intelligence is Jewish; he can thus disdain it in all tranquillity, like all the other virtues which the Jew possesses. They are so many ersatz attributes that the Jew cultivates in place of that balanced mediocrity which he will never have. The true Frenchman, rooted in his province, in his country, borne along by a tradition twenty centuries old, benefiting from ancestral wisdom, guided by tried customs, does not *need* intelligence. His virtue depends upon the assimilation of the qualities which the work of a hundred generations has lent to the objects which surround him. . . . To be sure, this sensibility ignores eternal truths or universal values: the universal is Jewish. . . . the principle underlying anti-Semitism is that the concrete possession of a particular object gives as if by magic the meaning of that object. Maurras said the same thing when he declared a Jew to be forever incapable of understanding this line of Racine: *"Dans l'Orient désert, quel devint mon ennui."*
>
> But the way is open to me, mediocre me, to understand. . . . Why? Because I possess Racine —Racine and my country and my soil. Perhaps the Jew speaks a purer French than I do, perhaps he knows syntax and grammar better, perhaps he is even a writer. No matter; he has spoken this language for only twenty years, and I for a thousand years. The correctness of his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> style is abstract, acquired; my faults of French are in conformity with the genius of the language. . . .

"The universal is Jewish." Last year I noted here ("The Greeks, the Romans & Captain Dreyfus," February 1973) that French Jews liked to think that the universal was French, and German Jews that it was German. The French Jews were somewhat less self-deluded, France having had the Revolution and the Declaration; but if most Frenchmen did not hate the universal so much as Sartre's anti-Semite, neither, surely, did they love it so much as the Jew. A Nazi said that when he heard the word "culture" he reached for his revolver. He did not necessarily mean that he scorned opera (especially Wagner) or even that he was waging war against *Kulturbolschewismus*. He may have meant that the word "culture" was a likely sign of a Jew speaking. Jews (and ex-Jews) did not want to recognize that for others, the words "culture" and "universal" may have been likely signs of a Jew (or ex-Jew) speaking.

Of course Nazis would take it as probable that a universalist was really a dirty Jew. Marxists could not—except that Soviet Russia is where "cosmopolitan," together with synonyms like "passportless wanderers," has officially been a bad word, meaning "dirty Jew." The Little Russian Cossack hetman Bogdan Khmelnitsky massacred Jews (and Poles) in Spinoza's time. Soviet Russia thinks so well of him that a city and, if memory serves, a decoration have been named after him. Stalin canonized him.

For Jews and even for Spinozaic ex-Jews it is not much compensation that in Marxist teaching Spinoza figures as a precursor. It will still be hard for them to find room in Russia.

It ought to be less hard for Mendelssohnian ex-Jews. They have been pretty good at that sort of thing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Myth of Malcolm Lowry

George Woodcock

Oscar Wilde once suggested that it was second-rate artists who were most interesting as personalities; in the case of greater artists, he implied, their fascinating eccentricities were subsumed in their work. Malcolm Lowry is one of the cases in which Wilde appears to have been proved wrong. For he was an artist of the first order who became transformed into a hero, but—and this after all brings Wilde his justification—transformed mainly because of his limitations as an artist. When Lowry died in England in 1957 (on first report through choking on food but in fact—as later revealed—from reinforcing alcohol with sleeping pills), he was still a relatively little known writer. A readership small enough to regard itself as a kind of esoteric cult had recognized that one of his novels—*Under the Volcano*—was among the fictional masterpieces of the century. But by 1957 Lowry had published nothing else that resembled *Under the Volcano* in either dimension or quality. His only other printed novel, *Ultramarine*, was an apprentice work in which it is difficult to find, even in retrospect, the least premonitory hint of the literary power that emanated from *Under the Volcano*.

These two novels, and a few short stories and sketches, were the only completed works of almost thirty years in which, while he was sober, Lowry wrote with neurotic fury. He left, indeed, a mass of written material which now occupies an intimidating quantity of space in the Special Collections division of the University of British Columbia library, but, apart from some poems which Lowry himself regarded as conventional and second-rate, only enough was complete at his death to make up a volume of short stories, *Hear Us O Lord from Heaven Thy Dwelling Place*. A novella—*Lunar Caustic*—and two novels—*October Ferry to Gabriola* and *Dark as the Grave Wherein My Friend Is Laid*—were later put together by Lowry's widow and her editorial collaborators; the process was mainly a matter of selecting the most convincing in each case of a whole variety of false starts, and how near any of these books really comes to what Lowry intended—if Lowry ever knew just what he intended—is entirely conjectural. All three, in any case, turned out after editing and publication to be interesting drafts of novels, with no formal completeness and no hint of escape from an autobiographical obsession with the author's unresolved neuroses. None of them showed the power, or the extraordinary poetic evocativeness, or the marvelously integrated planning, that combined to make of *Under the Volcano* such a splendid and unique novel.

A few scraps of Lowry's writings are still left unpublished, but having read them in manuscript at the University of British Columbia, I know we can expect little from them. Thus, after sixteen years of editing by Lowry's friends, and sixteen years of expectation by his *aficionados*, we are left precisely where we were on the day Lowry fatally topped off his whiskey with barbiturates. He is still of interest as a writer mainly on the strength of *Under the Volcano*, without which he would certainly have been forgotten by now, and of a handful of very good philosophic short stories, notably "The Forest Path to the Spring."

Yet, on this thin record, Lowry has become one of the most discussed writers of his time, and recently two new books on him have appeared within a few weeks of each other. One—Tony Kilgallin's *Lowry*—is a visually handsome but otherwise rather meager essay in biography and criticism published by an arty new Toronto house, Press Porcépic; the other is Douglas Day's *Malcolm Lowry*.* These books make up to seven the total of books devoted entirely to Lowry, and all published during the past five years. Three of these books have appeared first in Canada, where Lowry lived for most of his last eighteen years and which perhaps claimed his final loyalties more than any other country, since he enjoyed on Burrard Inlet near Vancouver some of his few periods of unbroken happiness; the other four, including Day's book, are by Americans and published in the United States. Lowry's fellow Englishmen have been cautious in writing of him at length and—perhaps significantly—no English publisher has yet initiated a book on him. Ironically, apart from book reviews, nobody wrote anything—not even a critical article—on Lowry when he was alive.

Day's book comes into print as a result of a series of events not inappropriate to a venture linked with the author of *Under the Volcano*, for it was undertaken only after Lowry's original prospective biographer, Conrad Knickerbocker, had committed suicide. Day has indeed faced greater problems

George Woodcock *is the author of* The Crystal Spirit, *a study of George Orwell, as well as of biographies of William Godwin, Proudhon, and Kropotkin.*

* Oxford, 483 pp., $10.00.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

than the other writers on Lowry, since *Malcolm Lowry* is in fact the first book that—in its 400-odd pages—attempts to be comprehensive in the sense of being critical as well as biographical.

Day has had to circumvent as best he can the traps laid for him by his subject and by his subject's friends, and he has had to attempt the overcoming of his own limitations. His first difficulty was clearly that of reconciling his dual biographical-critical task, and more specifically, of deciding just where to place his criticism. He attempts to solve it by interspersing his narrative passages on Lowry's calamitous life with long critical interludes on his books, placed chronologically as they were published or—in the case of posthumously-issued books—as their composition appeared most significantly in Lowry's writing life. Since Day is a lumbering and myopic critic, laboring the obvious and missing whatever is even lightly concealed, this slows down the pace of the book irremediably; sometimes it seems as if the talk will never end and the action start up again. Yet one sees a reason for the arrangement. Lowry's life, ungarnished by his books, considered both as splendid successes and tragic failures, would be a rather monotonous account of boozing and domestic mishaps; he knew few famous or even interesting people, and lived mainly in the inner world of his writing and his neuroses.

YET it is this inwardly-oriented mind and this in many ways grotesquely unsuccessful and ridiculous life that have turned Lowry—as a similar life turned Dylan Thomas—into a myth. He has become in readers' minds more than a mere writer; he is a real-life example of the anti-hero who has flourished in Western novels for many decades, and also of a cult perhaps even older than existentialist anti-heroism. For there is a romantic element in Lowry's record which relates him to the artist-as-Adonis-sacrificed cult of which one of the most notorious examples is the myth of Wilde, who never wrote as good a book as *Under the Volcano*, but who still haunts our minds in the same way as the doomed kings of *The Golden Bough*. Wilde was sacrificed by society, with his own connivance; Lowry was sacrificed by inner forces of self-destruction that even he hardly recognized. But the end result has been the same. The *fact* of Lowry sixteen years after his death is his one great work of the imagination, *Under the Volcano*; the *myth* is his life as we see it.

This, of course, poses enormous problems for the biographer, since even before Lowry died, the myth was being fed not only by Lowry's indulgent and romantic acquaintances, but also by Lowry himself. Even his letters have to be read with great caution; much of them is fiction, and very good of its kind. In the case of many events in Lowry's life, Douglas Day has had to sift carefully what is obviously fact from what looks very much like invention by Lowry or by someone else.

Anyone who reads *Malcolm Lowry* and Tony Kilgallin's *Lowry* seriatim will be be immediately struck by the divergent accounts of Lowry's first days in Vancouver when he lodged with an ex-sergeant-major in the Canadian army who happens to be still alive. Kilgallin derived his story from the landlord, who portrays himself as Lowry's long-suffering benefactor; Day gives a story from pro-Lowry sources (I suspect from his widow) which portrays the landlord as crude, rapacious, and heartless. Whose memory is right? Personally, having lived twenty years in Vancouver and knowing many of the people who were involved closely with Lowry, I am inclined to accept the landlord's version as being *nearer* the truth. But I am still haunted by doubts about much that happened in those early days in Vancouver and in other controversial situations. And Douglas Day doesn't always convince me that he has discovered the true pattern of events. But how does a biographer keep track of a mythomane, which Lowry was?

Obviously he cannot, infallibly. But he can at least box in his quarry by making sure that all his circumstantial information seems authentic. And there are times when my own experience tells me that Douglas Day's is not. I am thinking especially of his account of Lowry's wanderings in the bohemian tavern region of London known in later decades (but not in the 1930's when Lowry was there) as "Fitzrovia," after the Fitzroy Tavern on Charlotte Street. I speak with some modest authority on this subject, having been, for a decade and more, shortly after Lowry's period there, a frequenter of the same region and the same pubs, and a drinker with many of Lowry's bar companions. And I am astonished at Day's displays of ignorance. He says, for example: "The Depression still prevailed in England, and those who drank in pubs were with few exceptions those who had no other choice," going on to suggest that English people drank in pubs only if they could not afford to drink in restaurants or at home. Apart from the fact that it was *cheaper* to buy a quart of beer at the Jug-and-Bottle and drink it at home, the pub—as Day seems staggeringly unaware—was before World War II an institution which played a key part in English social life for most classes except the very rich, in good as well as in hard times. He also suggests that Lowry and his friends annoyed the patrons of the Marquis of Granby tavern because they loudly played the piano; any annoyance at the Marquis would have been because its patrons were almost entirely homosexuals of both sexes who resented the intrusion of outsiders.

Finally, Day suggests that in the Fitzroy, Lowry and his bohemian friends were "often not appreciated by the workers who spent their evenings there." He seems quite unaware of the class character of English drinking, which penetrated even the ground plans of taverns; workers went to the Public Bar, clerks and up to the Saloon Bar, and in the Fitzroy it was in the Saloon Bar, with its thudding pianola, that one met, in the late 30's, the artists and the poets, Nina Hamnett and Betty May and Aleister Crowley, together with Lowry's drinking pals Bob Pocock and the Hepburn brothers. Obviously, however carefully

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Douglas Day may have researched the surviving fragments of written material relating to Lowry's life, he has not adequately reconstructed in his mind—or in the reader's mind—the world in which Lowry lived.

THE great problem of Lowry's life as a writer remains that of his loss of creativity. Why, after writing such a near perfect novel as *Under the Volcano*, did he leave no later novel that was complete or even comparable? Day's explanation on this point is, I feel, shrewd and worth quoting:

> What destroyed Lowry's genius? If we refuse to agree with Freud that a writer's neuroses feed his art, then we may at least see that they can inhibit and disrupt it. Neurosis by definition is wasteful and destructive; it does not provide creative energy, it only expends it. I believe that Lowry's neuroses crippled him not only as a man, but also as an artist, in that they impeded him in his psychic journey between conscious discipline and unconscious experience. The root of neurosis is fear, and Lowry clearly feared his art; if its visionary aspect frightened him, so did its shaping aspect. He was, then, a man self-compelled to serve a vocation of which he was terrified; and this led him into the most elaborate and self-destructive ways of avoiding his art. Specifically, it led him ever deeper into introspection. Ultimately he was exhausted by this morbid self-absorption, and his art died.

This verdict certainly fits the pattern of Lowry's massive literary schemes that were never fulfilled. Most writers have experienced the occasions when they drive themselves to the desk, dreading the work ahead, or the more terrifying occasions when writing-blocks destroy or at least delay their productivity for months on end. In Lowry these common hazards of the writing life were gigantically exaggerated. And so *Under the Volcano* is a double miracle, both in itself as a novel, and as a work of self-liberation by a man who then returned to the prison of his tortured ego and never emerged alive.

Movies

"The Exorcist" and Its Audience

William S. Pechter

THOUGH I saw *The Exorcist* before it opened, I saw it with an audience which filled a large theater, and I was aware while the film was being shown of sharing in a rare experience: the experience of seeing a film which has its audience reacting as one, completely in the palm of its hand. When the lights came up after the showing, I felt that the film I'd just seen was not only a film but an event, and that it was about to become one of the biggest popular successes in movie history (in fact, it is on its way to becoming *the* single largest grossing film of all time). The last time I had such a feeling was when I saw *The Godfather* (which also broke all previous commercial records), and indeed, it is tempting to describe *The Exorcist* as the *Godfather* of horror films: a work aspiring to be the ultimate creation in a given genre, to surpass all others through its greater naturalism, and through its being more lavishly mounted and elaborately detailed. Actually, *The Exorcist* is much less good than *The Godfather,* without the earlier film's room for its actors or its narrative flair. But these faults, which would have crippled *The Godfather,* are much less detrimental to the essentially mechanistic character of the horror film, and in some ways (for instance, in the somewhat cryptic quality imparted to the film by its narrative lacunae and by its director's fragmented style) even contribute to *The Exorcist*'s effect. For, much more than *The Godfather, The Exorcist* aims for a single, if perhaps not simple, effect: to frighten. Its "success" can be directly measured by its ability to induce fear.

Unlike *The Godfather, The Exorcist* has been getting a bad press, but I have yet to see a review in which it was indicated whether or not the film was actually found frightening by the writer. Rather, as in the case of the first critical coverage of porno movies, there is much worrying about the appeal to and effect on those others who constitute the film's audience, and a tone which remains oddly impersonal, whether hectoringly moralistic or nonchalantly flippant. My own opinion of *The Exorcist* happens to be somewhat higher than that of most other reviewers, though, were I to be asked how good it is, I could provide a fairly evenly balanced inventory of its virtues and defects. But if I were asked whether or not I found the film frightening, my answer would be: yes, extremely. My responses in this were no different from what I sensed to be the audience's. Like those other spectators, I sat there in an essentially defenseless state, and allowed myself to be worked on by the film; I watched *The Exorcist* and was gripped by fear.

The Exorcist begins with a large-scale prologue set in Iraq. At the site of an archaeological excavation, some diabolic or demonic artifacts are unearthed, whose significance, though unclear to the audience, is evidently felt intensely by the elderly priest who supervises the project. Critics have complained that this sequence carries no meaning in the film for anyone who hasn't read the novel. Yet, as one such viewer, it seemed to me its general import—that of ancient antagonists, the priest and the forces of evil, girding for combat—was quite plain. The sequence has, moreover, and probably more than any other in the film, familiar generic associations: the violation of a tomb, and activation of an ancient curse, in some exotic setting.

The scene shifts to Georgetown, and the household of a movie star, of the new, unglamorous variety

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(played by just such a star, Ellen Burstyn). The actress (a divorcee), her beamingly wholesome twelve-year-old daughter (Linda Blair, the girl chosen to play this role, is a past winner of a medal from the President's Council on Physical Fitness), and some domestic help are living in a rented house while the actress is on location for the making of a movie. For a time, one mainly waits for something to happen, while some preliminaries involving noises that may be due to rats in an attic are unhurriedly protracted. One's chief impression of the film during these early sections is of a work in a weighty, naturalistic style, whose humorlessness verges on solemnity. But the humorlessness isn't inappropriate, and doesn't become pretentious in the film (as it has in the *obiter dicta* of the film's director, William Friedkin, and William Peter Blatty, who wrote the novel and the screenplay). The mood created by these vaguely defined, early sections is chiefly one of unfocused apprehension.

When that mood shifts, it does so abruptly and decisively, and from then on the horrors escalate dramatically. During the quiet aftermath of a frenetic party at the actress's house, the daughter, who'd been in bed upstairs, suddenly appears and, trancelike, prophesies some unnamed person's death, following which she urinates on the floor. Soon after, the bed to which she'd been returned begins shaking violently, and, in rapid succession, objects have begun to hurl themselves across her room and she has begun, in a strange croaking voice, to mouth a stream of blasphemies and obscenities (far more shockingly foul than any I've heard in Hollywood films before), and to exhibit extraordinary feats of strength in turning aggressively on those around her. A number of medical authorities are consulted, during the course of which episodes we see what was to me the *most* excruciatingly unpleasant thing shown in the film, an explicit description of a spinal tap. But though the movie has been criticized for its allegedly sadistic appeal, I detected no sadism—that is to say, no invitation to enjoyment of the girl's suffering—in this or any other episode, including one in which she masturbates and bloodily mutilates herself with a crucifix. The spinal tap, like the film's other horrific elements, is the kind of thing that causes spectators to turn away in revulsion, or might if they weren't being held so mesmerically; and its explicitness serves the purpose of letting the audience know from early on that this film will be an unflinching witness, turning away from nothing.

The medical consultations prove of no avail, and finally, as a last resort, an exorcism is suggested. By this time, the mother is convinced that her daughter was responsible for the grotesque murder of the director of the film on which the actress had been working, and is in a state of utter desperation. She goes for advice to a priest with secular training as a psychiatrist who works at giving psychiatric counseling to troubled fellow clergymen, and who has been undergoing his own personal crisis as a result of guilt feelings arising from the recent death of his mother. The priest consents to see the girl, who by this time must be strapped to her bed to prevent her from harming herself and others, and has become hideously disfigured by self-generating lesions which we see erupting on her skin like fissures in an earthquake.* In the course of being interrogated by the priest, she—or rather the being that is possessing her—claims to be not merely a demon but the devil himself, and speaks in a strange language (it is actually English in reverse) and, to profoundly sinister effect, in the voice of a derelict whom we had seen previously appealing to the priest for a handout during a scene in a subway station, and that of the priest's dead mother. At one point, during the height of these sections' intensity, the priest is brought by one of the domestic staff to see the girl's sedated body, on which the words "Help me" are spelled out as he watches, as if being scratched from within into her flesh. Reluctant at first, the priest is finally persuaded that an exorcism is called for.

Approval for the rite is granted, but it is to be performed by someone experienced in such matters: the elderly (and ailing) priest introduced in the prologue, who now happens to be back in America, with the young priest to serve as his assistant. The exorcism commences amid furious resistance from the possessed girl, whose appeals to the doubts and guilts of the younger priest grow increasingly insidious. (The older priest instructs the younger one never to engage in conversation with the possessed person, but to absorb himself wholly in the prescribed ritual.) Things go badly, and all seems lost when the younger priest, temporarily relieved by his superior, returns to the girl's room later to find the older priest dead. In an access of rage, the younger priest (who has been portrayed as an athletic, powerfully physical figure, and played with an unrelieved intensity by Jason Miller) turns on the girl, and begins to pound her violently with his fists (an act which the audience greets with immense satisfaction, as the tensions which have been gathering find release). "Take *me*!" the priest exclaims, "Take *me*!" And, at this, the devil is sensed to leave the girl's body and to enter the priest's, who instantaneously hurls himself through the bedroom window to his death on the pavement far below. The girl's possessor has been exorcised; and in the brief, hushed, concluding moments which follow, we learn that (apart from her spark of vestigial recognition of a priest's collar as a symbol of beneficence, which seems to me a maudlin touch) the girl remembers nothing of her ordeal.

* Some critics have held against the film the fact that its impact depends so much not on the work of the director but on make-up and special effects. Yet, while this charge is doubtless true, it hardly seems to me damaging. In fact, the make-up is brilliant—Max von Sydow's as the elderly priest no less than the possessed child's—as are the special effects, about which my chief reservation has to do with their occasional tendency to call attention to themselves as tricks by their very ingenuity: a levitation, however well done, falls into this category, as does a 180-degree turn of the girl's head *the second time*. (The first time we're caught too much off guard to reflect much on the mechanics.) Otherwise, the only outright mistake is in giving some substance vomited by the girl the consistency of homogenized porridge, and then tempting the fate of a spectator's laughter by a repeat performance in a different color.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Exorcist is thus about an exorcism which succeeds. But is it? To take it as this leaves too much out of account, most immediately the peculiarly muffled ("ambiguous" would be too high-flown a word) quality of its apparently triumphant ending. For if this is a victory over the devil, what kind of victory is it whose site is littered by the corpses of two priests, and whose beneficiary is an ordinary young girl at best unchanged by the experience she's been through? The "positive" reading of the film also fails to answer a question which might not be a legitimate one to ask of life (where criteria other than rationality may obtain), but is, I think, appropriately asked of *The Exorcist,* a work of art, or artifact, of someone's conscious devising. That question is "Why?"—why is this little girl the one possessed? Psychological indicators scarcely suffice—the girl's home, though broken by divorce and liberated in its language and mores, is hardly depicted as an example of *dolce-vita* decadence; indeed, the movie star is a loving and attentive mother. In any case, the film makes it unmistakably clear that the girl isn't just mentally disturbed, she *is* possessed.

I think that to ask the question, Why this girl?, in light of the film's muffled ending is to find the answer: the girl is a vessel, the devil's route to the priest, a priest wracked by guilt who at one point declares he's afraid he's losing his faith, and whose final attempt to take on the devil in individual combat might be seen as a surrender to pride as much as an instance of heroism. In seeing the film this way, a vital link is clearly provided by a dream the younger priest has before his involvement with the possessed girl, in which one of the diabolic artifacts unearthed at the archaeological excavation makes an otherwise inexplicable appearance.

Indeed, the very title of the work hints that it is one in which appearances will be deceiving, for it leads us to believe, from the way the older priest is introduced and reappears, that the titular exorcist will be he. But, in fact, the exorcist proves to be the younger priest. Given that, like the older priest, he dies, and, further, that he dies by suicide (at a time when he may already, for reasons of his own, be drawn to self-destruction), can one say that the film is about a possession which fails? For, whatever theological fine points may be involved, the destruction of the priests, and, above all, the act of suicide do seem to carry a kind of unequivocality. And here the film, which has been criticized for occasionally being softer than the novel (which I've since read), is harder: in the film, unlike the novel, the priest's life isn't prolonged so that he may be given the last rites of confession and absolution. He does remain alive long enough to press the hand of another priest who rushes to his battered body in an attempt to aid him. But since the dying priest may still be possessed (for surely the devil can't have been outrun by the mere speed of a leap from a window), this last fraternal gesture (toward a "worldly" priest, whom we've previously seen in the actress's social circle) is itself profoundly equivocal. Is the gesture of fraternity being extended by the dying priest, or by the devil?

WHETHER the film's audience consciously apprehends any of this in its experience of the work I don't know, but what that audience is nevertheless being given is, I think, a depiction of the rule of the devil, or of evil, or of chaos in this world, a celebration of the power of these things—by whatever name one calls them—to work their will. To say this is not to imply that the film's audiences are mere empty vessels into which such content is being poured, or celebrants at some sort of new Black Mass; it would be presumptuous in the extreme to assume that the film's image of the world is being granted those audiences' uncritical belief.

But in one particular, the film's image of the world *is* given an exceptionally striking credibility, and that is in the privacy and domesticity of its horrors: the sense of their existing, like skeletons in closets, unknown to anyone but a few principals behind the façades of pleasant houses on pleasant streets (not to say in the substantial Georgetown residences we associate with the pillars of society). And though it would be presumptuous to posit any too simple a relation between *The Exorcist* and its audience, it would be equally presumptuous to dismiss the film as no more than another horror film with a new gimmick, though, considered artistically, this is all it may be. After all, there have been films as sensationally horrific and as frightening as *The Exorcist* before. But a film doesn't achieve *The Exorcist*'s phenomenal success without striking some responsive chord in its audience; and such success usually has less to do with shaping an audience's beliefs than with affirming what an audience believes already. And so this film, heading for its unique position among others, paints its picture of a world of hidden horrors, a malevolent world beyond our comprehension and control. One might err in making too much of *The Exorcist* just as in making too little of it, but nothing would be more presumptuous, I think, than to conclude that those people turning out in record numbers to see it are merely experiencing the thrills of a novel horror movie: to assume, because we cannot know exactly what they are feeling and believing, that they are feeling nothing, believing nothing.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Above the Herd

BURR. By GORE VIDAL. *Random House. 430 pp. $8.85.*

Reviewed by JANE LARKIN CRAIN

GORE VIDAL once described himself as a "border lord" in the "dying kingdom of literature." While the kingdom may in fact be dying, Vidal's rank in it is of course far more baronial than his modest trope suggests. In 1946, at the age nineteen, he wrote *Williwaw,* his first novel, and his subsequent output, including eight novels, numerous plays for the stage and for television, short stories, and an abundance of essays on a wide range of subjects, has been both prolific and varied. *Burr,* Vidal's latest work, is the fourth of his novels to achieve best-sellerdom.

Burr is a historical novel set in the 1830's. The narrative moves back and forth between Aaron Burr's first-person "history" of the early days of the Republic ("as told to" the narrator, Schuyler, his young biographer), and Schuyler's own rendering of the contemporary political "tone" of the Jacksonian era. Schuyler has also been approached by political enemies of Jackson's Vice President, Martin Van Buren, to write an anonymous pamphlet proving that Van Buren is the illegitimate son of Aaron Burr. Schuyler accepts the secret commission, and his subsequent preoccupation with questions of paternity and illegitimacy provides a counterpart to the novel's fundamental concern with the "origins" of America itself.

The formative years of the United States, as they are protrayed in the novel, are a time of passionate rivalry among men eager for economic and political power, and it is in this context that an enmity arises among Aaron Burr, Alexander Hamilton, and Thomas Jefferson, based on their mutual and competitive scramble for the spoils of the Revolution. Although he shares with the others a drive for power and conquest, Aaron Burr emerges as a man of complex brilliance and vision, a kind of tragic hero undone by the intensity of his own ambition. Convinced that corruption and hypocrisy are fast becoming entrenched in American government, and that Jefferson has determined to ruin him, Burr decides to abandon the "great experiment," and to try to found a "true civilization" in Mexico. Jefferson, finding his own Napoleonic designs for America fatally threatened by Burr's ambition, has him tried for treason on the charge of plotting to separate the Western territories from the federal government—a government that Jefferson himself, in a reversal of his original advocacy of Arcadian democracy, has already begun to consolidate and centralize.

Burr is acquitted, but the charge of treason shatters his political career; and the remnants of popular sympathy he has continued to enjoy after having killed Alexander Hamilton in a duel several years earlier turns to overriding and irrational public hatred. Following the trial, in a kind of self-imposed exile, he repairs to Europe, returning to America only many years later to practice law in New York. Always a profligate spender, Burr dies a virtual pauper, disgraced in the eyes of all except a small coterie of loyal friends and followers, but nonetheless resigned within himself to the life he has led and the role he has played. As he confides to his young friend, Schuyler:

> I was able to indulge my true passion which is to teach others, to take pleasure in bringing out the best in men and women, to make them *alive,* and though I did not achieve any sort of kingdom in this world, I have established small human dominions along my way, proved to the doubting that women had souls, and trained a hundred boys to make the best of their life, without complaint or dishonor.

This, then, is the man who has been relegated to a place of ignominy in what Vidal sees as the fantasies that have come to be the accepted version of the American past.

As Vidal's version has it, the American Revolution in its essence was a struggle for self-aggrandizement by a handful of colonials, a contest for personal gain that never had anything to do with "liberty" in the usual sense. In creating an empire that has outlived Napoleon's, Jefferson made of the government a concentration of political power that effectively emasculated the Constitution he had helped to write. We are, according to Vidal, and as his hero reiterates endlessly throughout the novel, a nation founded on slaughter and slavery, governed for and by monied interests, with an indifference to true "egalitarianism," the creed we profess, by this time ingrained in our souls. Never much good to begin with, we have been driven by our heritage to confound money and power with virtue, and to mistake poverty and misfortune for depravity. As Vidal put it succinctly a few years ago in an essay entitled "Homage to Daniel Shays": "It is a tribute to the Protestant passion for wanting always to appear to be doing good (particularly when one is robbing the till) that Americans have been constitutionally incapable (*double entendre* intended) of recognizing the truth about themselves or anyone else."

Given the circumstances of the nation's inception it is not surprising, Vidal suggests, that American mythology has chosen to sanctify a social-climbing, power-hungry bastard from the West Indies like Alexander Hamilton, and a slave-owning, megalomaniacal satrap like Thomas Jefferson, while writing off a man of genuine greatness like Aaron Burr as an adventurer and a scoundrel. For Burr was a man of moral imagination and intelligence far too refined and subtle for the American herd, which has always been inhospitable to greatness of every sort, and tended to idolize all that is small and vulgar.

JANE LARKIN CRAIN *has published criticism in* COMMENTARY and Saturday Review/World.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Introducing a new Haggadah for our time.



Here is one of the most significant and beautiful volumes ever produced for the Seder ceremony – a stunning book which will be treasured for generations to come.

It is illustrated by the master artist Leonard Baskin, whose twenty full-color drawings make this Haggadah a work of art. Baskin's rugged images and unique vision of the human condition are a reflection of his own deep roots in Judaic tradition.

Produced by the Central Conference of American Rabbis under the editorship of Rabbi Herbert Bronstein, this Passover Haggadah is the product of seven years of scholarly research. It contains both the original Hebrew and a lyrical rendering into English of the story of the Exodus. This new translation is a poetic achievement that allows the genius of the original to speak to us again – for some, perhaps for the first time.

Throughout the service, optional interpretive readings illuminate the wisdom of the ancient text. Poetry and prose already endowed with the authority of durability speak to our present concerns. Writings by contemporary Jewish thinkers such as Erich Fromm, Elie Wiesel, and Martin Buber relate the age-old story of Passover to the awesome events of modern Jewish history such as the Holocaust and the establishment of the state of Israel.

Yet this is no modernist revision; it is deeply rooted in the inspired creative vision of the ancient rabbis. Rediscovering the rich poetry and purpose of the original liturgy and recovering ancient symbols and rituals, *A Passover Haggadah* follows tradition closely as it traces the journey from degradation, slavery, and oppression to hope and redemption. In its masterful fusion of the old and the new, *A Passover Haggadah* reveals the original patterns and designs of the Seder feast, many of which have been obscured for centuries.

A work of art, a work of spirit – *A Passover Haggadah* preserves and heightens all the beauty, drama, and wonder that have inspired young and old for centuries. We invite you to share in its joy and profound meaning.

For a rich, complete, and beautiful Passover celebration.

Words and music to thirty-four Passover songs, the largest collection in any Haggadah.

The traditional Seder service in Hebrew with a completely new English translation.

A fascinating historical account of Passover celebrations through the centuries.

Glorious full-color illustrations created especially for this Haggadah by the renowned artist Leonard Baskin.

A practical guide for preparing the Seder service and meal.

Optional readings selected from ancient and contemporary sources, including Elie Wiesel, Martin Buber, and Anne Frank.

Seven years in preparation by the Central Conference of American Rabbis – their first revised Haggadah in fifty years.



A PASSOVER HAGGADAH

Drawings by Leonard Baskin
Central Conference of American Rabbis

Available at your favorite bookstore or directly from:
GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS
A Division of The Viking Press
625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

Please send me_____ copy(ies) of *A Passover Haggadah* at $17.50 each. I have enclosed my check or money order for $_____ (we pay postage). I understand that I may return the book(s) within 15 days if not satisfied and owe nothing.

☐ Please bill me (I'll pay postage).

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State_____ Zip_____

GROSSMAN PUBLISHERS

A

128 pages with Hebrew imposition; 9⅜″ x 14″; 20 full-color illustrations printed on finest quality art-book stock, allowing for the closest reproduction of the artist's original work; the cloth cover is stamped in gold using an engraving by Leonard Baskin created especially for this edition.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He was, in short, much the kind of man that Gore Vidal takes himself to be, one of the "host of choice spirits" forced to live among coarse, materialistic, and hypocritical people who remain callously indifferent to the moral instruction he offers them.

WHILE many individual episodes in *Burr* are entertaining in themselves, the plotting tends to sluggishness; the book's separate story lines and sections never achieve the structural coherence necessary to sustain a work as large as this. As the narrative moves forward, we are always conscious of the very thing good novels make us forget, that the whole business is a contrivance. The book, moreover, is written in a curious "period" language that is probably supposed to promote historical verisimilitude, but a great deal of both the dialogue and the narration is simply stiff or grandiloquent. The transitions between Burr's sections and Schuyler's eventually come to seem wooden and obviously schematic; the momentum built up in any single segment stops abruptly at its close; and the effect is that while the novel is technically well-organized, its spirit is static and crude.

THE flaws in *Burr*'s architecture are serious, but its fatal shortcoming is the attempt to fob off its simplistic and polemical obsessions about America as "themes," and its carefully positioned strawmen as "characters." This is a book written in the interest of debunking some myths about the nature of the American experiment, and its primary energy derives from the ironic juxtaposition of "reality," as represented in Burr's supposed truth-telling, and the "ideal," or all those casually accepted conventional notions of American history that the reader theoretically brings with him. The strategy works for a while, but it soon becomes apparent that all the events, all the observations, all the interactions among the characters make, essentially, variations on the same small point. What at first passes for naughty iconoclasm eventually becomes predictable and tedious; there is only so much shock value to be derived from learning that George Washington had carbuncles, or that Thomas Jefferson repeated himself tiresomely in conversation.

It is, no doubt, a fitting irony that the spiritually impoverished but financially complacent American majority, which once rejected Aaron Burr and which, it pleases him to think, today rejects Gore Vidal, is flocking in its tens of thousands to buy this novel. Vidal has frequently complained that one of the reasons Americans are so benighted is that they never read anything, but perhaps his is the exceptional case. Could it be that his tutelage, so long lavished on an indifferent people, has finally begun to take hold? One can only hope that though they buy his books and enrich him generously, Americans will never take Vidal's lofty contempt for their country to heart.

A remarkable poetic retelling of a Talmudic tale by
ELIE WIESEL
author of *The Oath*



Photo: Philippe Halsman

ANI MAAMIN can be called a poem, a parable, a legend, for it is all of these and more. It is a retelling of the tale of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who come to speak to God of the suffering of the Jewish people, trying to make Him break His silence. The text of a contata (music by Darius Milhaud), it is designed by Philip Grushkin, printed in both French and English, and is a book of extraordinary beauty.

ANI MAAMIN
A SONG LOST AND FOUND AGAIN
$7.50, now at your bookstore RANDOM HOUSE

The Greening of Detroit

PARADISE LOST: THE DECLINE OF THE AUTO-INDUSTRIAL AGE. By EMMA ROTHSCHILD. *Random House. 264 pp. $6.95.*

Reviewed by ELLIOTT ABRAMS

FOR almost as long as anyone can remember, the automobile industry has been the primary symbol of American economic power and technological advancement, even as cars themselves have long been symbols of their owners' prosperity. According to Emma Rothschild, however, the industry's golden days are now over, and the automobile corporations may be experiencing "if not a long decline, at least a historical crisis." Once in the forefront of American industrial technology, the auto companies have now relinquished that position to corporations like IBM and Xerox. At the same time, the domestic auto market, given present problems of traffic, pollution, and energy supply, has

ELLIOTT ABRAMS *has contributed reviews and articles to* COMMENTARY *and the* New Leader.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reached a virtual saturation point, and seems unlikely to expand very much in view of rising costs of repair and gasoline, as well as growing public dissatisfaction with the safety and repair record of the industry. As a result, both the prestige and the profits associated with car manufacture in the United States are on the wane, in Miss Rothschild's view, and the future will bring "decline and possible extinction."

Nothing in the foregoing is exactly news, but the chief interest of *Paradise Lost* lies less in its conclusions than in the analytic method by which it reaches them—a peculiar blend of the most recent styles of cultural analysis with the most antiquated prejudices of British syndicalism. For all one knows, Miss Rothschild may never have read Charles Reich's *The Greening of America* or the many similar works that came in its wake, but their approach is her approach, one that eschews the careful marshaling of facts and arguments for bold, intuitive generalization. The kind of plodding scrutiny which Ralph Nader, for example, brought to the question of car safety, is nowhere in evidence here. Nor does Miss Rothschild seem much interested in the actual workings of the auto industry; an entire section on pricing policies omits any mention of the important link between those policies and the industry's oligopolistic structure. Given these omissions, it is perhaps not surprising that such relatively arcane matters as future energy supplies or the technology of pollution control are hardly gone into at all.

Instead, Miss Rothschild's main concern seems to be the "greening" of the auto industry, and her chief criticism the fact that this process has so far failed to take place, and shows no signs of taking place in the future. She is far more interested in talking about what might be called the spiritual aspects of car manufacture than about such boring issues as industrial organization, unemployment, and wages.

Perhaps the best example of this predisposition is to be found in the book's attitude toward factory work. As everyone knows, assembly-line jobs are grueling and mo-

If you're on your way to the land of milk and honey, it couldn't hurt to stop off in Germany for a beer.

Lufthansa has fast and frequent service to Tel Aviv. But since Israel is a long way off, we stop in Frankfurt or Munich. You can rest, relax, shop and even do a little business. Without paying extra fare.

All our flights serve fine kosher food. Just ask for your favorites when you make reservations. For more information on our Tel Aviv service, call your travel agent or Lufthansa.

Lufthansa German Airlines

680 Fifth Avenue, 52 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10019
Telephone: (212) 357-8400

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Did you know that the Bar Mitzvah ceremony is



Cornerstone of your library
3,000 entries
Cross-indexed
Regularly $18.00

YOURS FREE

with membership when you agree to purchase just four Club selections or alternates over the coming year

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unknown in the Bible and Talmud? (see page 57)
That Judaism frowns on celibacy? (see page 81)
That the mystical Kabbalah has doctrines in common with Hinduism? (see page 389)

The complete, eighteen-dollar

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION

One monumental illustrated volume spanning the heritage of Jewish faith, ritual, mysticism, and ethics through all the ages from Ur of the Chaldees and Pharaonic Egypt to the present. Nearly 3,000 entries covering every aspect of Judaism including cultural parallels in pre-Hebrew Semitic paganism... the intricate relationship with Christianity and Islam... the religious practices of such exotic Jews as the black Falashas of Ethiopia and the Bene Israel Jews of Bombay (who have lived in India for 2300 years and claim they are descendants of the Ten Lost Tribes).

FREE with membership in THE JEWISH BOOK CLUB

Ten years in preparation, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION places a library of knowledge about Judaism at your fingertips in one authoritative volume. The answers to your children's questions (and questions that you yourself have always wanted to ask) can be found here in a few moments. But in face of the temptations spread before you on every page, much self-discipline is required to put the book away once a question is answered. *Do you know the grounds on which polygamy is still technically permitted among Jews? See page 305.*

To turn these pages is to explore four thousand years of Judaism – its origins, history, scriptures, ceremonies, traditions, festivals, sacred languages (do you know that the Hebrew Bible contains sections not in Hebrew? See page 66), its 613 commandments through which every physical action becomes an act of worship.

Did you know that the words "Mazel Tov" are an ancient astrological formula? See page 254.

Here is the contrast between Jewish and Christian viewpoints on sex and marriage, body and soul (flesh isn't "evil" in Judaism; see page 365). All the multitudinous sects and rites of Judaism through four millennia are included... Ashkenazi and Sephardi... Orthodox, Conservative and Reform... the priestly Sadducees and their rabbinical rivals, the Pharisees (whose philosophy pervades the New Testament that denounces them)... The Qumran Community, where the Dead Sea Scrolls were written by Jews who awaited not just one Messiah but two. Here are the hidden Jews who lived for centuries in Persia disguised as Moslems and in Portugal and Majorca disguised as Catholics ... the dancing Hasidim, who still wear the formal costume of medieval Polish noblemen. Do you know what makes kosher wine kosher? See page 115. Does Judaism permit therapeutic abortion? See page 4.

All this and more is yours to explore and enjoy in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION. Prepared by experts on three continents, published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston in collaboration with the Massadah Press of Israel, and illustrated with religious art and ritual objects from the great museums and private collections, it sells for eighteen dollars. It is yours FREE when you join The Jewish Book Club.

The benefits of membership

- *Free introductory offer* – the $18 *Encyclopedia of the Jewish Religion.*
- *Savings of up to 50%* on works by S. Y. Agnon, Isaac Bashevis Singer, Bernard Malamud, Abraham Joshua Heschel and best-sellers such as *My People, Israel 25,* and *Rembrandt's Hat.*
- *Free newsletter* – lively, informative news about books of Jewish interest not always reviewed in the general press nor stocked by local stores.
- *Minimum obligation* – you need accept as few as four books during the next 12 months.
- *Valuable home library* – of works recommended by Commentary's editors.

THE JEWISH BOOK CLUB CJ-3
165 East 56th Street, New York, New York 10022

☐ Please send me my FREE copy of THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION, and enroll me in The Jewish Book Club. I agree to accept as few as 4 of the monthly selections or alternates during the next 12 months at the special members' prices, (plus a small charge for postage and handling). All selections and alternates will be described for me in advance in The Jewish Book News, and I may decline any of them by returning the printed card provided.

NAME_____

STREET_____

_____

CITY_____ STATE_____ ZIP_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Now in paperback

A major biography of Abba Eban, *memorable orator, persuasive diplomat,* tireless defender of Israel, and one of the outstanding statesmen of our time.

"The fullest and most authoritative life of Eban to be found."
—*The New York Times*



A DELTA BOOK $3.45
Dell Publishing Co., Inc.

HOW TO
BE A
JEWISH MARTIAN
WANDERING
STARS
An Anthology of Jewish Fantasy
and Science Fiction
Edited by Jack Dann. Introduction by Isaac Asimov. A Jewish princess marries a Martian ...a computerized city behaves like a Jewish mother... a minyan on a doomed planet and ten other funny, sad, nostalgic stories of Jewish fantasy and science fiction by Singer, Malamud and others. $6.95 at bookstores
Harper & Row
10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022
1817
SCIENCE FICTION BOOK CLUB

notonous for auto workers, as they are for workers in almost any other industry that comes to mind. People take these jobs not because they are pleasant, but because they pay relatively well. To Miss Rothschild, however, factory work is not merely unpleasant, it is also "degrading," "dehumanizing," and "repressive." The increasing mechanization and trend toward automation in auto assembly work she calls "Fordism," and she considers it to be the root of nearly all industrial evil, leading management to the unconscionable attempt "to increase the intensity and precision and predictability of work."

Short of pure Luddism, this analysis leads nowhere. One wonders in fact whether the author is aware that the function of factories is first of all to produce goods in large quantities. Since enough of them do so in America with great efficiency, the country enjoys a level of prosperity which most of its inhabitants do not find degrading, repressive, or even dehumanizing. If the alternative to the assembly line is a return to cottage industries, and the standard of living they entail, most factory workers would no doubt prefer to keep their present jobs. There is something anachronistic in the sight of a presumably knowledgeable observer railing against mass production as a kind of plot devised by the Bosses to make life hard for the Workers.

But it is not only the modern industrial system that incurs Miss Rothschild's distaste. She also seems to dislike cars themselves, and finds it hard to believe that there are others who actually like them. Thus, she speaks of the attempt to persuade consumers "to buy more cars than they need," implying not only the existence of some sinister, manipulating force, foisting desires upon us, but also her own superior qualification to judge the genuineness of the consumer's needs. As a student of economics she recognizes, of course, that the development of various stages of production is determined by "objective" forces (an overused term in *Paradise Lost*), yet she cannot refrain from excoriating the Bosses for their sins. In a manner that seems more quaint than revolutionary, she describes the "ruthless aggression" General Motors executives direct toward their employees, and goes on to picture a world in which the degradation and repression of workers seem very nearly a conscious goal of management. There is "one, American, law outside the plant, and a GM law inside," we are told, quite as though there were no judicial system in the country and, more to the point, no United Auto Workers either.

Miss Rothschild's harsh judgment of the auto executives seems to rest on the fact that, unlike her, they are concerned with profits and production. Auto company management is "intransigent," for it uses "tight managerial control" to cut production costs, and evaluates plans "continuously and competitively." As with her criticisms of mass production itself, one is tempted to ask here what precisely the author is advocating as an alternative. Loose controls? Cost overruns? Irregular and noncompetitive evaluations? Unlike universities or philanthropic foundations, corporations do not aim at seeking truth or raising consciousness, but rather at earning profits by producing and selling goods and services; Miss Rothschild seems to have difficulty remembering this.

The American automobile industry and its managers are far from being paragons of industrial virtue, and they probably deserve even more critical attention than they have been getting. One could make a strong argument, for example, that the larger companies are now far beyond the point of greatest economic efficiency, and ought to be broken up, thereby modifying the industry's oligopolistic structure. Similarly, the rule that each year's model must look different from last year's is hardly of divine origin, and Miss Rothschild is quite right in attacking this particular marketing principle.

Yet this and other very sensible criticisms of the giant auto industry contained in her book are all but lost in the fervor of Miss

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Passover Days (or Any Days)



Create delicious healthful and economical meals around Empire Kosher Poultry

KOSHER FOR PASSOVER

The Most Trusted Name in Kosher Poultry

KOSHER Empire POULTRY

INSPECTED FOR WHOLESOMENESS BY U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE P-1015

© EKPI, 1973

Shown are just a few of our big selection of fine quality young, plump, juicy and tender Chicken, Ducks, Turkeys and speciaities. Whole and Parts . . . Ready-to-Cook and Pre-Cooked. Poultry to eat in good faith, to eat in good health. Empire turns any-day meals into company-good holiday feasts. Enjoy!

At most Kosher Butcher Shops, Food Stores and Dellys.

For information, please write Empire Kosher Poultry, Inc.; Mifflintown, Pa. 17059.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LIMITED EDITION ETCHING, SIGNED AND NUMBERED BY

Benjamin Levy



JACOB AND ESAU

"It is surprising how such a young artist has succeeded in reaching such a beautiful crystallization and so much control in his paintings."
—Avala Gordon, Israeli art reviewer

In this starkly dramatic black and white etching, Esau with his rough goatskin tunic and Jacob in woven cloth and urbane bracelet show brotherly affection. Measuring 12" x 15¾" on a heavy 16" x 20" imported, deckle-edged, 100% rag content sheet, this etching was limited to 150 impressions.

He is considered one of the more interesting and gifted of the young artists working in the new figurative style, an artist to be watched and collected. His work has already won critical praise and many prizes in the United States, Israel and Europe. (His work in galleries starts at $95.00.)

$60.00, including special packaging, postage, and insurance.

Commentary Art Treasures
165 East 56 Street, N.Y., N.Y. 10022

I have enclosed my check for $_____ to cover the cost of *Jacob and Esau* @ $60.00 apiece. This includes postage and insurance. If I am not completely satisfied, I may return this work in good condition, insured, within ten days, and you will send me a prompt refund.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Rothschild's romantic distaste for mass production and her outmoded notions of class warfare in American industry. The book has already earned a certain popularity, corresponding as it does to widely-held current notions about the malevolence of American industrial practices. What it proves ultimately, however, is that the anti-industrialist ethos, even when combined with a substantial number of interviews and fairly wide reading in the field, cannot produce the kind of serious study required by the subject. Instead, *Paradise Lost* is part moral fable, filled with heroes and villains and lessons to be learned, and part weary political tract, likely to convince only the true believers.

A New Disguise

THE MASK JEWS WEAR: THE SELF-DECEPTIONS OF AMERICAN JEWRY. By EUGENE B. BOROWITZ. *Simon & Schuster. 222 pp. $5.95.*

Reviewed by DAVID SINGER

EVERY so often some development on the American-Jewish scene is hailed as yet another indication that American Jewry has come of age. It might be college students demanding funds for Jewish education, or women insisting on a greater role in synagogue life, or Reform rabbis stating their opposition to intermarriage. Whatever the event, if it runs sufficiently counter to established views or practices it is invariably taken, in some circles at any rate, as further proof that American Jews are at last facing up to reality.

Eugene Borowitz's *The Mask Jews Wear* will without a doubt find its way into the collection of exhibits purporting to show the growing "maturity" of the American-Jewish community. For what Borowitz, a prominent Reform rabbi, editor of *Sh'ma*, and professor of education and Jewish thought at Hebrew Union College-Jewish Institute of Religion, has set out to do is to expose "the self-deceptions of American Jewry," to strip away the myths and illusions to which American Jews hold fast. Unfortunately, *The Mask Jews Wear* fails singularly in its task. Rather than providing a touchstone of realism for the conduct of American-Jewish life, Borowitz manages merely to reinforce certain cherished myths of his own, if not to carry them to absurd extremes.

The main object of Borowitz's polemical attention is American society. Speaking out in "prophetic witness," Borowitz lets loose a clutch of familiar charges: the United States is a "materialistic and dehumanized" society in which "conformity is a prerequisite of acceptability and conscience a stigma"; Americans worship a technology that is "inherently impersonal and anti-human," and support an economic system that "is in its very form designed to depreciate the ethical"; America's "political, economic, and social structures dispose us, at best, to live amorally most of the time"; and so on. Stirring his clichés to a full boil, Borowitz concludes: "Our civilization is creating a new paganism. Outwardly we are elegant and assured, as befits our growing wealth and increased experience. Inwardly we are becoming as empty as the ancient Greeks and Romans came to be."

The only surprise in this stale catalogue is that Borowitz, contrary to expectation, exempts American Jews from his indictment. Indeed, as far as Borowitz is concerned, American Jewry has a natural affinity for the good, and constitutes a genuine ethical elite. In bold contrast to their hapless fellow citizens who have created a mean and ugly civilization, American Jews, according to Borowitz, retain a "high sense of what a human being ought to be." He asserts:

> Being Jewish . . . connotes a life of rich humanity and high character. . . . To be a Jew has always meant to care about how one and one's family and one's community lived. It means somehow still today books and think-

---

DAVID SINGER, *program specialist with the Jewish Communal Affairs Department of the American Jewish Committee, is working on a book about American-Jewish Orthodoxy.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing, celebrations and fidelity, industry and compassion, accomplishments and sharing, an affirmation of life and a covenant with humanity.

The United States may be going the way of ancient Greece and Rome, but the Jews continue to demonstrate a unique capacity for "radical social judgment combined with commitment to betterment from within." American Jews, Borowitz in effect argues, form a saving remnant in an otherwise sick society.

Such a striking phenomenon calls out for an explanation and Borowitz is quick to oblige. Most American Jews, he contends, if asked to account for their high quotient of social concern, would invoke the liberal/universalist outlook that is the presumed hallmark of modern, post-Emancipation Jewry. But this in Borowitz's view is simply self-deception—an attempt on the part of contemporary "Marranos in reverse" to hide from the reality of their Jewishness. Were American Jews more open to that reality, he insists, they would see that their liberalism is a direct continuation of the classical Jewish religious tradition:

> [Social passion] has been an intrinsic part of the Jewish life style passed on from parents to children down to the present day. . . . [That Jews] are devoted in overwhelming numbers today to all manner of causes to improve human relations goes back to the academies of the Pharisees, the marketplaces of Babylonia, and the community councils of German ghettos and Polish provinces.
>
> Each modern Jew is personally heir to that diverse tradition. Millenniums of teaching, preaching, practice, and expectations make him, so distinctively and disproportionately, a socially committed person.

American Jews, Borowitz maintains, have kept this truth from themselves out of a desire to blend harmoniously into the surrounding society. But since that society is now bankrupt, the time has come for Jews to cast aside "inauthenticity and learn again to say

An Unprecedented Event . . . An Unprecedented Publication . . .

ISRAEL 25

ISRAEL 25: A Pictorial Celebration of Israel's 25th Birthday

Now, in its 25th year, the State of Israel reports to the world on its first quarter century. In this magnificent volume—the official publication for the anniversary, published under the patronage of the Central Ministry of Information of the State of Israel—the founders, builders, and defenders of Israel review the country's progress to date. Without complacency, with refreshing candor, and with the pioneering enthusiasm that has spurred Israel from the beginning, they portray the vivid pageant of 25 years of Jewish statehood in all its varied aspects.

The highly informative text is the work of history-making leaders and specialists: Golda Meir, David Ben-Gurion, Yaacov Herzog, Haim Bar-Lev, Ernst D. Bergmann, Benjamin Eliav, David Horowitz.

The text of ISRAEL 25 is magnificently embellished with over 325 full-color and black-and-white photographs that splendidly capture the variety and vigor of the Land and its people. In a stunning fold-out, Jews gather to pray before the Western Wall in Jerusalem; across two pages of photos, the colorful population of the Holy City passes in parade—Jews, Moslems, Christians, young and old; the faces of Israel, from the "four corners of the earth" shine forth in all their diversity—Yemenite, Bukharan, Russian, Western European, American, Sabra; the pulsing rhythms of Tel Aviv's boulevards fairly leap off the page; the joys of a wedding, the solemnity of a religious festival, the dignity of labor, all and more find pictorial realization.

The volume is further enhanced by a 19-page, comprehensive calendar of events from 1948 through 1972 which, year by year, month by month, and day by day carry the reader through the highlights of Israel's stirring history.

For a significant remembrance of this momentous occasion in Jewish life, ISRAEL 25 is unsurpassed. Eloquent and splendid, it is a volume you will always cherish.

9½" x 12¾"
325 photographs in color and black and white

$17.95

Jewish Book Club
165 East 56th Street, New York, New York 10022

Please send ____ copies of ISRAEL 25 published at $17.95. My check for $_____ is enclosed. (The Jewish Book Club pays all packing and shipping costs.)

Name_____

Address_____

City_____ State_____ Zip_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

without hyphenation or other qualification: We are Jews."

IT is Jewishness, then, as Borowitz conceives Jewishness to be, that is the reality behind the mask that Jews wear. And this, to use his favorite term, is the greatest self-deception of all in *The Mask Jews Wear*. What Borowitz has written is a sycophantish tract, designed to polish the self-image of Jewish liberals by telling them they are more Jewish than they admit. The truth, of course, is that the large majority of American Jews are far *less* Jewish than they wish to believe. Jewishness, after all, is no will-o'-the-wisp. Whether it is defined in religious or cultural terms, it is something specific and concrete, and it offers a straightforward standard by which all claims to Jewish "authenticity" can be measured.

Nor is there the smallest shred of evidence that the political liberalism of American Jews has roots in the Jewish religious tradition; if that were the case, one would find the greatest degree of liberal sentiment in those circles where classical religious texts are seriously studied and where classical religious teachings are maintained. In reality the opposite situation prevails. The political liberalism of American Jews may very well tell us something about their Jewishness, but that "something" is mainly sociological, having to do with the Jewish position in modern society, and it is far removed from Borowitz's platitudes about the Jewish tradition.

"I hope," writes Borowitz in the opening chapter, addressing his would-be Jewish readers directly, "to find a way to move you to respond from your depths. I am sorry if that also irritates you." He then proceeds to give fawning approval to their most cherished and naive notions about themselves, offering his personal imprimatur as a Jewish theologian to a whole set of self-gratulatory delusions about the spiritual condition of the American-Jewish community. *The Mask Jews Wear*, then, is itself another mask, even more distorting of reality than the one it purports to rip away.



The Life of Captain James Cook

J. C. BEAGLEHOLE

Captain Cook is the greatest explorer-seaman of all time, yet the world has had to wait almost two centuries for the first full-scale biography to do justice to the man and his achievements. The culmination of the life work of the most distinguished historian of Pacific exploration, this lavishly illustrated biography places Cook in the context of his time and affirms his eminence in the history of maritime discovery. This volume is not merely a chronological account of the historically important events in Cook's life, but a deeply revealing study of the inner growth of a complex man, stubborn and hot-tempered yet patient and judicious, seen in his actions as a navigator, an explorer, and a commander of men. To a concern for scientific precision unapproached by previous explorers he added the passion of the dedicated discoverer, a quality that won him the allegiance of all who served under him. In 1768 Cook set forth on the first of the three great voyages of discovery that are the heart of this book. During the next eleven years, in voyages extending from the Antarctic regions to the Arctic Circle and from Chile to Indonesia, he transformed the world's knowledge of the vast areas of the Pacific. J. C. Beaglehole, who died shortly after completing the manuscript of this book, was Professor of British Commonwealth History at Victoria University, New Zealand and the editor of the definitive four-volume edition of Cook's journals. xvi + 804 pages, including 5 maps and 51 illustrations, four in full color. $18.50

Stanford University Press

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To enrich the meaning of the Seder — and your family's enjoyment of it —

THE PASSOVER HAGGADAH

with English translation, introduction, explanations, and commentaries, based on the Haggadah studies of E. D. Goldschmidt. Edited by Nahum Glatzer.

ILLUSTRATED WITH WOODCUTS FROM THE FAMOUS PRAGUE HAGGADAH OF 1526

• 126 pages • available in both Heirloom hardcover and sturdy softcover editions • both editions stain and grease resistant • Save on special quantity prices

---

Now everyone can be on the same page of the Haggadah at the same time! Unique among the many editions of the Haggadah that are available, this volume — edited by the distinguished scholar Nahum Glatzer — is a veritable encyclopedia in miniature, a source-book of fascinating lore pertaining to every aspect — from the simplest to the most abstruse — of the ancient festival of Passover. Commentaries and essays by such distinguished scholars and thinkers as Solomon Zeitlin, Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, buttress a text thoroughly annotated to provide guidance and illumination from the first Kiddush through the final singing of Had Gadya.

With the help of this Haggadah — beautifully clear, legible, and compact — even a relative newcomer to the patriarchal role can guide his family through the wonderful intricacies of the Passover ritual — whether he chooses to preside over an elaborate traditional Seder, or a simpler, more improvised contemporary celebration.

You may have the Passover Haggadah in either a beautiful, permanent hardcover or a sturdy softcover edition. Both are specially treated to resist grease and stains, and to provide many years of use.

Softcover Haggadahs	Prices
10 or more copies	$1.35 each
5 to 9 copies	$1.55 each
1 to 4 copies	$1.75 each
Hardcover Haggadahs	
10 or more copies	$3.85 each
5 to 9 copies	$4.15 each
1 to 4 copies	$4.50 each



THE JEWISH BOOK CLUB *165 East 56th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022*

Please send me: ___Soft cover Haggadahs @ $___each. Total $_____

___Hard cover Haggadahs @ $___each. Total $_____

Total $_____

☐ Payment enclosed. (The Jewish Book Club pays all packing and shipping charges.)

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____ ZIP _____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Revolutionary America

THE EMERGING NATIONS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By RICHARD B. MORRIS. *Harper & Row. 238 pp. $6.95.*

SEVEN WHO SHAPED OUR DESTINY: THE FOUNDING FATHERS AS REVOLUTIONARIES. By RICHARD B. MORRIS. *Harper & Row. 334 pp. $8.95.*

Reviewed by HERMAN BELZ

WE HAVE become so accustomed in recent years to discounting American political leaders' professions of concern for the rights of all mankind, that we probably find it difficult to take seriously the idea that the American Revolution was not only a struggle for independence but a movement for fundamental political and social change both in America and throughout the world. To credit the notion of revolutionary mission may lead to seeing evidence of it in 20th-century attempts to impose American-style democracy on other countries, particularly ones we defeat in war. The universalism of the American Revolution thus turns out to be another form of imperialism—liberal perhaps in its 18th-century, natural-rights origins, but imperialistic nonetheless. Our war of national liberation, to put it mildly, seems quite beside the point in the context of contemporary world politics.

It is a courageous liberal, therefore, who will argue that the American Revolution, though in many respects unique and the only one among the great revolutions of modern times successfully to establish institutions that made the gains of the revolution permanent, is an apt and relevant model for newly formed nations of today. Challenging the old progressive (and New Left) view that the natural-rights philosophy of the Founding Fathers was mere rationalization of bourgeois economic interests, as well as the neo-conservative thesis that the Revolution was a narrowly conceived effort to secure national independence, Richard B. Morris distinguishes himself as a courageous liberal indeed.

If not axiomatic, it is at least customary to regard the American and French Revolutions as very different sorts of affairs. It is true that both revolutions sought to abolish special class privileges and establish the principle of careers open to talent in politics and society generally. The big difference was that in America—in contrast to European society—this democratizing work had proceeded very far before the Revolution even began. As we have understood for some time now, there was no profound social problem—no poverty, inequality, oppression affecting the masses of the people—that needed to be resolved. Accordingly, the leaders of the American Revolution were able to concentrate upon the political task of founding constitutions of liberty, first in the states in 1776 and then for the country as a whole in 1787. Democratic changes in politics and society took place during the Revolution, but these followed paths clearly set forth in the Colonial period. In France, however, the historic obstacles to democratic social and political transformation were such—and the lack of a political culture based on institutions of self-government was such—as to prevent revolutionaries from achieving the goal of political liberty. Thus the French Revolution resulted in terror and violence and a return to essentially the same kind of authoritarian rule that had existed under the old regime.

IN *The Emerging Nations and the American Revolution* Richard B. Morris dissents from this view by arguing that the American Revolution was a radically transforming social movement like its counterpart in France—and like anti-colonial revolutions in the 20th century. Revolutionary America, Morris contends, had civil disobedience, mob violence, guerrilla warfare, support from the masses, a crisis of legitimacy, an intense nationalism resulting in a

HERMAN BELZ *is professor of history at the University of Maryland.*

National Best Seller
The IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
By ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, Jr.
The Pulitzer Prize-winning historian traces the escalation of Presidential power—and considers what Congress and the people can do about it
"Immensely valuable"
— WASHINGTON POST
"A vital book"
— NEWSWEEK
"Brilliant, provocative"
— CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
"Lucidity...and wit"
— THE NEW YORKER
At your bookstore • $10
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At Passover, Serve YUBAN® The Simcha Coffee

You want everything perfect at your beautiful Seder. So serve Yuban, the "Simcha Coffee."

Yuban is the coffee so rich, your guests will want a second cup.

There's a reason for this very special flavor. It takes some of the world's richest coffee beans —like those sun-ripened in Colombia—to make Yuban so very rich and delicious.

No wonder it's the ideal coffee to grace your holiday table. Just be sure to make enough Yuban for seconds.

The Premium Coffee of General Foods

GF
GENERAL FOODS

כשר לפסח

Certified Kosher for Passover by Rabbi Bernard Levy

Yuban® The Simcha Coffee

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one-party political system, sympathy for radical changes elsewhere, and—not least—a conviction that property values should not be placed above human values. This last was evidenced, says Morris, in "root and branch land reforms" and confiscation of Tory lands that were egalitarian in consequence, if not in design.

Interesting as Morris's analogies are, they seem to be greatly overdrawn. For reasons that I have already suggested, the differences between the American and French Revolutions were—and have always seemed—more important than their similarities. According to R. R. Palmer, who views the two revolutions as part of a general democratic upheaval in the 18th century, the American image of revolution had within a mere fifteen years "faded in a more blinding light on the screen of the world's opinion, and the mild accents of the heralds of liberty had been succeeded by a more ringing and compelling voice." Even less apt is Morris's comparison between revolutionary America and emergent nations of today. The American colonies had never been ruled and exploited in the manner of 19th- and 20th-century colonies, and while the United States was weak in relation to established European powers, its relative weakness was not nearly as great as that of new nations today.

Morris nevertheless tries to establish the relevance of the American Revolution by showing that historically it has been an inspiration and guide for revolutionaries all over the world. His evidence is the enthusiasm and interest which leaders of revolt have shown in employing certain political forms and much of the rhetoric of the American Revolution. The devices, methods, and tactical guides of later revolutions, Morris writes, "can be discovered" in American events of the 1770's. Our revolution determined the ritual observed by most later revolutions: even in Marxist Burma, Morris points out, revolutionaries found it expedient to issue a declaration of independence. What this proves, however, is not that a profound *historical* relationship exists between the American Revolution and other revolutions, but rather that the relationship has been essentially formal and *chronological*. Superficial resemblances and borrowings from the American example of revolutionary nation-making are not enough to make Morris's argument for the historical importance of the American Revolution persuasive.

ALTHOUGH Morris holds that the American and French Revolutions were basically alike, he recognizes their different outcomes. This he explains in part by reference to the character of the people: the Americans, in contrast to the French, kept their sanity and sense of humor, besides being better able to understand political arguments. Above all, however, Morris points to differences in leadership. The leaders of the American Revolution were sober, responsible, nondoctrinaire. Retaining a sense of

Why is this book being sent to Henry Kissinger, Golda Meir and the head of every Arab government?



ARMAGEDDON IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Dana Adams Schmidt

A New York Times Survey Series Book $8.95

Dana Adams Schmidt has a unique reputation in the Middle East. For over 11 years he has been the area's leading American journalist for *The New York Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor*. He knows the people, their governments and the issues. Both sides know him *and* respect him. His book will only increase that respect.

As its publisher, we feel "Armageddon in the Middle East" can add an important new dimension to the search for a lasting peace. Thus we are sending each of these leaders a copy of the book.

We also hope you'll get a copy too. And read it. You'll come away with a new appreciation of just how complex the issues are, how huge the dangers are, what the October War and oil embargo really mean, and just where the path to a permanent peace may lead.

"Armageddon in the Middle East" by Dana Adams Schmidt: read it and you'll be in good company.

THE JOHN DAY CO.
An Intext Publisher

Available at bookstores or send this coupon to:
THE JOHN DAY CO. C-3
257 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10010

Please send me:
___ copies of ARMAGEDDON IN THE MIDDLE EAST by Dana Adams Schmidt at $8.95 each. My check or money order is enclosed. I understand that I may return the book(s) within 10 days if I am not fully satisfied. Add applicable sales tax.

Name_____
Address_____
City_____
State_____ Zip_____

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is All This Worth $4 a Year?










The American
ZIONIST
War, Peace—Or More of the Same!
ELIAHU SALPETER
A Russian Jew in Israel
HAROLD TICKTIN
Senator Jackson and the Jews
CARL GERSHMAN
Emanuel Neumann as Zionist Statesman
JACQUES TORCZYNER
Report on Latin America
JACOB BELLER
Happiness is Growing Tomatoes in Israel
ABRAHAM RABINOVICH
Alfred Werner Takes a Fresh Look at Chagall
Martin Sicker Reflects on Abraham Shem-Tov
Chayym Zoldin on Be Sice's Film on the Holocaust
Published by the Zionist Organization of America
Fifty Cents





Our Cover Tells Only Half the Story. Subscribe Now and Get Our Current Issue Free!

THE AMERICAN ZIONIST
Subscription Department
145 East 32nd Street
New York, N. Y. 10016

NAME_____

STREET_____

CITY_____ STATE_____ ZIP_____

I enclose $4.00 for my one year subscription.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

graphics
museum quality
masters of the 16th to 20th centuries
Send for FREE CATALOG
Dealer in Rare Graphics
MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN
230-M Babcock St.
Brookline, Mass. 02146
(617) 731-2323

AN AMERICAN TRILOGY

Lines On The Death Of A Fisherman

Three Jews In A Tub

Dreamship

Three long novels by J. Inchardi, $10 each novel, post free, from Sirius Books, P.O. 177, Freeport, Maine 04032.

"A fine book...a model of informed scholarship, devotion, and accuracy."
—Sheldon S. Wolin, N.Y. Times Book Review

KARL MARX
HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT
by DAVID McLELLAN

The first complete, balanced, comprehensive biography of Marx since 1920. Illustrated.

$12.50 at bookstores

Harper & Row
1817 10 E. 53rd St., New York 10022



legality and moderation, they were not caught up in a consuming struggle for power as the leaders of revolutionary France were. Ignoring the vastly different social contexts of the two revolutions, Morris declares simply that the French produced no leader of the stature or selfless patriotism of Washington.

IN *Seven Who Shaped Our Destiny,* a series of biographical sketches of Franklin, Washington, John Adams, Jefferson, Madison, Jay, and Hamilton, Morris explores further the nature of America's revolutionary leadership. His avowed purpose is to discover why these "elite, prosperous, and conservative members of the Establishment" started a revolution, and what difference their leadership made to the revolutionary movement. Interesting as the profiles are, they are disappointing in their treatment of these questions. Morris ably narrates the various personal courses of action that led to commitment to the American cause, but he does not consider this evidence in the light of theories of revolutionary psychology that social scientists have offered in recent years. Nor, on the other hand, does he present the American leadership as the product of the mature political culture that had developed through the Colonial period. It is as though the undogmatic realism that characterized the Revolution were uniquely present in these few men. But the very contingency of their emergence from relative obscurity into positions of revolutionary leadership suggests that much of their importance lay in their representativeness, not their uniqueness. Morris concludes anti-climactically that the seven turned against Great Britain out of principled commitment, specific interests, and personal associations and connections. The making of American revolutionaries was, it seems, a rather idiosyncratic affair.

A few years ago, in *The American Revolution Reconsidered,* Morris observed that "Somehow the Founding Fathers do not come through to our present world, to the jet set, the civil-rights demonstrators, the workers on a Ford assembly line. . . ." This, rather than the more substantive questions posed above, seems to be Morris's main concern in *Seven Who Shaped Our Destiny.* Trying to lend contemporaneity to his account, he makes frequent allusion to present-day problems and uses terms like "activist," "establishment," and "radical chic elite." He also tells of the sex lives of our revolutionary leaders. While this approach can become annoying, on the whole it does not detract from the substantial success he achieves in presenting the founders as real people with flaws and weaknesses as well as virtues and strengths. Indeed, one wonders how some of them—Adams, Jefferson, Jay come to mind most immediately—could ever have appeared the charismatic leaders Morris says they were.

A collective portrait emerges of responsible gentlemen, strong-feeling, conservative, and realistic, who, believing that government must rest on the consent of the people, were nevertheless most effective when they dared to run ahead of public opinion and lift the people out of parochial concerns. This judgment may reflect the bias of a disgruntled liberal nostalgic for the New Frontier, but there is substantial accuracy in it. Not so, however, Morris's further conclusion that what held the nation together in 1776—and became the ultimate goal of our national existence—was a promise to eradicate tyranny, poverty, and ignorance throughout the world. This is a species of wishful liberal thinking that makes for neither good history nor compelling politics.

THE relevance of history lies not in drawing forced analogies from present concerns, but rather in understanding the past on its own terms, in relation to its own values and concerns. It consists further in recognizing the extent to which those values and concerns are often irretrievably and irrevocably cut off from our own. We will have learned something from history when liberals like Professor Morris, as well as radicals, stop trying to make America out to be very nearly the key to all progress in the modern world.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We put these 21 best-selling books into the first issues of 1 indispensable new magazine



Introducing Book Digest

Selections and Condensations from the Best Non-Fiction Books

The nucleus of the contemporary American idea explosion has shifted from the original magazine article to the non-fiction book. Each year, hard-cover publishers release over 25,000 such books, the most vital of which generate the headlines and debates which engulf our minds.

Bringing the superior products of this prodigious output to the public has tested the skill of the industry. First the hard cover book itself, then the paperback and the book clubs extended the reach of the best minds into the homes of Americans.

BOOK DIGEST is the latest and we believe, the most revolutionary step in that process. This new magazine has been designed to bring you the core of the most exciting and significant non-fiction books of each publishing season, books that you have heard about, but may have missed.

Some of these are "best sellers" in the conventional sense, others in the opinion of our editors, are the "best" of the new. Some will be published in BOOK DIGEST prior to their publication, others a short time after—all in the timely period when books make news.

The technique behind BOOK DIGEST is simple, yet it demands thoughtful editorial work. Our editors scour the publishers' offerings, read the new books while still in galley form, seeking out those worthy of appearing in BOOK DIGEST. Others are evaluated at publication time itself. Once chosen as a BOOK DIGEST selection, the manuscript is edited for publication, either by publishing significant portions of the book virtually intact, or by preparing a carefully-edited condensation of the "core" material.

To maintain the integrity of our selections and condensations, we always seek the collaboration of the author. In every case, the edited BOOK DIGEST selection is entirely in the author's original words and style.

Each issue brings you 10 to 12 provocative new non-fiction book selections and condensations in a well-designed, well-illustrated digest-sized magazine of over 200 pages.

In the Charter Issues

In our first issues of BOOK DIGEST, you will be reading selections or condensations from these much talked-about best-selling and best-reading new non-fiction books:

- **The Imperial Presidency** *by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.*
- **Real Lace** *by Stephen Birmingham.*
- **Pentimento** *by Lillian Hellman.*
- **The Making of the President** *by Theodore H. White.*
- **Marilyn** *by Norman Mailer.*
- **Upstairs at the White House** *by J. B. West and Mary L. Kotz.*
- **Economics and the Public Purpose** *by John Kenneth Galbraith.*
- **The Feminist Papers** *by Alice S. Rossi.*
- **Kind and Usual Punishment** *by Jessica Mitford.*
- **Cosell** *by Cosell.*
- **The Anderson Papers** *by Jack Anderson.*
- **The Mind of Adolf Hitler** *by Dr. Walter Langer.*
- **Why Johnny Can't Add** *by Morris Kline.*
- **Stalin as Revolutionary** *by Robert C. Tucker.*
- **I Never Danced at the White House** *by Art Buchwald.*
- **The Secret Life of Plants** *by Peter Tompkins & Christopher Bird.*
- **A Strategy for Daily Living** *by Ari Kiev, M.D.*
- **The L. A. Times Natural Foods Cook Book** *by Jeanne Voltz.*
- **Sexual Suicide** *by George S. Gilder.*
- **How to Save Your Life** *by Earl Ubell.*

No subject is too direct, too complex or sacrosanct for BOOK DIGEST. Its selections and condensations will involve the reader in the vital debates in the variety of disciplines that shape our lives today—politics, foreign affairs, history, psychology, the arts, biography, science, economics, business, education, autobiography, social criticism. Equally important, all points of view are represented.

BOOK DIGEST is handy; it is inexpensive; it is easy to read (not because it is simplified, but because of its brevity). It offers hundreds of dollars of value in one magazine.

Plus Features, Columns, Reviews



BOOK DIGEST also publishes service material and criticism to make the non-fiction world of books come alive. In a special supplement, *Reviews and Recommendations,* BOOK DIGEST reprints vital portions of major reviews. Each issue, the author of a best-selling selection is the subject of a taped "Conversation." A guest columnist comments on some aspect of writing or publishing. A "People" feature focuses on those who write and who make books important in our society.

Complimentary Copy For Charter Subscribers

A complimentary copy of the first issue of BOOK DIGEST is being reserved for you as part of a special offer for charter subscribers. By filling out the coupon below, you will receive a year's subscription (six bi-monthly issues) for only $5; you may cancel without obligation within 14 days if you are not fully satisfied with BOOK DIGEST'S charter issue.

Book Digest magazine C1M563

730 5th Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10019

Please send me my complimentary copy of the charter issue of BOOK DIGEST and enroll me as a subscriber for one year at a cost of $5.00 for six bi-monthly issues.

I understand that if I am not fully satisfied with the charter issue, I may cancel without obligation within 14 days and keep my complimentary copy.

(No need to send cash. We will be happy to bill you later.)

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

Reserve Your Complimentary Charter Issue Now

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Participatory Theology

THE SEDUCTION OF THE SPIRIT: THE USES AND MISUSES OF PEOPLE'S RELIGION. By HARVEY COX. *Simon & Schuster. 350 pp. $8.95.*

Reviewed by ALAN L. MINTZ

HARVEY COX'S first book, *The Secular City*, sold a half-million copies and was the most widely discussed book on religion of the 1960's. In that work Cox set himself against the increasingly common portrayal of the city as an environment hostile to man; instead, he presented it as a symbol of all the positive gains man had secured for himself in the modern age. According to Cox, the city's anonymity released man from the oppressive determination of the law; the mobility it offered delivered him from the provincialism of fixed community; its air of pragmatism and its profaneness centered his attention on this-worldly means of improving his lot; and the bureaucratic nature of the city's organization provided a model of rational planning and the fair distribution of services. In theological terms learned from Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Cox celebrated urban life as the cutting edge of secularization: man learning to rely on himself in a post-mythical and post-metaphysical age.

For a book taken so seriously in its time—it became a genuine cultural event when it was feted in the Christian intellectual community by the appearance of a companion volume, *The Secular City Debate*—it seems to have left no echo in subsequent discussions of theology or urban theory. Perhaps this is not surprising, since *The Secular City* was essentially a popular presentation of issues previously treated by others with greater originality and sophistication. The overwhelming enthusiasm with which it was received, however, reveals a great deal about cultural sensibility in the 60's. To the growing panic over life in the cities and to the sense of despair about religion, *The Secular City* answered that precisely what had been most feared would become the means of deliverance. The bad news of modern life, through a shift of perspective, could become the good news of the Gospels.

WITH the publication in 1969 of *The Feast of Fools* the direction of Cox's thought changed substantially. In an extraordinary *volte-face* he restored to grace all those categories which, measured against the grown-up standard of secularity, had previously been found wanting: myth, ritual, play, comedy, festivity, fantasy, vision. Disenchanted with the life of pragmatic politics, Cox dissociated himself from the values of anonymity, mobility, and bureaucracy and turned instead toward nonpolitical spheres

ALAN L. MINTZ *is an editor of* Response *magazine; he is currently studying in Israel.*

How America's social conflicts are fought out and resolved in its classrooms.

The church-state question.
Decentralization.
Integration and community control.
Over the past 150 years, many of the social and political conflicts dividing America have been joined in the nation's classrooms.
Wave after wave of disadvantaged groups scrambling for recognition have used the school system as an arena for challenging the social system.

That's why, in writing the first modern history of the New York City public schools, Diane Ravitch has done nothing less than write a sharply focused social and political study of the city itself.

From the violent Catholic-Protestant clashes of the 1840's through the controversy over progressive education to the bitter confrontation of Ocean Hill-Brownsville — Diane Ravitch "provides an insight into the city's factions and fabric that should be indispensable to students of its politics as well as of its schools."*

And indispensable, as well, to observers of the national scene. For the great questions that have faced New York City's schools are national questions, too. And *The Great School Wars* sheds significant light on them.

"Fascinating, well-researched, and well-written." —Nathan Glazer, Harvard University

THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS
New York City, 1805-1973
by Diane Ravitch
$12.95 at all bookstores

*Fred M. Hechinger

BASIC BOOKS, INC. 10 East 53rd St., New York 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of experience. Yet though the focus had shifted, Cox's interest in celebration persisted: *The Feast of Fools* was intended in every sense to be a celebration of celebration. Modern society, Cox argued, had been impoverished by the decline of festive moments that would allow man to disengage himself from work and to affirm life. On the level of imagination, the counterpart to festivity was fantasy; in fables, tales, and stories man criticized the present conditions of life by dreaming of alternative pasts and futures. Religion, in this scheme, was the collective fantasy of mankind.

The Seduction of the Spirit, Harvey Cox's latest book, continues and extends these concerns. In it he opposes "stories," the spontaneous creation of the religion of the people, to "signals," the fixed and received codes of the organized church. Although a balance between the two is the sign of healthy faith, modern society has, sadly, repressed the storytelling urge. Telling stories, and in particular telling one's own story, are ways of protecting the individual's sense of uniqueness—Cox calls this sense "interiority"—from the collectivizing regime of modern life. Cox takes "interiority" seriously also as a methodological principle for the writing of theology: the literary form of theology he believes should be autobiography. Too many recent religious writers have failed to illuminate the ways in which their lives and their ideas have engendered one another, or even to document the personal element in their search for the holy.

Cox's own search, as he records it in a series of anecdotal encounters, has taken him through the "liberated" zones of modern culture: liberal Marxism in Prague and East Berlin, popular folk-Christianity in Africa and Latin America, encounter groups at Esalen, the technological fantasies of Disneyland, the dialectics of the women's movement, the utopian planning of new cities, etc. Considered as a whole, he argues, these various elements constitute a kind of "people's religion"; the church has been calcifying, but religion itself and new religious

SIX SPOT LIGHTS ON AFRICA



Clash of Titans
Africa and US Foreign Policy
by Edward W. Chester
"Why, after all we have done for them, are most African nations suspicious of us?" This sweeping book tells why—and what we have done to them, as slave traders, diplomats, capitalists and missionaries. A classic in its field.
June **Hardbound $12.95**

Burundi: The Tragic Years
by Thomas Melady
Genocide—reported, not by a journalist, but by the US Ambassador, now permitted by the State Department to give the first full account of the Burundi blood-bath of 1972—which may happen again unless Melady's warnings are heeded.
June **Hardbound $4.95**

African Culture and the Christian Church
by Aylward Shorter
Invaluable study of the importance of African anthropology to the work of the Christian Church in that vast continent. A firm basis for understanding the interaction between the Christian religions and African secular and religious cultures.
February **Paperback $6.50**

Development: Lessons for the Future
by Thomas Melady
and Robert Suhartono
This authoritative book analyzes the mistakes which both the aid-giving and the aid-receiving peoples of Africa would like to forget. But it is also an antidote to the present pessimism of the *have* nations and the near despair gripping the *have nots*.
Hardbound $6.95

African Traditional Religion
by E. Bolaji Idowu
This book strongly sets forth the nature and the structure of the religion traditional within Africa and then shows how this religion is growing and must be understood if there is to be meaningful dialogue with other religious beliefs.
Hardbound $5.95

Basic Community in the African Churches
by Marie-France Jassy
An examination by a cultural anthropologist of religious splinter groups in East Africa which have broken off from the parent church. The dynamics of how and why religious communities are formed has relevance for the many US Christians in quest of community.
Paperback $4.95

Purchase at your local bookstore or write:

ORBIS BOOKS
MARYKNOLL, NY 10545

CEJWIN CAMPS
PORT JERVIS, N.Y.

Pioneer in Creative Jewish Cultural Camping
Sports, swimming, boating, canoe trips, overnights, electronics, photography, nature, arts, day trips, etc. Tutoring. Jewish Culture, Sabbath dietary laws. Mature staff, resident Doctors and Nurses. Well-maintained facilities.

56th Year
(Non-Commercial)

Boys and Girls 6-16
Co-Educational Activities
Individualized programs for each age group advancing to CIT, Leadership Camp and Israel trip.
Brochure: Cejwin, 1124 Broadway N.Y., N.Y. 10010; (212) 725-9440
July $435 • Aug. $385
8 weeks $795

Dr. A. P. Schoolman, Founder and President. Rabbi Jerome Abrams, Director

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW HARPER PAPERBACKS

THE MYTH OF THE MIDDLE CLASS
Notes on Affluence and Equality
Richard Parker

Foreword by G. William Domhoff. "As an economist thoroughly conversant with the basic income data, Richard Parker has no trouble at all demonstrating crisply and angrily that for most Americans life is financially a precarious affair."—Robert Lekachman, *Washington Post*
"An excellent handbook on the maldistribution of American wealth."—Michael Cunneen, *The Nation*
CN/346 $2.95



SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL
Economics as if People Mattered
E. F. Schumacher

Introduction by Theodore Roszak. "Dr. Schumacher is certainly an expert, an economist of distinction....About many things Dr. Schumacher has good things to say . . . here argued with remarkable force, well-supported by hard facts and figures, and stated so apothegmatically as to tempt a reviewer to immoderate quotation."—*Times Literary Supplement*
TB/1778 $3.75

For a complete catalog, write
Harper & Row
Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

symbols are being produced all the time. For Cox the primary task of the theologian in the face of people's religion is, simply, to learn from it: divesting himself of his sense of doctrinal superiority, the theologian comes to participate and to be initiated. Theology then becomes a record of personal experience in which the theologian distills from any given cultural phenomenon the particular religious truth it seems to be affirming.

Thus, at a folk Mass in Mexico, Cox finds in the popular veneration of Mary a model for female religiosity and a symbol of a receptive, nature-related mode of religious experience. At the Esalen Institute in California he enters the mineral baths naked with the other members of his encounter group and in the course of a group massage has a mystical vision of the "oneness of the self, other and All." After describing the planning and execution of a multimedia Easter rock Mass in which Cox himself took a central part he explains how contemporary symbols of rebirth helped him to realize the meaning of the Resurrection.

THERE is no doubt that Cox is on to something in stressing the potent combination of theology and autobiography: one thinks of great writers—Augustine, Newman, and Kierkegaard among them—who have produced masterworks in this mode. Cox's own relationship to this tradition is an interesting one; although he writes in the genre his goal seems clearly to stand it on its head. The customary theme of Christian autobiography has been the movement from some form of paganism to Christianity, from unbelief to belief, punctuated by an intensely experienced moment of conversion. The "I" of the writer, mired in the strain of idolatry particular to his times, wrestles with Christianity's call to faith and its promise of a salvation beyond time.

Cox has turned all of this around. Christianity, rather than becoming his eventual destination, has served instead as the point of departure in a career which has moved steadily toward the embrace, if not exactly of paganism then of the cultural fashions of the moment. Cox was raised as a Baptist in a small Pennsylvania town and was later ordained a Baptist minister. But since then he has traveled very far in another direction. Viewed in succession, the stages of his output make this movement very clear. *The Secular City,* in the early 60's, was a theological encomium to the optmism of the New Frontier; *The Feast of Fools* in 1969 constituted a defense of the hippie ethic which disavowed the importance of work and seriousness; and now *The Seduction of the Spirit* comes before us as an apology for the various forms of "turning inward" prevalent among former political activists: meditation, encounter, mixed-media entertainment, etc.

Cox's celebration of the New is irresponsible in a number of ways. From an academic as well as a working theologian—he is a professor of divinity at Harvard—we are entitled to expect care in the handling of historical religious materials and a sensitivity to historical echoes, but Cox is capable of such formulations as this: "Easter in the New Testament faith celebrates the liberation of all men and women from 'sin and death.' 'Sin' is understood as whatever chains people to the past, and 'death' as whatever terrifies them about the future." If a theologian is to be both a creative advocate of modern realities and a responsible representative of his faith then the acts of integration he performs must be honest, sophisticated, and above all responsible; Cox's efforts at combining the old and the new, however, seem more like promiscuous couplings whose offspring die at birth. Witness such newly coined terms as "experimental liturgics," "participant hermeneutics," or "ludic consciousness." Worst of all, however, is the way Cox panders to anything which manages to get itself called "liberating." Within the scope of the Christian mission to the world Cox has apparently taken as his special assignment the ministry to the New, rushing to assure the exotic pagans that far from being separated from the church, they form its vanguard.

What is ultimately at stake in all

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

this is the question of theology's relationship to culture. According to the model Cox offers, the task of theology is to celebrate the New, to identify those phenomena which promise to be the cutting edge of liberation and passionately to affirm them. As a result, his works constitute a kind of history of the popular adversary culture in America over the past fifteen years, recording the passage from politics to ecstasy and, now, to inwardness. But there is an alternative model, one which places theology in a critical relation to culture—and one which Cox seems largely unaware of. Taking seriously the possibility of idolatry, such a theology examines social phenomena by holding them up to the light and discerning carefully which of them hasten the Kingdom of God and which impede its coming. Critical theology possesses both a sense of history and a vision of God, and it is against these standards that it judges society. Cox, with his rehearsals of the latest nostrums, seems in the end little more than a public-relations official of the *Zeitgeist*, department of religious affairs.

At the Brink

THE DEVIL AND JOHN FOSTER DULLES. By TOWNSEND HOOPES. *Atlantic-Little, Brown. 562 pp. $15.00.*

Reviewed by EDWARD N. LUTTWAK

THE full-length biography is a serviceable if somewhat elaborate tool of political exposition, and Mr. Hoopes is candid in revealing to us right at the beginning exactly what kind of ax he means to grind: ". . . It seemed necessary to ask how and why America had come to press its quite legitimate concern for freedom and world order to extremes that increasingly failed to meet the tests of interest or reason, proportion, or morality." The occasion, needless to say, being Vietnam *circa* 1970. A few paragraphs later we learn that the guilty party was John Foster Dulles; indeed Dulles is presented as the devil-preacher of "categorical anti-Communism and limitless strategic concern" who was the ultimate cause of it all.

Mr. Hoopes is not one of those tiresome New Left historians whose low skill in fabricating the evidence is frequently betrayed by unconquerable ignorance, but he does share some of their premises: unless prevented by domestic constraints, Malenkov, Khrushchev, Nasser, *et al.*, are generally represented as seeking accommodations with the United States while Dulles is forever rejecting their advances out of suspicion, or cowardly deference to the prejudices of the Republican Right.

The discussion of these "missed opportunities," always Exhibit A in the case against Dulles, reveals a peculiar inability to benefit from hindsight, so that even after almost two decades Mr. Hoopes manages to fall into traps that Dulles avoided, whether by luck, suspicion, or just possibly because of an experienced shrewdness that even Mr. Hoopes must sometimes acknowledge. Thus Mr. Hoopes's long and detailed treatment of the Middle East (142 pages out of 505) is predicated on the fundamental assumption that if only Dulles had done the right thing, a satisfactory arrangement *could* have been reached with Nasser and his Arab radical-nationalist following.

It never seems to occur to him that the essence of Arab radicalism may have been precisely to strike postures of defiance against the West, and that much of Nasser's policy was a search for confrontations with the West that would be as noisy as possible, without being really dangerous. Mr. Hoopes fails to recognize that in those days, when the Russians had not yet been recognized as merely another species of Westerner, the basic equation of Arab radicalism was Russian-good/American-bad, and that American attempts at accommodation were therefore bound to fail. Any bazaar analyst would quickly expose any pro-Arab moves in Washington as sinister plots

EDWARD N. LUTTWAK *is visiting professor at the School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. Mr. Luttwak is the author of* Coup d'Etat *and* A Dictionary of Modern War.

NEW HARPER TORCHBOOKS

TIME OF NEED
Forms of Imagination in the Twentieth Century
William Barrett

"Examining Camus, Hemingway, Faulkner, Kafka, Joyce, Hesse, and even E. M. Forster—as well as Giacometti, Henry Moore, Picasso, and others in the visual arts—[Barrett] shows them moving beyond rational meaning.... For all the pages that have been written about them, his interpretations of these artists are startlingly fresh and provocative."—ANATOLE BROYARD, *New York Times*

TB/1754 $2.95

THE END OF THE MODERN AGE
Allen Wheelis

"The clearest essay of cross-currents of scientific and humanistic values so far.... In little more than 100 pages of masterful, often beautiful prose, Wheelis provides a brief, well-documented history of science, distinguishes between the functions of faith and reason, separates consequences from the fact of knowledge, and without meanness or fear delineates the perils of man's present condition. This is a work of great vision."—*Choice*

TB/1752 $2.95

For a complete catalog, write
Harper & Row
Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or at least as deceptive attempts to conceal a basic malevolence.

Thus the United States earned no real good will by forcing the British, French, and Israelis to discontinue the Suez adventure and give up its fruits, while the Russians, who did very little, received the acclaim of the Arab world. Had Dulles gone through with the offer to finance the Aswan Dam, it is most unlikely that the arrangement would have lasted: the urge to attack America and her interests was irrepressible. In fact, had Nasser reached an accommodation, he would probably have lost much of his appeal to radical-nationalist sentiment and many would have regarded him as just another puppet *à la* Nuri es-Said.

BUT the real charge against Dulles is his apparent military activism. Once again Mr. Hoopes discusses the Dullesian strategy of "massive retaliation" in curiously dated terms. This *declared* policy of calculated ambiguity is here presented in crude and literal terms: Mr. Hoopes's Dulles is seemingly ready to use nuclear weapons to protect any interests, however marginal, against any Communist aggression, however indirect. It was all very well for contemporary critics such as Robert E. Osgood, the sometime high priest of "limited war," to take massive retaliation as literally as possible in arguing for more powerful conventional armaments, especially ground forces, in opposition to Eisenhower's budget-cutting "new look" defense policy. But unlike the contemporary critics, Mr. Hoopes has no right to ignore the actual record, the manner in which Dulles in fact harnessed military power to his foreign policy.

Mr. Hoopes rightly stresses Dulles's total lack of interest in the nuts and bolts of weaponry and he also acknowledges Dulles's almost pacifist pre-war attitudes. And yet he fails to see that Dulles combined a fundamental opposition to any use of force, with a determination to get the utmost in the way of real political leverage out of American military power, partly in order to avoid having to use any of it anywhere. It is not merely by coincidence that the administration he served was the only one between Hoover and Nixon that managed to stay out of any hot war, the only one that never sent a GI to die abroad. Nor was this due to Eisenhower alone, as Mr. Hoopes would have us believe. Clearly war could only be avoided by either appeasement or manipulation, and Dulles's whole policy was precisely to manipulate the symbolism of military power. Hence his "treaty mania," which, as has been pointed out long ago, reflected Dulles's desire to draw *clear* lines of demarcation across every "gray area" in order to avoid another Korea brought about by Russian probing and American indirection.

Nor does Mr. Hoopes acknowledge Dulles's most important personal achievement. Having seen the collapse of Wilson's post-World War I policy at close quarters, having seen Acheson's foundering in the last stage of the Truman administration, Dulles learned a lesson that others were to disregard at their peril: the first duty of an American Secretary of State is to generate broad-based public support for an active foreign policy. Public opinion anywhere can only respond to threats that are immediate and vivid, and in America's case distance and size generally insure that threats are neither of these things.

By portraying the variegated confrontations with the Soviet Union and China in terms of *unavoidable* struggle with evil, by taking every opportunity to address mainstream opinion in countless speeches and impromptu interviews cast in mainstream language, Dulles harnessed the force of moral compulsion to persuade the public to support an active foreign policy, presented in moralistic terms. In the process, he overcame the new-isolationist potential of the Korean war, silenced the old isolationists in the Republican Right, and built up a vast fund of public support for the same policy of containment that Truman and Acheson ultimately could no longer sell (except that the similarity was carefully disguised by loose talk about "liberation"). Kennedy's foreign policy was sustained by this inherited legacy; Johnson was reduced to bankruptcy over Vietnam and Nixon, true to form, resorted to fraudulence (e.g., the Cambodian bombing episode). Not only did those who followed him fail to replenish the indispensable capital of public support, but they also went to war, which Dulles was obviously determined never to do unless to defend visibly central interests. Instead of threatening unspecified and unlimited mayhem as Dulles did, they were seduced by the plausibility of a policy of graduated force, in which force became feasible precisely because it was limited.

DULLES has had a bad press with the intelligentsia because of his graceless manner and because of his despicable pandering to McCarthyism—a calculated political act, as Mr. Hoopes makes clear. But his achievement cannot be denied, nor can one follow Mr. Hoopes in attributing all the good in his policies to Eisenhower's ". . . humane, practical wisdom" and all that was bad to Mr. Hoopes's own devil. That is why this well-written and amply documented book is so very misguided. Dulles was always reluctant to speak with the Russians, but was always eager to preach to Buffalo, Dayton, and Wichita. No wonder that he was disliked in Cambridge and Manhattan.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Only Venice is Venice.
Only V.O. is V.O.



There is only one Venice. One city of canals and lagoons, where beauty is the hallmark of all creation.

Generation after generation, for a thousand years, Venetians have commissioned the greatest artists of their time to embellish their homes and public buildings.

Leonardo da Vinci, Titian, Tintoretto, Giovanni Bellini—the Renaissance masters perfected their art here, and left it as a legacy, a monument to the betterment of the human spirit. And so the city has accepted it. In carnivals and celebrations, festivals and holidays, the people renew old traditions. They gather as they have for centuries, for small talk and philosophy, symphony and espresso.

And through the years, only Venice is Venice. Europe's greatest drawing room. A treasure house of art and architecture. A one-of-a-kind creation.

Like Venice, Seagram's V.O. is also a one-of-a-kind creation. Through the years, V.O. has stood apart, as a whisky uncompromising in quality, with a tradition of craftsmanship that has made it The First Canadian in smoothness. The First Canadian in lightness. And The First Canadian in popularity throughout the world.

Only Venice is Venice. Only V.O. is V.O. All the others come after.

Seagram's V.O.
The First Canadian.

CANADIAN WHISKY—A BLEND OF SELECTED WHISKIES. 6 YEARS OLD. 86.8 PROOF. SEAGRAM DISTILLERS CO., N.Y.C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


Sometimes when a man has worked very hard
and succeeded, he enjoys ordering things just because they're expensive.
Johnnie Walker
Black Label Scotch
YEARS 12 OLD
JOHNNIE WALKER® BLACK LABEL 12 YEAR OLD BLENDED SCOTCH WHISKY, 86.8 PROOF. BOTTLED IN SCOTLAND. IMPORTED BY SOMERSET IMPORTERS, LTD., N.Y., N.Y.

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED